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PERMISSIBLE SELF-DEFENSE TARGETING
AND THE DEATH OF BIN LADEN
JORDAN J. PAUST
My recent article on Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and
Permissibility of Use of Drones in Pakistan, I and writings of the vast majority of
text-writers, 2 demonstrates that use of measures of self-defense against armed
attacks by non-state actors is permissible under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter and relevant customary international law even though the direct effects of
responsive force will most often occur in a foreign country.3 Nothing in Article 51
of the Charter or in general patterns of pre- and post-Charter practice and opinio
juris4 requires special express consent of the state from which the non-state actor
armed attacks emanate and on whose territory a self-defense action takes place
Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston.
1. Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and PermissibilitY of U.S. Use of
Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237 (2010).
2. Id. at 238-39, 239 n.3.
3. See, e.g., id. at 238-49, 279-80; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 354-55 (2nd ed.
2005); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 183-85, 204-06, 208 (4th ed. 2005).
If responsive force is directed merely against the non-state actors who are perpetrating ongoing armed
attacks, the use of force against them in a foreign state in compliance with Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter is not a use of force against the foreign state, against its territory, or in violation of its territorial
"integrity" within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the Charter. See e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 256, 258-
59, 279. Importantly, there are no geographic limits with respect to armed attacks that trigger the
inherent right of self-defense. For example, an armed attack by a group that initiates a war between a
nation or people and a state, a belligerency, or an insurgency within a single state can justify use of
responsive armed force in self-defense. See also Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against
Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533, 534 (2002) [hereinafter Paust,
Use of Armed Force] ("nothing in the language of Article 51 requires that such an armed attack be
carried out by another state, nation, or belligerent, as opposed to armed attacks by various other non-
state actors... "); Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process.
The Bangladesh Experience, II VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 11 n.39 (1978) (where an armed attack
occurs within a state by a government against a people undergoing a process of self-determination, such
people should have the right of self-defense and the right to seek self-determination assistance in
accordance with the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter). Concerning the role of various non-
state actors in the international legal process, see, Jordan J. Paust, Non-State Actor Participation in
International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 977 (2001).
4. It is well recognized that patterns of practice and expectation need only be generally shared for
the existence of a customary international legal norm. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, JON M. VAN DYKE,
LINDA A. MALONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 93-95, 100, 105-08 (3d ed.
2009); CASSESE, supra note 3, at 162. Additionally, the evolving meaning or content of a treaty is
based partly in the ordinary meaning of terms as supplemented by the object and purpose of the treaty
and general patterns of practice and opiniojuris over time. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
art. 31(1), (3)(b)-(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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against the non-state actor.5 Additionally, it would be demonstrably incorrect to
claim that a state has no right to defend itself outside its own territory absent (1)
express foreign state consent, 6 (2) attribution or imputation of non-state actor
attacks to the foreign state when the foreign state is in control of non-state actor
attacks,7 or (3) the existence of a relevant international or non-international armed
conflict.8
I. THE SELF-DEFENSE PARADIGM
From either a moral or policy-serving perspective, a new requirement should
not be imposed that there be either express foreign state consent or attribution to
the foreign state in contexts where neither exists and when non-state actors engage
in continual armed attacks that kill a number of persons, result in serious bodily
injury of others, and are designed to spread terror. Such a new requirement would:
most likely encourage violence and functional safe havens for those who
initiate violence against other human beings. This would not appear to
serve peace and security when such armed attacks are occurring or
peace more generally over time when various non-state actors are
prepared to engage in transnational acts of terroristic violence without
regard to peace, territorial boundaries, the dictates of humanity, or the
dignity of their victims.
9
With respect to the need to serve various policies at stake in the context of
continual non-state actor armed attacks, including peace, security, human rights,
and effective opposition to international crime, it is important to note that state
sovereignty
is not absolute under international law or impervious to its reach,
territorial integrity of the state is merely one of the values preferred in
the U.N. Charter, and permissible measures of self-defense under
Article 51 of the Charter that are reasonably necessary and proportionate
against actual armed violence must necessarily override the general
5. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 249-58, 279; Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to
Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF YORAM DINSTEIN 167-
68, 176-77 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007).
6. Schmitt supra note 5, at 167-168, 176-177.
7. DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 206.
8. Paust, supra note 1, at 251-52, 258-61, 279-80.
9. Id. at 251 n.37. If a selective response to non-state actor terroristic attacks would not be
permitted, there would be a danger of promoting a type of "one-sided warfare" that Professor Richard
Falk rightly decries in other contexts where "the perpetrator inflicts unspeakable pain while facing no
risk of retaliation and is generally insulated from accountability under law." Richard Falk, Torture,
War, and the Limits of Liberal Legality, in THE UNITED STATES AND TORTURE: INTERROGATION,
INCARCERATION, AND ABUSE 119, 122 (Marjorie Cohn ed., 2011). Professor Falk provides important
criticism of non-defensive "one-sided warfare" engaged in by the United States and seeks "to offer an
alternative approach to state violence to that taken by liberal legalists" who "could argue plausibly that
one-sided warfare remains lawful so long as military targets are selected in a manner that respects
civilian innocence." Id. at 123, 129.
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impermissibility that attaches to armed intervention.10
One should also note that the self-defense paradigm is different from both a
mere law of war or law enforcement paradigm. Self-defense targetings and
captures can occur with respect to the following groups: (1) direct participants in
armed attacks (DPAA) whether or not an armed conflict exists that would also
allow the targeting and capture of persons who are combatants; (2) civilians who
are direct participants in hostilities (DPH); or (3) civilians who are unprivileged
fighters engaged in a continuous combat function.1" Whether or not lawful use of
force in self-defense is undertaken in time of war or relative peace, selective use of
armed force as part of permissible self-defense is not simplistically "law
enforcement" or limited by what would only be authorized during law
enforcement.
Concerning the war in Afghanistan and the targeting and capture of leaders
and other members of al Qaeda and the Taliban in parts of Pakistan, few would
disagree with Professor Ved Nanda's observation that the defacto theatre of war or
"geographical region of conflict" has expanded to include parts of Pakistan.1 2
There is a porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan that neither country
effectively controls. For several years, quite deadly, injurious, and continuous "al
Qaeda and Taliban armed attacks [have been] planned, initiated, coordinated, or
directed from inside Afghanistan and Pakistan on U.S. military personnel in
Afghanistan who are engaged in an international armed conflict."'' 3 The theatre of
war has expanded to locations where persons directly participate in hostilities.
14
Professor Nanda has also recognized that self-defense targetings and captures
may occur "outside the geographical region of armed conflict" or "outside the area
of hostilities," so long as there is strict compliance with general principles of
necessity and proportionality that govern the permissible use of lawful measures of
self-defense.1 5 Of course, I agree that lawful measures of self-defense can occur
10. Paust, supra note 1, at 256-57 & nn.47-48.
11. See id. at 260-64, 271-72, 275, 279-80.
12. See id at 254-355 & n.44; Ved P. Nanda, International Law Implications of the United States'
"War on Terror, " 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 513, 533 (2009) ("One could justify the targeted
strikes by the US in Pakistan on the ground that the geographical region of conflict stretches from
Afghanistan to Pakistan It is recommended that the Obama Administration review its policy
authorizing the killing of suspected terrorists outside the geographical region of armed conflict ... and
if killings are sought outside the area of hostilities the 'proportionality' element be strictly adhered to,
and if terrorists can be apprehended killings should be a last resort.").
13. Paust, supra note 1, at 250-51, 254-55. With respect to breaches of the neutrality of Pakistan,
it is obvious that these have occurred at the hands of certain members of a] Qaeda and the Taliban who
have misused neutral territory for their war-making efforts. Breaches of neutrality by public or private
actors are international crimes under customary international law. Henfield's Case, It F. Cas. 1099,
1119-20 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793). Such a misuse of neutral territory supplements the permissibility of self-
defense targetings of members of al Qaeda and the Taliban inside of Pakistan.
14. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, art. 51(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol I].
15. Nanda, supra note 12, at 533.
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outside of an actual theatre of war against those who are directly participating in an
ongoing process of armed attacks against the United States and/or its embassies,
military personnel, and other nationals abroad. 16 For this reason, the self-defense
paradigm is recognizably different from a war paradigm; the right of self-defense
allows the targeting of persons wherever such forms of direct participation occur. 17
Quite clearly, significant armed attacks or attempted armed attacks have emanated
from parts of Yemen, thereby permitting self-defense targeting of direct
participants in Yemen. 18
II. THE PRINCIPLES OF DISTINCTION, NECESSITY, AND PROPORTIONALITY
When using responsive force in self-defense, either outside the context of an
armed conflict or during an armed conflict, international legal principles of
distinction among persons, reasonable necessity, and proportionality will condition
the permissibility of responsive conduct. 19 From my perspective, armed drones are
merely a particular type of weapons system. The same general principles,
therefore, that condition the use of armed force in self-defense or conduct during
war must be applied to the use of armed drones. If anything, some armed drones
appear to have the capability of being "smart" weapons - weapons that can allow
more precise forms of targeting2 - and can avoid indiscriminate and unnecessary
16. Paust, supra note 1, at 244-49, 252, 255, 258-60, 279-80. The right of self-defense continues
at least as long as the process of armed attacks continues. Clearly, armed attacks on our nationals in
Afghanistan have continued for a number of years. Importantly, these continual and deadly attacks on
our nationals as part of an overall process of armed attacks against the United States and its nationals
for many years are different than merely one-time or sporadic small-scale attacks of minor significance.
Importantly also, one should focus on the process of attacks (if such exists) as opposed to restricting
one's view merely to each individual attack that forms part of the ongoing process of attacks. See, e.g.
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Uganda), Judgment, 146 (Dec. 19, 2005).
Thus, one should use a movie camera as opposed to a single snapshot in order to realistically view and
assess the process of ongoing attacks and the use of responsive force. Paust, Use of Armed Force,
supra note 3, at 533-35 & n.6, 536 & n.9.
17. Paust, supra note 1, at 253-54 n.41; see Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The
Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 565 (1999); DINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 247.
18. Airport Terror Scare, Yemen Linked Yet Again to Threat U.S. Increasingly Concerned over al-
Qaida Branch, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 30, 2010, at A19; Peter Baker, Magazine Preview; Obama's War
Over Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at MM 30; Peter Finn & Gregg Miller, Plane Bombs More
Lethal than in Dec. 25 Attempt, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2010, at A3; Eric Lichtblau, The People We Pay
to Look Over Our Shoulders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2010, at C2; Mark Mazzetti, et al., Bomb Plot Shows
Key Role Played by Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at Al; Mark Mazzetti & Robert F. Worth,
U.S. Fearing Yemen Terrorists, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 31, 2010, at Al.
19. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 270-76; INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at
615(1987).
20. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 274; Eyal Benvenisti, The Legal Battle to Define the Law on
Transnational Asymmetric Warfare, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 339, 353, n.40 (2010) (noting that
computer programs can provide specific estimates of incidental deaths). It should also be noted that
drones armed with significant firepower are not so-called battlefield weapons that can only be used in
the context of war. Restrictions on use of weapons during self-defense will involve nuanced application
of the general principles of distinction, reasonable necessity, and proportionality, as explained below.
Laurie R. Blank & Benjamin R. Farley, Characterizing US Operations in Pakistan: Is the United States
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death, injury, or suffering.2' Whether a weaponized drone is "smart" will depend
in part on what weapons are placed on the drone and the circumstances
surrounding actual use.
In the future, drones as small as a dragonfly could be used for very precise
targetings. For these reasons, it is evident that armed drones are not illegal per se,
such as weapons or tactics using poisonous substances or gases, radiation
poisoning, or torturous effects during an armed conflict. 22 Yet, if a drone is armed
with a poisoning agent, use of that particular drone during an armed conflict would
be illegal per se in view of the general and absolute ban on use of poisoned
weapons and tactics under the laws of war, let alone the fact that poisoning effects
are unnecessary and can produce lingering suffering.
Human rights law generally applies at all times and in all social contexts,
including war.2 3 Yet, with regard to lawful targetings of those who are taking a
direct part in ongoing armed attacks or hostilities, the general human right to
freedom from arbitrary deprivation of life24 will only be applicable with respect to
Engaged in an Armed Conflict?, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 151, 152-53 (2011).
21. Concerning the customary prohibition of unnecessary death, injury or suffering, see for
example, JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 639, 679-
680, 697-99 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL.]; Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross,
Customary IHL Database, Rule 70, Weapons of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary
Suffering, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl cha-chapter20_rule7O?OpenDocument&
highlight=unnecessarysuffering [hereinafter Customary IHL Database]; Jordan J. Paust, Weapons
Regulation, Military Necessity and Legal Standards: Are Contemporary Department of Defense
"Practices" Inconsistent with Legal Norms?, 4 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 229, 231 (1974). The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) considers this customary principle to be reflected in
what it terms the "principle of humanity." See, e.g., Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion
of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT'L R. RED CROSS
991, 1041-42 (2008) [hereinafter ICRC Guidance].
22. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, arts. 1-3, 16, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1523 (noting examples of prohibitions);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; VI Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, arts. 3(1), 5, 27, 32, 147, Aug, 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET
AL., supra note 21, at 679-82 (addressing relevant laws of war and their application to poisonous
substances and gases). Use of poisonous substances and gases can also constitute torture or cruel or
inhumane treatment of persons if they are in the actual power or effective control of a perpetrator and,
therefore, such treatment can constitute a violation of applicable laws of war and human rights laws that
prohibit torture or cruel or inhumane treatment of persons. See Jordan J. Paust, Remarks by Jordan J.
Paust, 72 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 39, 43-45 (1978) (regarding impermissibility of use of the neutron
bomb or warhead).
23. U.N. Charter art. 55(c) (regarding the requirement of "universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights"); id. art. 56 ("All members pledge themselves to take joint and several action ... for
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."); Paust, supra note 1, at 265-66. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights applies wherever a party has jurisdiction or "effective control"
over a person. ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 2(1); PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 21, at 813, 816.
24. ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 6; Paust, supra note 1, at 263-64, 269.
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those persons who are within the jurisdiction, actual power, or effective control of
the state or other entity using a drone. 25 Therefore, it is evident that those who are
being targeted, for example, by a high flying drone in a foreign country will not be
protected under the general human right to life. In any event, if they are lawfully
targeted in compliance with the principles of distinction, reasonable necessity, and
proportionality their deaths will not be "arbitrary" within the meaning of human
rights law.26 Moreover, compliance with the principles of distinction, reasonable
necessity, and proportionality provides a higher form of protection than a test
based merely on what is or is not arbitrary in a given circumstance.
27
With respect to the laws of war, "general principles of [distinction,]
reasonable necessity, and proportionality have been integrated into several
provisions of Geneva law applicable during an international armed conflict. 2 8 As
explained,
Articles 48 and 50-51 of Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
reflect treaty-based and customary international legal requirements
concerning necessity and proportionality. These include (1) the need to
distinguish between civilians (who are protected from attack "unless and
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities"29) and lawful
military targets (the so-called principle of distinction), (2) the
prohibition of attacks directed at protected civilians or civilian objects as
such, and (3) the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. 30 A customary
prohibition related to the prohibition of "indiscriminate" attacks31 is the
more general prohibition of unnecessary death, injury, or suffering
during war,32 one that is also partly reflected in the duty set forth in
Geneva Protocol I to avoid attacks "expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life ... which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated., 33  Some "incidental" loss of
25. ICCPR, supra note 22, art. art. 2, Paust, supra note 1, at 264-265.
26. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 95, 25
(July 8).
27. Paust, supra note 1, at 263-64, 269, 272, 280.
28. Id. at 270.
29. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 14, art. 51(3). Obligations under Geneva law and customary
international law reflected therein apply whether or not an enemy generally violates such law. Jordan J.
Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and
Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811, 814-16 (2005). For this reason, reprisals
are impermissible. PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 21, at 655; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 441 (7th ed. 2008).
30. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, arts. 48, 51-53; see also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS
& LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 3-67 (Int'l
Comm. of the Red Cross 2005).
31. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 51(4).
32. See id. art. 35(2).
33. Id. art. 51(5)(b). See also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 30, at 46-50
(concerning the principle of proportionality); Paust, supra note 1, at 270-71 n.87.
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civilian life might be foreseeable but still permissible if the requirements
of reasonable necessity and proportionality are met.
34
Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters who directly participate in a process of armed
attacks over time and who traverse "in and out of Afghanistan from Pakistan and
their leaders are directly, continuously, and actively taking part in hostilities in
Afghanistan whether or not they constantly take up the gun."
35
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has recognized that
such non-state fighters can also be recognized as "members" of "organized armed
groups . . [that consist] of individuals whose continuous function it is to take a
direct part in hostilities ('continuous combat function')" or as "members of an
organized armed group with a continuous combat function" and that they are
targetable. 36 The ICRC adds that "members of organized armed groups . . cease
to be civilians . and lose protection against direct attack., 37 The ICRC would
distinguish such member-fighters or "fighting forces" "from civilians who directly
participate in hostilities on a merely spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized
basis. '38 The latter are targetable when they directly participate in hostilities.
Moreover, direct participation in hostilities by civilians includes their
"[m]easures preparatory to the execution of a specific act . . as well as the
deployment to and the return from a location of its execution., 39 As Nils Melzer, a
legal expert with the ICRC, has affirmed, general practice is "to directly attack
insurgents" or organized armed groups "even when they are not engaged in a
particular military operation," the practice is not internationally condemned, and
"members of organized armed groups . . . are not regarded as civilians, but as
34. Paust, supra note 1, at 270-71.
35. Id. at 271 & n.90. Therefore, they can be classified as DPH within the meaning of Article
51(3) of Additional Protocol I. Id. Importantly, the specific singular limitation of protection in Article
51(3) controls the reach of claims to use force that are otherwise based on alleged necessity during war.
For example, the DPH standard trumps claims based on alleged strategic necessity to target a civilian
population. Nonetheless, general principles of reasonable necessity and proportionality continue to
operate as limitations.
36. ICRC Guidance, supra note 21, at 995. Paust, supra note 1, at n.90.
37. Id. at 996.
38. Id. at 1007.
39. Id. at 996; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 27-29 (2004) (arguing that civilians who directly participate in
hostilities should lose their civilian status); NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
56, 310, 314, 317, 319-20, 327-28, 345 (2008) ("[T]hat threshold would almost certainly be reached
where a civilian supplies ammunition to an operational firing position, arms an airplane with bombs for
a concrete attack, or transports combatants to an operational combat area."); HCJ 769/02 Public
Committee Against Torture v. Government of Israel, [2006] lsr. L. Rpts. (2) 459, 39 [2006] (lsr.),
("[A] civilian who has joined a terrorist organization . and in the framework of his role in that
organization he commits a chain of hostilities, with short periods of rest between them, loses his
immunity from attack.").
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approximately equivalent to State armed forces" for targeting purposes.40 Melzer
also added that those with "functional 'combatancy' are targetable. 4'
When applying principles of reasonable necessity and proportionality with
respect to use of drones for targeting, one should consider all relevant features of
context. Among appropriate considerations are identification of the target (e.g., as
a DPAA, combatant, fighter with a continuous combat function, or DPH as
opposed to a non-targetable civilian); the importance of the target; whether equally
effective alternative methods of targeting or capture exist; the presence, proximity,
and number of civilians who are not targetable; whether some civilians are
voluntary or coerced human shields; the precision in targeting that can obtain; and
foreseeable consequences with respect to civilian death, injury, or suffering.42 As
Melzer avers, part of a nuanced contextual inquiry should involve consideration of
"the actual level of control exercised over the situation by the operating State" and
an appropriate consideration of "required intensity or urgency may" actually
involve "a generous standard of 'reasonableness' in traditional battlefield
confrontations. 43 For this reason, and because of other features of context that can
be relevant to a nuanced application of the principle of reasonable necessity, no
rigid rule should exist that would require ground verification of target selection and
engagement when ordinary civilians are known to be nearby. As Melzer added
more generally, there should be inquiry into qualitative, quantitative, and temporal
necessity and whether methods and means to be used "contribute effectively to the
achievement of a concrete and direct military advantage ... without unreasonably
increasing the security risk of the operating forces or the civilian population. 
44
A 1999 decision regarding the use of air strikes by NATO forces during the
armed conflict in Kosovo demonstrates proper use of the principles of distinction,
reasonable necessity, and proportionality. At one point, there was a refusal to
target a bridge in Belgrade, Yugoslavia that was itself a proper military target
because it had been used by Yugoslavian military to transport soldiers and military
arms and equipment. NATO refused to target the bridge when it became known
that thousands of civilians were on the bridge one evening during a peaceful
candlelight procession to protect the bridge.45 At that moment, the bridge was not
being used for transport of military personnel and equipment and, if targeting was
thought to be generally needed, NATO forces could wait even though the civilians
appeared to be voluntary shields. I do not believe that U.S. armed drones are
40. MELZER, supra note 39, at 317.
41. Id. at 327-28.
42. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 275-77; see also Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy,
Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Care for CIA Targeted Killing, 22, 28-38 (William Mitchell Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 2010-14, Tex. Tech Law Sch., Research Paper No. 2010-25, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 1625829 (addressing a U.S. military six-step decisional and review
process and suggesting relevant criteria and considerations with respect to targetings by CIA
personnel).
43. MELZER, supra note 39, at 397.
44. Id.
45. PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 21, at 683.
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inherently indiscriminate weapons systems and I believe that, if anything, they are
generally "smart." Of course, those who choose lawful targets and those who use
drones to engage lawful targets during self-defense operations and/or during armed
conflict must pay attention to the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. Such
attacks are necessarily inconsistent with the principles of distinction, reasonable
necessity, and proportionality.
Additional guidance with respect to lawful targeting is found in Geneva
Protocol I's exposition of what can constitute "indiscriminate" attacks, which are
prohibited under both customary and treaty-based international law. As
paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 51 recognize,
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) Those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) Those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) Those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate:
(a) An attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct
military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing
a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and
(b) An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.46
As can be seen, the description of indiscriminate attacks necessarily
encompasses the principles of distinction, reasonable necessity, and
proportionality. In the context of war, indiscriminate attacks are war crimes,47
46. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 14, art. 51(4)-(5).
47. The general mens rea standard with respect to criminal responsibility of perpetrators of
unlawful bombings and artillery or rocket attacks can involve either knowledge or wanton and reckless
disregard. Customary IHL Database, supra note 21, at Practice Relating to Rule 12. Definition of
Indiscriminate Attacks, X. The mens rea standard with respect to jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) is generally a higher standard of knowledge. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 30, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. For this reason, ICC jurisdiction is noticeably
more limited than international law requires. The phrase "may be expected to cause" in Article 51(5)(b)
of Additional Protocol I might allow prosecution under a criminal negligence standard.
Some might prefer that decision-makers who review the legality of prior targetings adopt a "margin of
appreciation," "deference," or presumption of validity. See Benvenisti, supra note 20, at 358. With
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whether engaged in by government forces or a non-state actor like al Qaeda.4 8
Outside the context of war, they would constitute an illegal use of force that can
result in some forms of criminal responsibility4 9 and should not be tolerated.
POSTSCRIPT
On May 2, 2011, U.S. Navy Seals entered Osama bin Laden's walled and
secretive compound in northern Pakistan equipped for combat under an
authorization from President Barack Obama to kill or capture bin Laden, the leader
of al Qaeda Members of the Seal team shot and killed one of bin Laden's
couriers and his brother, one of his son's after he had rushed toward some Seals,
and later bin Laden. According to the Obama Administration, bin Laden was
unarmed but did not surrender, he was not under actual control of the Seals when
he was killed, and, according to some, there were weapons nearby and/or he had
made a furtive move. 51 Drones had been used to gather intelligence prior to and in
support of the military operation but were not used to launch a missile into the
compound, perhaps in part because it was not certain that bin Laden was in the
respect to criminal sanction processes, there is no need for an extra layer of presumptions because under
international law an accused will already be presumed innocent until proven guilty. See ICCPR, supra
note 22, art. 14(2); Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 75(4)(d). Moreover, with respect to
criminal or civil sanctions against those who either knew that their conduct would result in
indiscriminate death, injury, or suffering or who engaged in conduct with wanton or reckless disregard
of such consequences, it would not be policy-serving or preferable to provide such a person with a new
.'margin of appreciation" or deference.
48. There are two reasons why members of al Qaeda are bound by relevant treaty-based and
customary international law. First, a treaty is binding on a party to the treaty and its nationals and
nearly all states are a party, for example, to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See, Jordan J. Paust,
Responding Lawfully to al Qaeda, 56 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 759, 766, 782-83 (2007). Second,
customary international law is universally applicable and binds all human beings, among other actors.
PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 21, at 6, 650, 655-56.
49. Indiscriminate attacks occurring when there is no relevant armed conflict would most often be
prosecutable under domestic criminal law addressing murder, manslaughter, and assault and battery. It
is possible that intentional attacks on non-targetable civilians would also be prosecutable as customary
crimes against humanity. For a discussion regarding the difference between customary crimes against
humanity and those within the limited jurisdiction of the ICC, see for example, Jordan J. Paust, The
International Criminal Court Does Not Have Complete Jurisdiction Over Customary Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 681 (2010). Most text-writers agree that al
Qaeda's 9/11 attacks on civilians at the World Trade Center were non-state actor crimes against
humanity. See, e.g., id. at 694 n.37.
50. See, e.g., Steven Lee Myers & Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Calls World "Safer" After
Pakistan Raid, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2011; Jay Carney, White House Press Secretary, Press Briefing,
May 4, 2011 ("The team had the authority to kill Osama bin Laden unless he offered to surrender, in
which case the team was required to accept his surrender if the team could do so safely. The operation
was conducted in a manner fully consistent with the laws of war," "the team was prepared and had the
means to take bin Laden into custody," and "[w]e acted in the nation's self-defense"), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/04/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-
542011.
51. See, e.g., Mark Landler & Helene Cooper, New U.S Account in Bin Laden Raid: He Was
Unarmed, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,2011, at Al; Mark Landler & Mark Mazzetti, The Death of Bin Laden:
Obama Says He Won't Release Bin Laden Photos, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2011; Myers & Bumiller, supra
note 50.
VOL. 39:4
2011 PERMISSIBLE SELF-DEFENSE TARGETING
compound.52 It was reported that the government of Pakistan did not know of the
Navy Seal operation until after it had been successfully completed and it is
obvious, therefore, that Pakistan had not consented to U.S. use of armed force on
its territory to carry out the Navy Seal mission to kill or capture bin Laden.53
In view of the fact that Pakistan had not consented to the use of armed force
on its territory to carry out the operation, issues addressed in this article concerning
permissible use of force in self-defense are clearly relevant to whether or not the
operation violated international law. Use of a Navy Seal team instead of a drone
attack can be relevant regarding compliance with the principle of proportionality,
but in this instance5 4 use of the Seal team merely raises an additional issue whether
it was lawful under the circumstances for members of the team to kill bin Laden
instead of capturing him. Quite obviously, the Navy Seal operation was not
simplistically a law enforcement operation. It was a self-defense 55 and law of war
operation, especially since the de facto theatre of war had migrated to parts of
Pakistan and to the very spot where bin Laden had been planning and directing
attacks through use of his trusted couriers, for example, to use or transfer flash
drives containing emails and other information to be sent to various members of al
Qaeda. 56
52. See, e.g., Myers & Bumiller, supra note 50 (the President's counterterrorism adviser John 0.
Brennan said that the Seal operation was chosen partly to minimize collateral damage and "'to ensure
that we knew who it was that was on that compound"').
53. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, U.S. was Braced for Fight With
Pakistanis in Bin Laden Raid, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2011, at Al (during planning, "a proposal to bring
the Pakistanis in on the mission" was rejected; capture of bin Laden was part of the plan: but "the [kill
or capture] mission always was weighted toward killing, given the possibility that bin Laden would be
armed or wearing an explosive vest"); Jane Perlez & David Rohde, Pakistan Pushes Back Against U.S.
Criticism on Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2011 (Pakistan clearly had not consented and called the
U.S. operation an "'unauthorized unilateral action").
54. Since bin Laden was a highest value target who apparently never left the compound, a known
courier and DPH was with him, and his wives and sons knowingly lived with him in the compound, it
might not have been impermissible to destroy the compound with a drone attack. Under the
circumstances, the wives, and possibly the son who was killed, might have been considered to be like
voluntary shields whether or not any of the wives directly participated in hostilities. See also Paust,
supra note 1, at 275-77 (regarding the need for nuanced and contextually-aware application of the
principle of proportionality, consideration of the presence of civilians of various types, and
consideration of the presence of human shields).
55. See also Jeremy Pelofsky & James Vicini, Bin Laden Killing Was Act of Self-Defense,
REUTERS, May 4, 2011; David Crane, Legal Arithmetic: Adding Up the Legality of Operation
Geronimo, JURIST, May 14, 2011, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/2011/05/david-crane-legal-
arithmatic.php; Amos N. Guiora, Targeting Bin Laden: Legal, Geopolitical and Strategic Issues,
JURIST, May 4, 2011 http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/2011/05/amos-guiora-targeting-bin-laden.php
("Bin Laden's continued threats and his proven ability to successfully conduct attacks
unequivocally categorized him as a legitimate target at the time he was killed. The attack ... adhered
to fundamental international law principles, including distinction, military necessity, proportionality and
alternatives. As a result, the operation was the manifestation of lawful and legitimate self-defense").
56. See, e.g., The Death of bin Laden: Painstaking Email System Kept Terrorist Ahead of U.S,
HOUS. CHRON., May 13, 2011, at A3; Christopher Dickey, Ron Moreau, Sami Yousafzai, A Decade on
the Lam, NEWSWEEK, May 5, 2011, at 32.
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In context, the killing of bin Laden was permissible under Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, which allows the United States to target the leader of al Qaeda in
self-defense in response to ongoing armed attacks on U.S. military personnel and
other U.S. nationals in Afghanistan and from across the porous border areas with
Pakistan. As noted in this article, under either a self-defense paradigm or a law of
war paradigm the United States did not need special Pakistani consent for use of
lawful measures of self-defense on Pakistani territory against a direct participant in
continual armed attacks on U.S. military personnel and other U.S. nationals in
Afghanistan (a DPAA) and the United States did not need special Pakistani
consent to try to target or capture a direct participant in hostilities (a DPH) who
also exercised some command and control functions within an expanded theatre of
war during what had been and still is an international armed conflict in
Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan involving the Taliban and its armed affiliates,
the armed forces of the United States and a number of other countries, and the
armed forces of Afghanistan.
57
As also noted in this article, and contrary to some viewpoints, it is not correct
to claim that the United States would not have the right to defend itself outside its
own territory absent (1) express foreign state consent, (2) attribution or imputation
of non-state actor attacks to the foreign state when the foreign state is in control of
the non-state actor attacks, or (3) the existence of a relevant armed conflict where
measures of self-defense occur. In this instance, neither express consent nor
attribution pertained, and the United States could have sought to target or capture
bin Laden in Pakistan as a permissible measure of self-defense even outside a de
facto theatre of war. In any event, the defacto theatre of war had extended to bin
Laden's compound where he was engaged in planning and authorizing operations
and other violent conduct by members of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and from the
porous border areas of Pakistan.58
Some have claimed that the Navy Seal operation would only have been
permissible if Pakistan had been "unwilling or unable" to kill or capture bin
Laden.59 It is far from clear that Pakistan's government was unwilling to carry out
57. It is important to recognize that the conflict is an international armed conflict so that the Navy
Seals have combatant status and combatant immunity for lawful acts of war and would not be
prosecutable under relevant domestic law for murder. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 1, at 277-78, 280.
58. See also U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 17, para.
31 (1956) (quoted infra note 63)[hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY FM 27-10]. With respect to
Pakistan's neutrality, bin Laden and al Qaeda, as well as the Taliban, had breached Pakistan's neutrality
long ago and their continued misuse of neutral territory supplements the permissibility of self-defense
and law of war targetings.
59. See, e.g., Ashley S. Deeks, Pakistan's Sovereignty and the Killing of Osama Bin Laden, 15
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. INSIGHT, May 5, 2011, available at http://www.asil.org/insights110 505.cfm; cf
U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 20
(2004) ("If a neutral state is unable or unwilling to prevent the use of its territory for the purposes of...
military operations, a belligerent state may become entitled to use force in self-defence against enemy
forces operating from the territory of that neutral state."); U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY FM 27-10, supra note
56, at 185, para. 520 ("Should the neutral State be unable, or fail for any reason, to prevent violations of
its neutrality by troops of one belligerent entering or passing through its territory, the other belligerent
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or participate in a mission that it had not been aware of or more generally that its
government would have been unwilling or unable to kill or capture bin Laden
despite speculation that a few Pakistani military or intelligence personnel might
have known where bin Laden was hiding. More importantly, despite occasional
rhetorical use of the "unwilling or unable" phrase in some contexts and its
admitted relevance as a feature of context during war when an enemy has breached
the neutrality of a state (for example, by using areas within it for planning,
authorizing, and carrying out operations,) this supposed "test" is not a legal
limitation of either the inherent right of self-defense against ongoing armed attacks
or the right under the laws of war to target enemy DPH and leaders of armed
groups within an expanded defacto theatre of war. Conversely, it is not a criterion
the sole existence of which can justify use of armed force in a foreign state without
foreign state consent if, for example, (1) the right of self-defense under Article 51
of the U.N. Charter has not been triggered because there has been no "armed
attack,, 60 (2) there has been no authorization to use armed force by the U.N.
Security Council, 61 (3) there has been no authorization of regional action by a
relevant regional organization,62 or (4) there is no exception to the express
prohibition of three types of armed force within Article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N.
Charter.
63
Importantly, human rights law reflected in the ICCPR (including the right to
freedom from arbitrary deprivation of life) did not apply for bin Laden during the
Navy Seal operation because, according to what has been disclosed by the Obama
Administration, the Seals did not have effective control of bin Laden while he was
alive and, as noted in this article, with respect to a person located in foreign
territory effective control is the trigger for application of human rights reflected in
the ICCPR.64 If bin Laden had been within the effective control of the Seal team,
may be justified in attacking the enemy forces on this territory."); Theresa Reinold, State Weakness,
Itregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 244, 246 (2011)
(noting different uses of such a phrase in different contexts).
60. U.N. Charter art. 51.
61. See id. art. 42.
62. See, e.g., id. art. 52 (regarding permissible "regional action"); Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed
Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533, 545-47 (2002).
63. Concerning the prohibition of merely three types of armed force under Article 2(4) of the
Charter, see, for example, Paust, supra note 60, at 536-37.
64. See supra note 25; see also Laurie Blank, Finding the Paradigm: Investigating Bin Laden's
Demise, JURIST, May 8, 2011 (human rights law is the wrong paradigm and "[u]nder the law of armed
conflict, whether Bin Laden was armed or unarmed is essentially an irrelevant question. As the leader
of enemy forces, he was a legitimate military target at all times . . . [and] the law of armed conflict
includes no obligation to offer the enemy a chance to surrender," assuming that the enemy has not done
so and does not clearly intend to do so) http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/2011/05/laurie-blank-finding-
the-paradigm.php. Concerning Professor Blank's recognition regarding targeting under the laws of war,
see also Geneva Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art., art. 41(1) ("A person who is recognized or
who, in the circumstances should be recognized to be hors de combat shall not be made the object of
attack."), (2) ("A person is hors de combat if: (a) he is in the power of an adverse Party; (b) he clearly
expresses an intention to surrender; or (c) he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise
incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself; provided that in
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his human right to life would have pertained and would have been violated if his
life had been taken arbitrarily - as it would have been, for example, if bin Laden
had surrendered and was otherwise in effective control of the team. President
Obama's authorization for the mission was to kill or capture as circumstances
permit. If the authorization had been merely to kill and if bin Laden had been
within the effective control of the Navy Seals when he was killed, the order and
killing in pursuance thereof would have been unlawful under human rights law (as
an arbitrary deprivation of life), the laws of war (as an unnecessary death), and
international law regarding permissible use of force in self-defense (as an
unnecessary death). Moreover, under the laws of war, an order to kill when a
person obviously intends to surrender and when capture becomes a clear
alternative would be tantamount to an order to take no prisoners or what is termed
a refusal of quarter, and the order would create war crime responsibility.65
However, that was not what President Obama had authorized.66
Although there has been no chorus of criticism regarding the constitutionality
of President Obama's decision, it is worth noting that precisely because the
President is bound under the Constitution to faithfully execute the laws67 and
international law is among the constitutionally-based laws of the United States,
68
the President has an enhanced authority to execute relevant competencies of the
United States under international law to use armed force in self-defense against
armed attacks and to target certain persons during war.69  With respect to bin
Laden and al Qaeda, Congress has also authorized the President to use
"appropriate" force under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force,7° and
the word "appropriate" has rightly been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to
any of these cases he abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape."); Paust, supra note
1, at 275 & n.101, quoting MELZER, supra note 39, at 370, 397-98, 413; infra note 63.
65. See, e.g., Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Annex, art. 23(c) (it is especially unlawful "[t]o kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his
arms, or having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion") (d) (it is especially
unlawful "[t]o declare that no quarter will be given"), 36 Stat. 2277; T.S. No. 539 (Oct. 18, 1907)
[hereinafter HC IV]; Geneva Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 40 ("It is prohibited to order that there shall
be no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this basis"); U.S. DEP'T
OF ARMY FM 27-10, supra note 56, at 17, paras. 28 (refusal of quarter), 31 (treacherous killing is
prohibited by HC IV, Annex, article 23(b) and "[t]his article is construed as prohibiting assassination,
proscription, or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a
reward for an enemy 'dead or alive.' It does not, however, preclude attacks on individual soldiers or
officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or elsewhere") (emphasis
added).
66. See supra notes 48, 51 for the news accounts detailing the Seal operatopm.
67. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3 ("he shall ... take care that the Laws be faithfully executed").
68. See, e.g., id arts. II, § 3; III, § 2; VI, cl. 2; JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 7-11, 169-73 (2 ed. 2003); Jordan J. Paust, In Their Own Words: Affirmations
of the Founders, Framers, and Early Judiciary Concerning the Binding Nature of the Customary Law
of Nations, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 205, 240-45 (2008).
69. See generally Paust, supra note 60, at 553-54.
70. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
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include permissible measures and limitations under the laws of war within the
congressional authorization. 71 Congress has the power to limit warfare in terms of
72
its extent, objectives, operations, persons and things affected, places, and time,
including use of drones or special operation teams in Pakistan, but outside the
limitation in the AUMF has chosen not to do so.
71. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520-21 (2004) ("It is a clearly established
principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities .... (prisoners of
war 'can be detained during an armed conflict, but the detaining country must release and repatriate
them "without delay after the cessation of active hostilities," unless they are being lawfully prosecuted
or have been lawfully convicted of crimes and are serving sentences'). Hamdi contends that the AUMF
does not authorize indefinite or perpetual detention. Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the
purpose of interrogation is not authorized. Further, we understand Congress' grant of authority for the
use of 'necessary and appropriate force' to include the authority to detain for the duration of the
relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles . . . Active
combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan ... The United
States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities ...."); id., 542 U.S. at 551 (Souter, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part) (using the law of war and stating: "there is reason to question whether the
United States is acting in accordance with the laws of war I conclude accordingly that the
Government has failed to support the position that the" AUMF "authorizes the described detention"));
see also Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee
Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007
UTAH L. REv. 345, 400, 403-05 (2007); Paust, supra note 60, at 554 & n.109; Harold Hongju Koh,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law, pt. III.B.I (Mar. 25, 2010) ("we
are resting our detention authority on a domestic statute - the 2001 . . [AUMF] - as informed by the
principles of the laws of war" and "as a matter of international law, this Administration has expressly
acknowledged that international law informs the scope of our detention authority. Both in our internal
decisions about specific Guantanamo detainees, and before the courts in habeas cases, we have
interpreted the scope of detention authority authorized by Congress in the AUMF as informed by the
laws of war.") (emphasis in original), available at http://www.state.gov/s/1/
releases/remarks/139119.htm.
72. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 69, at 382-99, and cases cited.

REMARKS: THE RESORT TO DRONES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL'
It is a privilege to be part of the Sutton Colloquium, one of the most important
discussions of international law that occurs in the United States. I would like to
express sincere thanks to Professors Ved Nanda and David Akerson for inviting
me, as well as to their students and staff for organizing the event.
My remarks concern this question: When may a state lawfully resort to drone
attacks? The answer lies in the first instance in what we call thejus ad bellum, the
law governing resort to military force. This is a distinct body of law with
important overlaps with jus in bello, another body of law also known as
international humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of armed conflict (loac), which
governs how force is used once an armed conflict is underway.' We must begin
with thejus ad bellurn, however, analyzing whether resort to weaponized drones is
lawful before turning to the jus in bello, to determine whether the way drones are
used is lawful.2
Drones are unmanned aerial vehicles that are operated by a pilot who may be
thousands of miles away from where the drone is flying.3 The militaries of
sovereign states and of non-state actors are quickly acquiring large fleets of drones.
Most of these drones are currently used for surveillance only. Increasingly,
however, states and non-state actors are acquiring drones equipped with missiles
and bombs, the sort of weapons that international law restricts to armed conflict
hostilities. The restriction on weaponized drones to use in combat zones means
that the distinction between situations of armed conflict and situations that are not
armed conflict is critical. What exactly distinguishes these situations is a matter of
common sense that is reflected in the definition of armed conflict found in
* Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law and Research Professor of International Dispute
Resolution-Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame. While these remarks substantially follow the
talk Professor O'Connell presented at the University of Denver's 39th annual Sutton Colloquium, the
author and the editors have made some necessary changes for the print version.
1. See MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, CASES AND
MATERIALS 103-13 (2d ed. 2009) (providing an overview of both the jus ad bellum and the jus in
bello).
2. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan,
2004-2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL, THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT 13 (Simon
Bronitt ed., forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1501144 [hereinafter O'Connell,
Pakistan].
3. See Peter W. Singer, Robots at Par: The New Battlefield, WILSON Q., Winter 2009, at 30, 33-
34 (discussing robotic weapons including drones).
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international law. Armed conflict is the exceptional situation, while peace is the
normal situation. Thus, whether the United States or any state is lawfully using
armed drones depends on whether the initial resort to armed force is lawful or
whether the use is within a situation defined by international law as an armed
conflict.. Outside of armed conflict such use would be unlawful.
Before going into more detail respecting the law on resort to drones, I will
first provide a brief history and very brief overview of drone use by the United
States from 2001-2010. This history will set the stage for our discussion of the
applicable law.
At the time of this writing, the United States has two types of combat drones
in its arsenal: the MQ-1 or Predator and the MQ-9 or Reaper.4 Predators began as
surveillance drones and then were adapted to carry two Hellfire missiles.5 The
Reaper is similar in design and function to the Predator, but was specially designed
as a launch vehicle for weapons. It can carry up to fourteen Hellfire missiles and
500-pound bombs.6 The U.S. is rapidly increasing its supply of drones and will
soon have more unmanned than manned aerial vehicles in its arsenal. I
understand pilots are not altogether happy with this development.
The United States is not the only country that possesses this technology.
Other states and non-state actors have drones, including the United Kingdom,
France, Russia, Turkey, India, China, Hezbollah, Israel, and Iran.8 An October
2010 report by United Press International (UPI) says that Israel has sold drones to
over 42 states.9 Iran is also supplying drones to friendly states and non-state
actors. In a New Yorker magazine article in late 2009, Jane Mayer described the
U.S. as having two drone programs: one conducted by the U.S. Air Force and one
by the CIA.' 0
From my discussions with others, especially with a former commander of
drone operation at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, it is clear to me that all drone
operations are today and probably for some time have been joint operations. None
are carried out by the Air Force alone. The commander told me that "a thousand
4. See Spencer Ackerman, Air Force is Through with Predator Drones, DANGER ROOM (Dec.
14, 2010), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/air-force-is-through-with-predator-drones.
5. Id.
6. MQ-9 Reaper, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE (Aug. 18, 2010),
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6405.
7. Singer, supra note 3, at 38.
8. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted
Killings, 27, n.51, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by
Philip Alston), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/
A.HRC. 14.24.Add6.pdf [hereinafter Alston Report].
9. Iran Muscles into the UAV battlefield, UPI.cOM (Oct. 5, 2010, 2:38 PM),
http://www.upi.com/BusinessNews/Security-Industry/2010/10/05/Iran-muscles-into-the-UAV-
battlefieldlUPI-47421286303914/.
10. Jane Mayer, The Predator War, What are the Risks of the C.I.A. 's Covert Drone Program?,
NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/
10/26/091026fa fact mayer.
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people see the video feed" from the deployed drones, from the pilots in their
trailers in Nevada and New Mexico to intelligence analysts at CENTCOM to
personnel in Japan to the President of the United States.
The first known use of a drone to kill a named individual occurred in
Afghanistan in November 2001. This was about a month after the United States
and the United Kingdom launched the intervention of October 7, 2001, in response
to the 9/11 attacks. In the midst of armed conflict hostilities, the U.S. Air Force
used a drone to launch a Hellfire missile to kill Mohamed Atef, a reputed al Qaeda
leader,in his home near Kabul.11 On November 3, 2002, the U.S. used a drone
outside of a combat area to launch Hellfire missiles at a passenger vehicle traveling
in a thinly populated region of Yemen. The CIA operated that drone from a base
in Djbouti on Africa's east coast. 12 The United States Air Force at the time had
control of drone operations, but did not carry out the strike because of concerns
about its legality. The CIA apparently had no such concerns and carried out the
strike killing all six persons in the vehicle, including a suspected top operative in al
Qaeda and a United States citizen, a young man in his twenties from Buffalo, New
York. 13  According to Dina Temple-Raston of National Public Radio, the CIA
quickly arrived at the site, repelled an agent down, and took DNA samples from
the bodies to confirm who had been killed.
14
In January 2003, the United Nations Human Rights Commission received a
report on the Yemen strike from its special rapporteur on extrajudicial summary or
arbitrary killing. She concluded that the strike constituted "a clear case of
extrajudicial killing."' 5 Drone attacks by the United States in Pakistan began in
2004.16 The number of attacks have jumped dramatically to about 30 in 2008 and
continued to climb in 2009 to about 50."7 In 2010, the U.S. attacked in Pakistan
about 120 times. 18
11. Al-Qaida: Dead or Captured, TODAY NEWS, MSN (June 22, 2005 3:37 PM),
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/4686228/42958222.
12. See Jack Kelly, U.S. Kills al-Qaeda Suspects in Yemen, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 5, 2002, at Al,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-11-04-yemen-explosionx.htm (providing a
detailed account of the attack); Doyle McManus, A U.S. License to Kill, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at
Al, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2003/an/I1 /world/fg-predatorl 1.
13. John J. Lumpkin, Administration Says That Bush Has, in Effect: A License to Kill, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 2002, at A12.
14. DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, THE JIHAD NEXT DOOR: THE LACKAWANNA SIX AND ROUGH JUSTICE
IN THE AGE OF TERROR 196 (2007).
15. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Comm'n on
Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Disappearances and Summary
Executions, IT 37-39, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/3 (Jan. 13, 2003) (by Asma Jahangir).
16. See David Rohde & Mohammed Khan, The Reach of War: Militants; Ex-Fighter for Taliban
Dies in Strike in Pakistan, N. Y. TIMES, June 19, 2004, at A6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/19/world/the-reach-of-war-militants-ex-fighter-for-taliban-dies-in-
strike-in-pakistan.html.
17. Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, 2010: The Year of the Drone, New AmErica
Foundation., http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones/2010 (last visited May 11,2011).
18. Id.
2011
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
The U.S. has also been using drones in Somalia, a place that almost never gets
mentioned in discussions of U.S. use of military force. 19 I have been unable to
pinpoint when U.S. drone use in Somalia first began, but I have found news
accounts that the U.S. was using drones in late 2006, perhaps to assist Ethiopia in
the invasion that it carried out to attempt to install a new government in Somalia.20
Despite the fact that we refer to drones as "unmanned," there are people
involved in all of these drone operations. There are people associated with drone
use in Afghanistan, Djibouti, Pakistan, Yemen, and places where the drones have
been housed such as Uzbekistan.
Many of these persons are CIA personnel or individuals under contract with
the CIA. John Radsan, a former assistant general counsel at the CIA, has related to
me that all decisions to actually fire a missile or drop a bomb from a drone are
made by the CIA at its headquarters in Langley, Virginia. 21 Jane Mayer's article
also confirms that the CIA is using private military contractors to assist with its
drone operations. 22 While I certainly do have concerns about the CIA and private
military contractors being involved in the use of lethal force, I do not think that is
the most important issue confronting the United States as a matter of law today
with respect to drone use. The U.S. could easily return all drone operations to the
military. The most serious issue with respect to drones is the amount of firepower
involved-drones are currently configured as military weapons, meaning resort to
drones is lawful in only four circumstances.
First, military force may be used as part of a lawful exercise of individual or
collective self-defense under the United Nations (UN) Charter Article 5 1. Second,
the United Nations Security Council may authorize military force. Third, military
force may be used by a government in effective control of a state to suppress an
organized armed uprising within a state where military force is resorted to by rebel
armed forces. Fourth, military force may be used by a state asked to join in
suppressing an insurrection within another state.
23
A drone is the aerial equivalent of a ground-based missile launcher or bomber
aircraft. The police do not deploy this type of force-police do not get to drop
19. See Steve Bloomfield, Somalia: The World's Forgotten Catastrophe, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 9,
2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/somalia-the-worlds-forgotten-catastrophe-
778225.html; A Strike Against Al-Qaeda's Hornet's Nest, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Sept. 1, 2007,
http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/0,1518,458597,00.html; U.S. Missile Strike Hits Town in Somalia,
CBS NEWS.COM (Mar. 3 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/03/03/world/main
3898799.shtml.
20. See Bloomfield, supra note 19.
21. Interview with John Radsan, Professor at Law and Dir. of Nat'l Sec. Forum, William Mitchell
Coll. of Law, in Univ. of Notre Dame Law Sch. (Oct. 8, 2009); see also, Richard Murphy & A. John
Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOzO L. REV. 405, 405, 412-14
(2009).
22. Mayer, supra note 10.
23. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Preserving the Peace: The Continuing Ban on War Between
States. 38 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 41, 41-42, 45-46 (2007); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to
Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 889-90, 893, 899 (2002).
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bombs or use Hellfire missiles against criminal suspects. In law enforcement,
lethal force is restricted to situations of absolute necessity.24 Civilian casualties are
not tolerated. There is no principle of proportionality that applies to the police
when they are exercising lethal force.25 Armed drones are therefore lawful only in
armed conflict hostilities. The right to resort to them must be found in the law
governing resort to military force, the jus ad bellum. The way they are used must
be based on IHL and human rights.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is the most important rule on resort to force.
26
Itis a treaty rule that is binding on all sovereign states. Treaty rules are not easily
changed by contrary state practice, despite what some commentators argue.
Rather, such contrary state practice is a treaty violation according to the law of
treaties. 27 Contrary state practice might be relevant to the formation of a rule of
customary international law. 28 In the case of Article 2(4), however, not only are
we talking about a treaty rule, the United States argued in its memorials in the
Nicaragua case in 1984 that it is a rule of jus cogens. 29 In other words, Article
2(4) is a peremptory rule that cannot be overcome by a contrary treaty rule, let
alone a new rule of customary law derived from state practice.
In addition to arguing that 2(4) has been changed by state practice, some
scholars try to interpret it as allowing more than it does. 30 Article 2(4) is properly
interpreted as prohibiting all uses of force above a certain de minimis level.
Minimal uses of force such as firing a bullet across a boundary or across the bow
of a ship may perhaps violate the principle of non-intervention, but such examples
are too minor to come within the purview of Article 2(4). With this exception,
Article 2(4) generally prohibits all uses of force.
Other UN Charter articles provide two express exceptions to this virtual ban
on all uses of force. In Chapter VII, the Security Council has been given authority
to act in cases of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression
24. See, e.g., Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials,
U.N. Cong. on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 8th Sess., Aug. 27-Sept. 7,
1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, 3, 4, 9, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/firearms.htm.
25. Alston Report, supra note 8, 30, 31.
26. See Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 809, 822 (1970).
27. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
28. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ] 71, 77 (Feb. 20).
29. Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of
International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993, 1000 (2001); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Drones Under
International Law 3-4 (Oct. 8, 2010) (unpublished Washington University of Law Whitney R. Harris
World Law Institute International Debate Series), available at http://law.wustl.edu/
harris/documents/OConnellFullRemarksNov23.pdf. Jus cogens norms are peremptory norms from
which no derogation is permitted.. Id.
30. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law,
in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM, 346, 389-90 (Benjamin Wittes ed.,
2009) (arguing that if the U.S. wants to legitimize its targeted killing policy under the framework of
international law requires that the U.S. maintain its self-defense justification for doing so, thereby
sufficiently creating state practice for the lawfulness of such killings).
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and it may authorize measures to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Article 51 also provides an exception, but note how detailed Article 51
is. So often people seem to skip over it. Every word of the Article is binding and
has meaning. It reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
collective or individual self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
31
Measures need to be reported to the Security Council.32 The evident
restrictions in this article have come under a lot of pressure from a number of
people, especially academics in the United States. For some reason, for a number
of years, it has been a common practice by international lawyers in the U.S. to try
to find loopholes in Article 51.33 Louis Henkin in his famous debate with Jeanne
Kirkpatrick in the 1980s, later published in the book Right vs. Might, pointed out
that it is not in America's interest to find loopholes to these clear rules of the
Charter.34 This point continues to be absolutely right.
In 2005, all states re-confirmed the United Nations Charter as written at the
UN World Summit in New York City.35 The International Court of Justice (ICJ),
the chief judicial organ of the United Nations, and the only court of general
jurisdiction on matters of international law, has restated in numerous cases that the
Charter means what it actually says with respect to self-defense.36 The ICJ has
made clear that self-defense is a term of art in international law. The reference in
Article 51 to self-defense refers to the right of a victim-state to use significant
offensive force in the territory of a state legally responsible for a significant armed
attack.
In at least five separate decisions spanning a 60-year period, the ICJ has said
that the armed attack must be attributable to a state for the exercise of self-defense
31. U.N. Charter art. 51.
32. Id; see, e.g., Cassese, supra note 29, at 999 (explaining that although in his view the U.S. may
not be required to obtain Security Council authorization for acts of self-defense against terrorism, at the
very least the U.S. needs to report its measures of self-defense to the Security Council).
33. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 30, at 21; Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-
State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237
(2010) (arguing that a state may act in self-defense against another state even where the other state is
not responsible for an armed attack if a non-state actor carried out the attack from the other state's
territory; consent is also not required, in his view.)
34. See Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT VS. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 69 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989).
35. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 2, 79-80, 85, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 8th
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1 (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.unep.org/greenroom/
documents/outcome.pdf.
36. See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 136, 1 139 (July 4) [hereinafter The Wall]; Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 195, 200 (June 26)
[hereinafter Nicaragua].
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on that state's territory to be lawful. 37  Even if the ICJ had not said this so
frequently, we know from the law on state responsibility that before you can take
offensive measures against another state, that state has to be responsible for the
first unlawful use of force. 38 The ICJ has also ruled that the armed attack giving
rise to the right of self-defense must be an attack that involves significant force. It
must be more than a mere frontier incident, such as sporadic rocket fire or small
groups of persons crossing a border.
39
In addition to the Charter, the ICJ has also said in several cases that two
general principles of international law impose important conditions on the right to
exercise force in self-defense. Those principles are necessity and proportionality.
40
In distinction to Professor Newton, I understand that proportionality has a core
meaning that crosses all areas of law from criminal law sentencing to trade law, to
countermeasures to the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.4 1  This is the core
meaning of balance or equivalence between the injury or wrong and the response.
In addition to proportionality, the ICJ made clear in the Nuclear Weapons case that
for any use of force to be lawful in self-defense, it must be necessary to achieve a
defensive purpose. If the state can first make that necessity showing, the state
must then show that the method of force used will not result in disproportionate
loss of human life or destruction of civilian property or the environment. The ICJ
said in Nuclear Weapons, that we have a specific rule "whereby self-defence
37. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 l.C.J.
168, 146-47 (Dec. 19) (deciding that Uganda could not justify the use of force in Congo given that
Congo was not responsible for the attacks in Uganda of non-state actor groups.); The Wall, 2004
I.C.J.136, 1 139 (stating that for Israel to be able to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter as a
justification for using military force on the territory of another state, a state must be responsible for an
unlawful armed attack.); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 51, 61 (Nov. 6) (finding that
the U.S. could not justify its acts against Iran as self-defense because it had not discharged its burden of
proof to establish Iran's responsibility for attacks against the U.S.); Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 195
(holding that the right to self-defense requires an armed attack by a state or attributable to a state by
"'the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry
out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to' (inter alia) an actual
armed attack conducted by regular forces, 'or its substantial involvement therein"'); see Corfu Channel
Case (Alb. v. U.K.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9) (finding that the United Kingdom had no right to remove
mines from the Strait of Corfu where it was not proven that Albania had placed the mines as an armed
attack on the UK).
38. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Int'l L. Comm'n,
arts. 21-22, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Nov. 2001), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ddb8f804.pdf [hereinafter Draft Articles].
39. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 195.
40. Id. 194; Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 43; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 95, 41 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
41. See Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102
AM. J. INT'L L. 715, 719-21 (2008) (explaining that proportionality requires constraint with respect to
the level of permitted force under both thejus in bello and thejus ad bellum, and also applies to use of
countermeasures).
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would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it. '4
2
The U.S. began its use of force in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, invoking
Article 51.43 The use of force and self-defense in Afghanistan, however, ended in
2002 when the Loya Jirga chose Hamid Karzai to replace the Taliban as the
government of Afghanistan.4 Today, the U.S. and other international forces are in
Afghanistan at the invitation of President Karzai in the attempt to suppress a
significant armed insurrection. If you need further evidence that the U.S. does not
actually view its actions in Afghanistan today as valid acts of self-defense, I
recommend Bob Woodward's book Obama's Wars.45  Woodward recounts in
detailed discussion how the U.S. is engaged in suppressing an insurrection in
Afghanistan against Karzai. There is little discussion, however, that U.S.
involvement in Afghanistan today is a self-defense effort that began in 2001.
Beyond Afghanistan, the U.S. has been invited to join in some military
operations in Pakistan, but it is not clear whether those invitations came from the
elected leader of Pakistan, President Zardari. 4 Moreover, following the floods of
2009, Pakistan had suspended its own offensive military operations - troops have
plainly been needed to aid in the rescue and rebuilding effort. Similarly, Ethiopia
may have asked for U.S. assistance to use drones during its intervention in
Somalia, but Ethiopia's operation is over. Ethiopia withdrew from Somalia, failing
to replace the government in Somalia.47
Nevertheless, despite the absence of any basis to resort to the use of military
force anywhere but Afghanistan at the time of writing, the Obama Administration
has persisted in using drones in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. How has the U.S.
justified these attacks? State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh gave a speech
at the American Society of International Law's Annual Meeting in March 2010,
and indicated two possible justifications, though I find them mutually
contradictory. He said first, that the U.S. is currently in a worldwide, armed
42. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 95, 41.
43. Permanent Rep. of U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001); Charg6 d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission
of the U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. to the U.N., Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Charg6 d'affaires
a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/947 (Oct. 7,
2001).
44. See President HamidKarzai, EMBASSY OF AFG., WASH. D.C.,
http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/president.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2011).
45. BOB WOODWARD, OBAMA'S WARS 5 (2010).
46. See Jackie Northam, Airstrikes in Pakistan's Tribal Areas Legally Murky, NPR (Mar. 17,
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 101953944.
47. See Somalia Joy as Ethiopians Withdraw, BBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7825626.stm; Ethiopia Completes Withdrawal of Troops from
Somalia, CHINA VIEW (Jan. 26, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/26/content
10721724.htm.
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conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces.48 But then he also said
that the United States is responding to threatened attacks by individuals in these
organizations, using force to preempt attacks under a theory of self-defense. 49 So
in other words, there is no worldwide, armed conflict but rather preemptive attacks
to stop future terrorist plots. If, however, the U.S. is already in an armed conflict,
resorted to in self-defense, it does not need to justify each attack as a preemptive
attack in self-defense and each attack would be governed by IHL instead of the law
of self-defense. Indeed, preemptive force is not a lawful basis for exercising force
against a sovereign state, let alone an individual, so this argument is doubly odd. If
we leave to one side the credulous arguments that the U.S. is in a worldwide,
armed conflict and/or resorting to preemptive attacks, could the U.S. defend drone
attacks in Yemen after, for example, the toner cartridge incident? 50
The British have strongly advocated for decades that terrorist attacks must be
treated as criminal acts under international law unless they are part of an armed
conflict, separately established from the terrorist attacks. 5' Terrorist attacks
generally have the hallmarks of crime; not armed attacks that can give rise to the
right of self-defense under Article 51. Terrorist attacks are usually sporadic, and
they are rarely the responsibility of the state where the perpetrators are located.
However, in some circumstances though rare, terrorist attacks may be carried out
so continuously that they rise to the level of armed conflict.
For instance, the Supreme Court of Israel found in 2006 that Israel was
engaged in a continuous state of armed conflict with various terrorist organizations
due to the "constant, continual, and murderous waves of terroristic attacks," and
they responded in the armed response to these.52 The Israeli court described a
situation that was more than a crime and would seem to share the important
features of the textbook-case of self-defense: the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.
After Iraq invaded Kuwait, Kuwait had the right to use force in self-defense.
53
48. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, The Obama Administration and
International Law, Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/ 13911 9.htm [hereinafter Koh Speech].
49. Id.
50. Eileen Sullivan,'Toner' Terror Fallout, N.Y. POST (Nov. 9, 2010, 1:15 AM),
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/national/toner-terror-fallout-IrPzhCk38E2yVudpSuDkCO (stating that
the "toner cartridge" incident was an attempt by terrorists in Yemen to destroy two cargo planes headed
to Chicago with bombs hidden inside of printers, but the plan was thwarted when Saudi Arabian
officials obtained information of the attack and provided the United States with the FedEx and UPS
tracking numbers of the printers).
51. See, e.g, Reservation of United Kingdom (July 2, 2002), Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/
ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9E03FOF2EE757CC 1 256402003 FB6D2?OpenDocument; U.K. MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 31 (2004).
52. HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel (2) PD 459, 16 [2006]
(Isr.), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/dl4f3f94989
b702fc I 2572d80043927b!OpenDocument.
53. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The U.N. 's
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Other states could join Kuwait, in collective self-defense. 54  Self-defense was
authorized by the Security Council in order to expel the invader.5 5 The liberation
of Kuwait had two aspects not found in connection with most terrorist attacks. No
one doubted who had carried out the armed aggression. It was Iraq. Second, the
occupation of Kuwait created a continuing wrong that could be righted.5 6 The
international law violation could be effectively corrected through the use of major
military counter force.
In the case of terrorist attacks, the first task is always evident. The necessity
to act in self-defense means the state that has suffered an attack sees the imminent
threat of another attack or is facing continuing attacks to which they must respond
quickly.5 7 This is a difficult showing to make in the case of terrorist attacks.
Terrorist attacks are usually too brief and do not result in ongoing wrongs, such as
the unlawful occupation of territory. It usually takes time to find out who the
perpetrators are and where they are. But force used long after a terror attack loses
its defensive character becomes an unlawful reprisal. States are forbidden from
taking reprisals affirmatively in the General Assembly's Definition of Aggression,
which elaborates on Article 2(4).58 Even when militant groups remain active along
a border, and are regularly carrying out small attacks, such incursions are not
considered armed attacks that can give rise to the right of self-defense under
Article 51, unless the state where the group is present is responsible for their
actions.
In the case of Congo v. Uganda,59 decided by the ICJ in 2005, Uganda had
sent troops into Congo after years of cross-border incursions into Uganda by
militant groups based in Congo. Numerous Ugandan citizens were killed as a
result of these militant attacks, but Congo did little to control the militants.
Nevertheless, the ICJ found that Congo's failure or inability to take action against
the militants to protect Ugandans did not give rise to any right by Uganda to
exercise major military force on the territory of the Congo.60 Thus, although this
notion is often heard, there is no actual right to use military force triggered by a
state unwilling or unable to control such groups. In the Congo case, Uganda was
found to have violated Article 2(4) for its attacks on Congolese territory. 61 Uganda
Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 479-80 (1991).
54. See id.
55. S.C. Res. 678, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990), available at http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/1070384.53221321 .html.
56. See Draft Articles, supra note 38, art. 22.
57. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 121 (Malcolm Evans &
Phoebe Okowa eds., 2d ed. 2004)
58. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 3, U.N. Doc. A!RES/3314 (XXIX)
(Dec. 14, 1974).
59. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J.
168 (Dec. 19).
60. Seeid 109-110, 112, 129, 146, 152.
61. Id. 149, 153, 165.
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needed to take defensive measures on its own territory or in co-operation with
Congolese authorities instead of unilaterally sending troops into Congo.
Within states, resort to military force is limited by international human rights
law, which prohibits a government from using excessive force in responding to
acts of violence, even if armed groups seeking to take power or secede perpetrate
the violence.62 Those armed groups must reach a certain level of organization and
a certain level of ability to confront the government authority before armed force
beyond police measures may be exercised.63
I disagree with Professor Newton that there is no international law governing
how internal armed conflicts are waged. There is a very large body of customary
international law that has been gathered by the International Committee of the Red
Cross in their customary law study. 64 There is plenty of law regulating the conduct
of internal armed conflict. But the rule I am emphasizing today, that armed force
may not be used outside armed conflict situations, is a rule from human rights law.
Officials of the Bush and Obama Administrations have made the argument
that because the 9/11 attacks were significant and were preceded and succeeded by
terrorist attacks, the U.S. may target and kill al Qaeda members and their
associates wherever they are found.65 Following the 2002 Yemen strike, the
National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, said that the U.S. is allowed to use
military force because the U.S. is in "a new kind of war." 66 The U.S. argued that
the war existed not where fighting was occurring but where certain individuals
were found.67 The Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs of the
Department of Defense also said that the United States could target al Qaeda and
other international terrorists around the world and those who support them without
warning.
68
As weak as it was in other ways, at least the Bush Administration had a
logically consistent argument. They said we could kill al Qaeda members if they
were in the U.S., Germany, Switzerland, and elsewhere based on a suspect's
presence and claimed the combatant's privilege to kill wherever a suspect was
62. See Alston Report, supra note 8, 30-32.
63. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 562 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
64. ICRC, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2001), available at
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v lcha.
65. Koh speech, supra note 48; O'Connell, Pakistan, supra note 2, at 16.
66. Fox News Sunday with Tony Snow (Fox News Network television broadcast Nov. 10, 2002),
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,69783,00.html.
67. See, e.g., Katerina Ossenova, DOJ Official: President May Have Power To Order Terror
Suspects Killed in U.S., JURIST (Feb. 5, 2006), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/02/doj-official-
president-may-have-power.php; Anthony Dworkin, Obama Administration Announces Legal Basis for
Drone Attacks, CRIMES OF WAR http://www.crimesofwar.org/commentary/obama-administration-
announces-legal-basis-for-drone-attacks/ (last visited June 2, 2011).
68. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Re-Leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 446, 454 (2003)
(citing Anthony Dworkin, Pentagon Official Examines Legal Aspects of Terror War, available at
http://hsm.intellibridge.com/summary?view_id = 117201800 (on file with author)).
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found. In contrast, the Obama Administration bases its policy on the conditions in
which the suspect is found, not just who the suspect is. 69 Legal Advisor Koh has
said that the Obama Administration no longer uses the term "global war on
terror." 70 Rather, he says the United States is in an "armed conflict with al-Qaeda
as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11
attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under
international law.",7 1  They had to take a different position from the Bush
Administration because President Obama campaigned against the global war on
terror. Thus, the Obama Administration is attempting to differentiate the current
legal position from that of the Bush Administration.
However, with all due respect to Harold Koh, his argument is actually weaker
than the Bush Administration's. You cannot justify the right to use force based on
who an individual is as opposed to whether there has been an armed attack where
the person is. Moreover, if the U.S. is already in a worldwide, armed conflict, we
have no need to invoke self-defense for each additional attack. Finally, if there is a
worldwide, armed conflict, it must be in the U.S. and Germany as much as Yemen
and Pakistan. The Legal Advisor has said that decisions to use force would be
based on the conditions and capacities of governments.72 This point again reveals
the weakness of the argument. The combatant's privilege to kill is based on the
exigencies of armed conflict hostilities and not on the strength or weakness of a
government.
The International Law Association (ILA) undertook a five-year study to help
clarify what the definition of armed conflict was in international law in response to
the Bush Administration's view that there could be a global armed conflict based
on the existence of certain persons.73 I was asked to chair that committee of 18
persons from 15 countries. Judith Gardam, the prominent Australian professor of
international humanitarian law and human rights law, was the rapporteur.74
Christine Gray from the University of Cambridge was a member of the committee,
as was Sir Michael Wood, former legal advisor to the British Foreign and
Commonwealth office, Eric Myjer of the University of Utrecht, George Nolte of
the Humboldt University, Berlin, and many others.75
The ILA report states that international law defines armed conflict as always
involving at least two minimum characteristics: 1) the presence of organized armed
69. Koh Speech, supra note 48.
70. Renee Dopplick, ASIL Keynote Highlight: U.S. Legal Adviser Harold Koh Asserts Drone
Warfare is Lawful Self-Defense Under International Law, INSIDE JUSTICE (Mar. 27, 2010),
http://www.insidejustice.com/law/index.php/intl/2010/03/26/asil koh drone war law.
71. Koh Speech, supra note 48.
72. See id.
73. INT'L LAW ASS'N, HAGUE CONFERENCE (2010) USE OF FORCE COMM., FINAL REPORT ON THE
MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2010), available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1022 (click on "Conference Report The Hague (2010)" hyperlink).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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groups, 2) engaged in intense inter-group fighting.76 The fighting or hostilities of
an armed group occurs within limited zones, theater of combat, or combat zones.
Ask any member of the U.S. or NATO armed forces where the U.S. is engaged in
combat operations today and they will correctly tell you in Afghanistan and Libya.
Terrorism, as I discuss above, is generally a crime. Although in some
circumstances it may be carried out so continuously as to be the equivalent of the
fighting of an armed conflict as the Israeli High Court explained. The isolated
terrorist attack, regardless of how serious the consequences, is not an armed
conflict because armed conflict requires a certain intensity of fighting.
This is certainly not the situation in the United States today. Even where the
U.S. is using drones on the basis of consent from the territorial state, that state may
not consent to use military force on its own, against its own people, except when it
is engaged in armed conflict hostilities. The legal restriction on the use of military
force in such situations is found in human rights law. The major human rights
treaties, for example, permit derogation in situations of emergency. Outside
emergency, a state may only take human life when absolutely necessary in the
defense of persons from unlawful violence - in the case of immediate need to save
a human life.
Even on those occasions in Pakistan where hostilities were occurring and the
President may have been asked to engage in those armed conflict hostilities, the
question remains whether using military force in the situation of Pakistan through
the use of drones meets the principles of necessity and proportionality. Necessity
in thejus ad bellum refers to the decision to resort to force as a last resort and that
the use of major force can accomplish the purpose of defense.
One of the leading counter terrorism experts today, David Kilcullen, says that,
in fact, the drone attacks have been counterproductive. He said this in his March
2009 Congressional testimony:
I think one of the things we could do immediately to send a strong
message is to call off the drone strikes that have mounted in the western
part of Pakistan. . [T]hey've given rise to a feeling of anger that
coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to spikes in
extremism well outside the parts of the country where we are mounting
those attacks. 7
The views of Kilcullen and other counter terrorism experts raise questions as
to whether drone strikes can ever be defended as accomplishing the military
objective. Bob Woodward writes that the President is also aware of the long term
disability of drone strikes: "Despite the CIA's love affair with unmanned aerial
76. Id at 2.
77. Effective Counterinsurgency: The Future of the U.S. Pakistan Military Partnership: Hearing
Before the H. Armed Servs. Comm., 11 th Cong. 21 (2009) (statement of David Kilcullen, Partner,
Crumpton Group, LLC, Senior Fellow,
EastWest Institute, Member of the Advisory Board, Center for a New American Security), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 11 lhouse hearings&docid=f:52666.pdf.
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vehicles, such as Predators, Obama understood with increasing clarity that the
United States would not get a lasting durable effect with drone attacks., 78 I do not
think anybody believes that we will create much more than a temporary disruption
of al Qaeda activities.
General Lute, a member of the National Security Council, believes attacking
from the air a "high value" target hit list will accomplish little.79 This is consistent
with what we are hearing from counter terrorism experts. Indeed the Rand
Corporation, in a study produced in 2008, provided very definitive evidence that
drone attacks or military force against terrorist groups is almost never effective. 80
The way that terrorist groups come to an end is by bringing them into the political
process or through law enforcement efforts. 81 These are not the conclusions of
Human Rights Watch; they are the conclusions of the Rand Corporation.
Some commentators have asserted that the U.S., and presumably other forces
fighting in Afghanistan, has the right to pursue terrorist suspects in "hot pursuit.,
82
This assertion was heard frequently in September 2010 after helicopter gunships
crossed the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan.83 International lawyers well
understand, however, that hot pursuit is a right restricted to maritime policing
efforts.84 Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the amount
of force permissible in hot pursuit is consistent with enforcement measures, not
military force. 85 "Hot pursuit," as an enforcement measure, is a narrower right
under the laws of the sea, confining states to stricter rules than the rules governing
the amount of force a state may use against another.
86
Another highly questionable attempt at justification is something referred to
as "unit self-defense., 87 As I understand it, it is an argument that, if one naval ship
in a unit of ships is attacked by an enemy ship or a plane, then the entire unit to
which the victim vessel belonged may strike the entire attacking unit. Outside of
78. WOODWARD, supra note 45, at 284.
79. Id.
80. See SETH G. JONES & MARTIN C. LIBICKI, How TERRORIST GROUPS END: LESSONS FOR
COUNTERING AL QA'IDA 18-19, 30-31 (2008), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
monographs/2008/RANDMG74 1 -1 .pdf.
81. See id at 18-19.
82. Northam, supra note 46.
83. Issam Ahmed, NATO Helicopter Strike on Pakistan Shows New Strategy of "Hot Pursuit,'
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-
Central/2010/0930[/NATO-helicopter-strike-on-Pakistan-shows-new-strategy-of-hot-pursuit; but see
NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 72-73 (2010)
(arguing the doctrine of hot pursuit does not provide a sound basis for military operations contemplated
in Pakistan and Afghanistan).
84. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 245-46 (4th ed. 2005); Christian
J. Tams, Symposium, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 359, 371 (2009)
(summarizing Christine Gray, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 112 (2d ed. 2004)).
85. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 111, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
86. See id (listing the rules of "hot pursuit" for ships at sea); DINSTEIN, supra note 84, at 246.
87. Dale Stephens, Rules of Engagement and the Concept of Unit Self Defense, 45 NAVAL L. REV.
126, 126 (1998) (describing -unit self defense'" and the limited assessment of its legal basis).
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an armed conflict, there is no legal basis for this asserted right. Even in an armed
conflict, the right to attack the enemy is based on the necessity to do so-not on
whether a ship or plane belongs to a "unit." Nor do I see how this argument can
lawfully be applied to individual terrorist suspects.
Finally, some arguments are also being made that there is a right of
preemptive self-defense to kill a person or group of persons who may be about to
engage in future violent action.8 8 As already explained, however, the right of self-
defense in international law is based on response to an armed attack occurring, not
preempting future attacks. The law of self-defense does not encompass a right to
initiate military action against an individual or a small group, especially when the
state where such persons are present is not legally responsible for their action.
The strongest conclusion to draw under the jus ad bellum is that there is no
legal right to resort to drone attacks in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and other places
where the U.S. is not involved in armed conflict hostilities. In 2010, that meant
Afghanistan only. Drone attacks constitute the use of military force. Resort to
them is lawful when a state is a victim of an armed attack and the Security Council
has authorized the use of force at the request of a government in effective control
who needs assistance in suppressing an organized armed opposition force.
Professor Kenneth Anderson, in a working paper written for a joint project of
the Brookings Institute of the Georgetown University Law Center and the Hoover
Institute, wrote a statement that I think is absolutely correct and that the United
States should carefully heed. He wrote that:
[A] strategic centerpiece of U.S. counter terrorism policy rests upon
legal grounds regarded as deeply illegal - extrajudicial killing is one of
the most serious violations of international human rights law, after all,
as it should be - by large and influential parts of the international
community.
89
Beyond effectiveness against terrorism, the current law on drones should
appeal to the West because we are not the only ones who have drones. It is time to
start using our legal imagination and to think about these new weapons in the
hands of China, Iran, Hezbollah, and others. What are the rules that we should be
modeling for all?
In conclusion, commentators are currently debating whether drone technology
represents the next revolution in military affairs. Regardless of the correct answer
to that question, drones have not created a revolution in legal affairs. The current
law governing battlefield launch vehicles is adequate for regulating drones. We do
not have a full study of the psychological impact on operators or on our leaders of
this new technology-some indicators suggest it is leading to more killing. Our
88. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 84, at 182; W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The
Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 525, 530-31 (2006);
Franck, supra note 26, at 821.
89. Anderson, supra note 30, at 16.
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leaders may not fully understand that drones are battlefield weapons. The fact that
there is not a uniformed member of our armed services in the vehicle may be
sending the wrong message that use of drones is somehow not really the use of
military force and we can get away with using them away from battlefields. They
seem attractive: fast, sleek new technology that we can sneak into countries and get
rid of bad guys. Yet, anyone who has seen the destruction caused by drones knows
what they are. They are battlefield weapons. They should be regulated under
battlefield rules and the United States should be insisting that the entire
international community treat them this way. There is no more persuasive
argument than pointing out that these are the rules the United States follows.
FLYING INTO THE FUTURE: DRONE WARFARE AND THE CHANGING
FACE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW
KEYNOTE ADDRESS TO THE 2010 SUTTON COLLOQUIUM
MICHAEL A. NEWTON*
It is a delight to be here today, particularly in the presence of Professor Ved
Nanda. I do hope that you realize how privileged you are to be here under his
tutelage, and I salute him as one whose influence has affected both the content of
the law and the character of those who have learned from him in this great law
school. The discussion regarding the scope and propriety of drone warfare cannot
be undertaken in isolation. Drones and the parameters of their appropriate use are
very much at the forefront of the modem consciousness, and thus I think it wholly
appropriate to carefully consider the best way ahead for both the legal profession
and the profession of arms.
Before we consider the specifics of drone warfare, we must remember two
predicate points. Firstly, the discipline of international criminal law has never
been healthier as the era of accountability is irreversibly underway. While the
challenges of administering justice in the midst of profound political and personal
passions remain, there is no current shortage of young and inspired advocates who
wish to contribute. Furthermore, they do so against the backdrop of a developed
discipline. It cannot be forgotten that the discrete discipline that we term
international criminal law, and that many of us teach in our law schools, has taken
form and root only over the past fifteen years. Thus, any discussion of drone
warfare must be cognizant of the backdrop of criminality and prosecutorial
prerogatives that did not exist until relatively recently. The long list of leaders and
policymakers that have been held accountable bears witness to the authority of the
criminal law regime. This pool includes a rogue's gallery of political leaders and
powerful personalities. Moreover, individuals at the leadership level will be those
that authorize drone warfare in the future. No one is truly above the law in this
modern era.
Secondly, in my opinion, the debates over drone warfare should not be seen
through an isolated lens. Drone warfare takes place against the broader backdrop
of many issues. To a certain extent, the interaction of these issues clarifies where
* Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School,
http://law.vanderbilt.edu/newton. While these remarks substantially follow the talk Professor
Newton presented at the University of Denver's 39th annual Sutton Colloquium, the author and the
editors have made some necessary changes for the print version.
1. See generally MICHAEL A. NEWTON & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, ENEMY OF THE STATE: THE
TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN (2008).
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we are and where we are heading, but at the same time the interaction creates
complexity. For example, the changing face of conflict has spawned a revision of
counterinsurgency doctrine that has changed the way we define the very nature of
armed conflict.
What does the very scope of the phrase "armed conflict" now mean in light of
our modem experience? How does jus in hello interface with the established law
of peace in a new era of seemingly perpetual conflict? What does it mean to
achieve victory in an era of transnational conflict against established non-state
terrorist organizations? What are the key operational dynamics and how do
civilized nations best remain within the legal regime while still attacking the
relevant terrorist organizational centers of gravity? The United States' position on
these doctrinal areas has evolved significantly. Moreover, this evolution has not
taken place in isolation, as the United States has evolved in conjunction with its
allies.
The earlier panel alluded to the complexities introduced by the intersection of
differing international law regimes. Two of these colliding regimes are the
tectonic plates of international human rights law and international humanitarian
law ("IHL"). As drone warfare becomes not only necessary, but a new normality,
the clash between these great, huge, moving icebergs of law becomes ever more
pointed. From my perspective, it is an oxymoron to argue that humanitarian law is
a mere subset of human rights law. No, IHL has a much richer, longer, and diverse
history. The Martens clause 2 and other aspirational phraseology in the corpus of
humanitarian law do little to change the relationship between these two
international regimes. Additionally, it cannot be forgotten that all of the Geneva
principles derived from a strongly stated consensus to improve humanitarian
3protections.
The principle of command and control is central to IHL. The idea that a
commander's orders operate with the force of law to limit the application of
violence arose independently in widely disparate cultures and historical periods.4
This suggests that command and control is more than just a legal technicality, but
rather is fundamental to the nature of warfare itself. Hence, the body of IHL
sprang from the realities of military practice and the demands of military duty.
Despite the fact that states in the modem era have obligations arising from human
2. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague 11) July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803, T.S. no. 403, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19thcentury/hagueO2.asp. See also
Antonio Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky, EUR. J. INT'L L. 187
(2000).
3 The Geneva Conventions of 1949: Origins and Current Significance, Ceremony to Celebrate
the 60th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, Address by Philip Spoerri, Director of International
Law, ICRC, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (Dec. 8, 2009),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/geneva-conventions-statement- 20809.htm.
4. Michael A. Newton & Casey Kuhlman, Why Criminal Culpability Should Follow the Critical
Path: Refraining the Theory of 'Effective Control' 4 (Vanderbilt University Law School Public Law and
Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 10-17, 2010), available at http://law.case.edu/lectures/files/2010-
2011/20110211 -Newton-EffectiveControl-SSRN.pdf.
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rights awareness, this normative development did not simply eviscerate the
preexisting body of law. Human rights law has obviously evolved in a specialized
and, in some sense, universalized context. However, international human rights
law should not be perceived as the Pac-Man that ate IHL.
The key point to understand in the context of drone warfare is that this clash
of the tectonic plates of law is immensely important and directly relevant to the
way we view rapidly evolving technology. To be more precise, these international
law regimes are wholly determinative of the best practices and professional norms
by which we appropriately apply the evolving technology of drones, or remotely
piloted vehicles ("RPVs").
The other notable legal development in the post 9/11 era is of course our
changing perceptions regarding the rights and duties attached to non-state actors
or, to be more precise, non-state participants in armed conflict. Where should the
line be drawn concerning humanitarian human rights protections and humanitarian
obligations or conversely humanitarian rights begin? That is the core of the
question; and it is derived from both of those bodies of law. As the earlier
panelists noted, any attempt to address drone warfare that ignores the changing
legal terrain is doomed to be incomplete despite the reality that the questions are
inherently complex. Not to state a tautology too bluntly, but inadequate framing of
the key issues will result in incomplete answers that ignore the broader doctrinal
and legal debates.
The law of state responsibility has also been changing dramatically.
Remember, in the context of human rights law, the state itself is primarily
responsible for protecting the human rights of those persons within their
jurisdiction.5 Well, we all know that. By the way, that should be on your Bar
exam. Currently, it is not, but it should be for you law students. I am advocating
for the day when we will have core international human rights questions on the Bar
exam. Human rights are a fundamental, foundational knowledge necessary for
good lawyering. Practicing lawyers cannot become successful in the world today
without understanding these basic principles. I really believe that, so keep
studying your human rights law. But I digress.
Of course, the entire debate regarding drones takes place in the context of a
sea change in our understanding of the authoritative actors in an armed conflict.
The keen international sense of vulnerability in the aftermath of the al Qaeda
attacks in New York and Washington D.C spawned an extremely rare fever of
international unity. President Bush declared a state of national emergency, 6 and
the U.N. Security Council swiftly passed Resolution 1368 unanimously.
7
5. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Principles and Guidelines for a
Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, 2006, HR/PUB/06/12, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46ceaef92.html.
6. Proclamation No. 7463 Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist
Attacks, 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006).
7. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns, 'In Strongest Terms', Terrorist
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Resolution 1368 categorized the attacks as a "threat to international peace and
security," 8 affirming the "inherent right of individual or collective [self-defense]" 9
expressed in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and specifically directing "all States to
work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors
of these terrorist attacks. ' 1° For the first time in its storied existence, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") invoked the principle of Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, thereby recognizing that the attacks constituted an "armed
attack" consistent with the treaty's provisions that trigger NATO obligations to
assist another member so attacked. 1 NATO aircraft helped to fly combat air
patrols over U.S. airspace in the immediate wake of the attacks.
12
Despite the modern consensus that the sovereign right of self-defense did not
originate in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and is not restricted to
responses enumerated therein, there remains a great deal of debate over the
appropriate principle that ought to apply to non-state actors that conduct conflicts
that transcend national borders. Does the responsibility for protecting human
rights jump from border to border as the combatant engages in transnational
conflicts? States, as a matter of state responsibility, remain responsible for
combatant activities conducted from their territories. Conversely, states are, of
course, responsible for protecting and defending the human rights of those people
and those persons in their territories.
Lastly, an ostensibly obvious point, which cannot be overlooked is that the
nature of the conflict is changing. Until 9/11, there was a huge debate on the
proper relationship between state actors and non-state actors. Before the al Qaeda
attacks many scholars debated whether it was even possible to enter an armed
conflict with a non-state actor. As I just noted, that seems so pass6 after 9/11; so
quaint. Today it is widely accepted that the very essence of civilization, central to
governmental authority, is the government's obligation to defend its territory and
its citizens from attack, even if that attack comes from non-state actors. General
acceptance of the truism that we can indeed be in an armed conflict against non-
state actors that is fully subject tojus in bello does not, however, answer essential
Attacks on United States; Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1368 (2001), Council Calls on All States
to Bring Perpetrators to Justice, U.N. Press Release SC/7143 (Sept. 12, 2001).
8. S.C. Res. 1368, I 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
9. Id. pmbl.
10. Id. 3 ("[T]hose responsible for aiding, supporting or [harboring] the perpetrators, organizers
and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable...").
11. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Invocation of
Article 5 Confirmed, N. ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. [NATO] (Oct. 2, 2001),
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/l001/elO02a.htm; What is Article 5?, NATO,
http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm (last updated Feb. 18, 2005).
12. NATO, Anti-terrorism Operations, ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS, http://www.aco.nato.
int/page142123533.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2011); NATO and the Fight Against Terrorism, NATO,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics 48801.htm (follow "'Historical background" hyperlink) (last
updated Mar. 9, 2011, 3:54 PM) (describing Operation Eagle Assist which lasted from October 2001 to
May 2002 and was intended to free up U.S- air assets for strikes against Afghanistan, from which the
September 11 attacks were planned and launched).
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questions that confront practitioners. The real questions are: what is the scope of
that conflict? Who are the participants in that conflict? How does IHL bind
asymmetric actors? Remember, humanitarian law was designed to apply on a
reciprocal basis to people who act in conformity with the language of the Geneva
Conventions on behalf of a state; in other words, those who belong to a state party.
Drone strikes that transcend international boundaries and that are conducted
against an amorphous transnational organization raise vital legal questions. Some
of these are offensive questions, such as targeting issues, while some are defensive
questions (at least in the sense of good lawyering on behalf of your client), such as
the rights, duties, and obligations of the striking party. As an extension, what are
the effects on the application of the law when that non-state actor acts in ways that
undermine-and I would argue ignore-the larger body of humanitarian law?
Does that obviate the need for IHL? Does another legal regime apply? Does it
mean that non-state actors can be targeted without the constraints otherwise
imposed by IHL? These are all complex questions that cannot be answered
without recourse to the backdrop of larger legal developments.
Before I make the legal observations at the heart of my comments, I want to
pause and highlight my deep conviction that words have meaning. This was
alluded to in conversations this morning, but I want to emphasize that words do
have meaning, particularly when they are charged with legal significance in the
context of legal documents because of the implications of language. To be
specific, the danger of loose or misused language is heightened in today's
globalized society where there really are no secrets. Now we have a common
homogenized body of norms, criminal norms that have begun to be implemented in
the domestic systems of countries all around the world. Those norms are directly
relevant to both the precepts of command responsibility, the precepts of corporate
responsibility, and the precise contours of the line between state responsibility and
individual responsibility. The paradox is that even as we have made tremendous
strides over the last 20 years to eliminate impunity, to create accountability
structures with clearly established legal norms that do, in fact, export criminal
liability, we have also created a perverse incentive for those same norms to be
discussed in a cavalier and cutting manner. If you do not think this is a serious
concern, then read the foreign press following any NATO drone strike in
Afghanistan, or Pakistan, or Yemen.' 3 Words have meaning and it is important for
us to use words precisely if for no other reason than to refrain from giving aid and
comfort to our enemies.
A very strong strain of thought argues that drones are really nothing special;
certainly nothing that needs an entirely separate legal framework.1 4  In other
13. See, e.g., Declan Walsh, Leading UN Official Criticises CIA's Role in Drone Strikes, THE
GUARDIAN (London), June 3, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/un/03/us-
pakistan-drone-strikes?fINTCMP=SRCH.
14. See, e.g., Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 101, 106-08 (2010) (stating that the U.S. government considers itself in an armed conflict in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the Taliban).
2011
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
words, the body of developed humanitarian law is sufficient to handle drones as a
mere technological innovation. From this perspective, drones are simply another
delivery mechanism to be analyzed against the framework of established principles
of humanitarian law, such as reciprocity, humanity, necessity, distinction,
proportionality. In other words, while drones (RPVs in the current lingo) present a
wholly new technological stand- off capability, they merely represent a new
incarnation of a method of conflict that must be assessed in light of the preexisting
Hague and Geneva principles that are today intertwined in what we conveniently
lump together under the rubric of "international humanitarian law." To be more
precise, we could correctly speak of the corpus of the "laws and customs of war."
These principles nevertheless do not stand alone on the battlefield. They are
implemented by the force of will of the commander.
Every drone strike is undertaken at the express command of a commander.
"To command" is an active verb. Commanders are critical to a fighting
organization, and are keenly aware of the linkages between law and operations,
because "their organizations will be most effective-militarily-where they field
their organization with the proper control mechanisms."' 5 According to the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "[t]he first duty of a military
commander, whatever his rank, is to exercise command."'16 The commander or
superior is the decisive actor because inattention to the basic legal duties inherent
in a hierarchy of authority undermines the "very essence of the problem of
enforcement of treaty rules in the field."'" Mao Tse-Tung put it simply,
"[u]norganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory."' 18 In the modem
era, therefore, successful military operations require that commanders at all levels
are educated and empowered to make important and accurate decisions, because
their actions often have strategic consequences that are intertwined with the
legality and legitimacy of the decisions made and actions taken. The modem
media has been known to transform appropriate and tactical decision-making into
another weapon in the moral domain of conflict at the behest of the side with the
best cameras, biggest microphones, and most compliant media accomplices. Legal
lacunae can be deliberately magnified and exploited by an adversary to degrade
combat effectiveness. Mistakes are often amplified, and law is misused, not to
facilitate effective operations that minimize civilian casualties and preserve human
dignity, but to create greater military parity between mismatched forces. U.S.
counterinsurgency doctrine captures this truism:
15. Michael A. Newton & Casey Kuhlman, Why Criminal Culpability Should Follow the Critical
Path: Reframing the Theory of Effective Control, 40 NETH. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 3, 52 (2009).
16. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 art. 87, 3549 (Yvez Sandoz et al. eds.,
1987), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/lal3044f3bbb5b8ecl 2563fb0066f226/36fc92
eb9e83fbbec1 2563cd00437bfb!OpenDocument [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL I].
17. Id. 13550.
18. MAO TSE-TUNG ON GUERRILLA WARFARE 45 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., 2000).
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Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough training and
clear guidance; then they trust their subordinates to do the right thing. Preparation
for tactical-level leaders requires more than just mastering Service doctrine; they
must also be trained and educated to adapt to their local situations, understand the
legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and sound
judgment in accordance with their senior commanders' intent.
19
Accordingly, commanders need both a clear understanding of the law
regulating drone strikes and the courage to act decisively to limit civilian casualties
and comply with the law, while remaining faithful to the overriding imperative of
mission accomplishment. Thus, it should not be surprising that there is a long-
standing rule of engagement promulgated under the authority of commanders that
says you may not send unobserved artillery fire into an urban area. In other words,
sending artillery fire into those areas must only be done under the express authority
of a commander absent overriding imperatives. Despite the fact that subordinates
have legal authority derived under the principle of jus in bello, in order for a
particular strike aimed at a military target - with indirect artillery fire located in a
civilian area to adhere to distinction and proportionality, it must comply with a
more stringent set of constraints imposed by command prerogatives.
When assessing the normative state of practice regarding drone warfare, we
therefore need to be very precise in our analysis of the line between pragmatics and
legal obligation. What is the distinction between the law as it is and the law as we
might want it to evolve? What is the difference between lex lata and lexferenda?
Where do we want the law to develop, where should it develop? How are states
and non-state actors bound by divergent norms? Or is the law to be conceived of
as a homogenous mass that must be objectively determined and neutrally applied?
In light of the precursor thoughts I've just outlined, let me quickly develop
what I see as four discrete areas where we should look to the future, building on
what's happened in the past and focusing on the future developments, which is by
coincidence the assigned topic of this panel. As you might have inferred from my
earlier reflections on the nature of command, the application of command
responsibility [or its extension to the realm of superior responsibility drawn from
Article 25 of the Rome Statute] has particular ramifications for the future of drone
warfare. The law is exceedingly clear in this regard as commanders must "do
everything feasible" to minimize or eliminate collateral damage and "take all
feasible precautions" to ensure that the choice of means or methods of attacking
any military objective minimizes "incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
[and] damage to civilian objects."' 2° Thus, the complexities of debate from this
morning regarding the scope of direct participation in hostilities and the boundaries
19. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUEL 3-24: COUNTERINSURGENCY 157 (2006) [hereinafter
COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL].
20. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 57, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I], available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3ae6b36b4.html.
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of acceptable conduct on the part of non-state actors cannot be obviated. The
commander's most solemn duty is to conduct operations with strict adherence to
the laws and customs of warfare. This principle is especially applicable in the
context of drone warfare because of the pejorative caricature that I have
increasingly encountered, that commanders can afford to be cavalier because the
lives of THEIR personnel are not endangered through the conduct of drone
warfare.
By extension, there is a very real and important debate regarding the
standards for assessing feasibility during drone operations. Where is the line
among what is advisable, what is feasible, what is appropriate, and what is criminal
in this context? That line today is ill-defined except with resort to the broader
definitions of distinction and the proportionality in the broader bodies of law that
we know today. The precise feasibility criteria are ill-defined at best. Though I
fully realize that what I am about to hypothesize is controversial, and indeed
anathema to many, it may well be time to consider an additional protocol designed
to address the residual questions revolving around drone warfare. The foregoing is
intended to make clear that "drone warfare" represents a distinctive synthesis of
heterogeneous activities, technologies, strategies, and actors. The distinctive
dimensions of drone warfare merit movement towards a holistic international
consensus on the appropriate scope, rationale, and legal metrics applicable to this
new method for defeating our enemies. Furthermore, if we undertake to negotiate
an additional protocol precisely on the issue of unmanned area vehicles, Drone
warfare, and micro-Drones, one of the key issues has to be with particular
application - what does feasibility mean in this context? We need to define it with
our allies so that, in fact, the law is clear and we know what the law is. More to
the point, commanders can command.
Another vital issue to be addressed in any future discussions related to drone
warfare is the concept of effective warning. Humanitarian law, unlike human
rights law, builds in a broad base of appropriate command discretion and
appropriate combatant discretion. Thus, the language is often: "where
circumstances permit," "when feasible," "when possible," etc., which of course is
not reflected in human rights law. Though it derives from wholly different sources
and operate with entirely different structures, the latitude that is properly afforded
to commanders in the midst of armed conflict is somewhat analogous to the margin
of appreciation and deference given to domestic authorities under modern human
rights jurisprudence.
Article 57(2)(c) of the 1949 Geneva Convention's Protocol I expressly
mandates that "effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may
affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit., 21  This
21. Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 57(2)(c). See also INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
COMMENTARY ON THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949
AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, art. 57,
2190 (Yvez Sanoz et al. eds., 1987), http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750073?OpenDocument
[hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL I] (emphasizing that precautions precedent to attacks
on civilians will be of "greatest importance in urban areas because such areas are most densely
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provision is an express obligation that is really just a lex specialis application of
the larger obligations to "take constant care" to protect civilian lives and objects22
and to "do everything feasible" to protect civilians both in the choice of targets and
in the means selected to attack targets.2 3 But, one might well ask, what does
effective warning mean? Is the concept of effective warning dependent on the
modality of the offensive technology used by the commander? Wouldn't any
abstract principles created to regulate the concept of effective warning carry
counterintuitive consequences? During Operation Cast Lead, IDF warnings in the
urban areas of Gaza consisted of: 165,000 telephone calls, 300,000 warning notes
on December 28, 2008 alone, 2,500,000 leaflets overall, radio broadcasts, and
another newly developed tactic involving non-explosive detonations known as
"roofknocking. '24
The Goldstone Report sets forth several criteria in determining whether a
warning is effective:
[I]t must reach those who are likely to be in danger from the planned attack, it
must give them sufficient time to react to the warning, it must clearly explain what
they should do to avoid harm and it must be a credible warning. The warning also
has to be clear so that the civilians are not in doubt that it is indeed addressed to
them. As far as possible, warnings should state the location to be affected and
where the civilians should seek safety. A credible warning means that civilians
should be in no doubt that it is intended to be acted upon. 25
After detailing the content of the leaflet and radio broadcast warnings, the
Report concluded that the warnings did not comply with the obligations of
Protocol I because Israeli forces were presumed to have had the capability to issue
more effective warnings, civilians in Gaza were uncertain about whether and
where to go for safety, and some places of shelter were struck after the warnings
were issued.26  Thus, despite giving more extensive warnings to the civilian
population than in any other conflict in the long history of war, the efforts of the
Israeli attackers were equated with attacks intentionally directed against the
civilian population. This approach eviscerates the appropriate margin of
appreciation that commanders who respect the law and endeavor to enforce its
constraints should be entitled to rely upon-and which the law itself provides.
There is simply no legal precedent for taking the position that the civilians actually
respond to such warnings, particularly in circumstances such as Gaza where the
civilian population is intimidated and often abused by an enemy that seeks to
populated").
22. Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, art. 57(1).
23. Additional Protocol I, supra note 20, arts. 57(2)(a)(i)-(ii).
24. Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories:
Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 498-99, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Goldstone Report] available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
englishlbodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/UNFFMGC_Report.pdf.
25. Id. 528.
26. Id. 499-542.
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protect itself by deliberately intermingling with the innocent civilian population.
The newly minted Goldstone standard for warning the civilian population would
displace operational initiative from the commander in the attack to the defender
who it must be remembered commits a war crime by intentionally commingling
military objectives with protected civilians. This aspect of the report would itself
serve to amend the entire fabric of the textual rules that currently regulate
offensive uses of force in the midst of armed conflict. Logically, if this standard
were applied to drone warfare with intellectual rigidity, there would be no lawful
margin for drone strikes. This simply cannot be accepted as an appropriate
extension of the law in this area.
The logical corollary to this example derives from the application of the
proportionality principle in the context of drone strikes. Article 8(2)(b)(4) of the
Rome Statute sets out the modem scope of the proportionality principle. 27 Of
course, it cannot be forgotten that proportionality in the context ofjus in bello (or
the conduct of armed conflicts) has a very different meaning from that found in the
jus ad bellum regime or gleaned from the human rights jurisprudence. Though the
Rome Statute expressly sets out the consolidated articulation of the modem
concept of proportionality, its relevance to drone warfare is more subtle. The
crime is committed only through the intentional launching of an attack predictably
anticipated to result in disproportionate and hence unlawful damage. For example,
no responsible commander intentionally targets civilian populations, and the law
on this matter is clear and fundamental. 28 Nor would a responsible military
commander ever launch an attack intentionally against civilians or civilian objects
or against a target with reasonably anticipated disproportionate results. In the age
of twenty-four hour news cycles, such a commander would foolishly imperil the
overarching operational objectives but would also betray the core obligations of
the military profession.
So let me pause while we reflect on these truths. If a media outlet or
antagonist throws out numbers and press releases to report that a drone strike killed
"X" number of people or damaged particular civilian property, the presumption
cannot be automatically that those were disproportionate drone strikes. The war
crime, the crime that defines the boundaries of professional practice, begins with
the word intentionally. The key focus is not on the damage inflicted but on the
information available at the time of the attack and the precautions taken by the
commander. As an aside, I am proud that the Rome Statute language includes
damage to the environment within the purview of the crime of intentionally
launching an attack that can be anticipated to result in disproportionate damage.
This extension of the law is entirely warranted and to me represents a concrete
advancement in our legal understanding of the protections afforded by the
applicablejus in bello.
27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, opened for signature July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3, 37 I.L.M. 1002.
28. Additional Protocol 1, supra note 20, art. 48.
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This brings me directly to the third area that should be clarified in customary
practice as drone strikes become a more common dimension of state practice. The
legal balancing drawn from Article 8(2)(b)(4) of the Rome Statute is predicated on
a comparison between the damage to otherwise protected places and people as
assessed against the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
The concrete and direct language flows directly from the text of Protocol I. There
is, however, a vital distinction in light of modem law and the practice of modem
drone strikes. The geographic shackles that might have been imposed by our
concept of sovereign conflicts have been definitively removed. The Elements of
Crimes for Article 8(2)(b)(4) adopted by international consensus (which included
the United States delegation) contain an express footnote to clarify that the
assessment of concrete and direct overall military advantage cannot be constrained
29by geographic or temporal limitations.
Now, let me be clear of what I am not arguing. The debates over the freedom
enjoyed by a sovereign state to direct its drones anywhere around the world to kill
anyone that sovereign directs will continue unabated for good reason. Just because
the definition of proportionality is a much more open and permissive definition
than is often postulated does not remove any residual geographic dimension from
the jus ad bellum analysis. And then of course, there is that last word
"anticipated." The critical perspective is that of the commander, and the key data
lies in the mental calculus drawn from the pressures of command and the
conflicting mandates of the mission that must be accomplished in the midst of
uncertainties aplenty and unknown collateral consequences. In passing, I should
note my own strong (though highly controversial) belief that the United States and
our NATO allies should do a much, much better job of being more transparent
about these decisions. Where we're right, I don't think we should be afraid to go
to the world and say "we're right about that and here's why." Our silence and
perceived hubris leaves a tabula rasa for a hostile press and cunning adversary to
sway the popular perception that the modem conflict is the center of gravity on the
road to either victory or defeat. We should not permit the enemy to proclaim and
to propagate unchecked negative inferences. We should demonstrate our
professionalism and precision at every opportunity. In my opinion, the IDF and
other westernized militaries do more than any other participants in conflict to
minimize or eliminate accidental deaths and damage to civilian property and to
punish it when investigations reveal wrongdoing. The world should rationally
have some mechanism available for freely and candidly offering the proof of
professionalism.
The final scope of my hypothetical Protocol on drone warfare stems directly
from the geographic scope of the proportionality rule that I just raised with you.
The classic law of neutrality is closely related to the obligation of states to prevent
their territory from being used for combatant purposes. In the context of non-state
29. Rep. of the Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal Court, Finalized Draft Text of the
Elements of Crimes, 24 n.36, U.N. Doc PCNICC/2000/l/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000).
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actors whose activities transcend boundaries, sometimes all over the world
instantaneously from the defense perspective, you would argue that there may be
no such thing anymore as a neutral state, because geographic boundaries don't
mean as much as they used to, precisely because those decisions about war making
are not being made by state actors.
Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, and other transnational organizations simply don't
care about borders. In fact, borders affirmatively help them. They serve to
interfere with the application of force. They serve to give them sanctuary.
Resolution 1373 emphasizes the fact that in the conduct of hostilities in this armed
conflict not of an international character, a neutral state cannot exist. The language
of Resolution 1373, the definitive resolution on the subject from September 2001,30
specifically asserts that "all states shall ...[p]revent those who finance, plan,
facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those
purposes against other States or their citizens; [e]nsure that any person who
participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts
or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice., 31 The words "facilitate" and
"participates in ... preparation" suggest that, although there may not have been a
consensus among the UN Security Council over the exact extent of the definition
of "terrorist acts," its members plainly intended to apply individual criminal
liability to those complicit in terrorist acts. On this basis, a court in a UN member
state could prosecute terrorist facilitators through a broad application of complicity
liability that would include such actions as are understood as Material Support for
Terrorism under U.S. law. Indeed, regional conventions include the widest
possible scope of liability for terrorist acts in prohibiting any state or individual
from "aiding, abetting or counseling the commission of [terrorist acts] or
participating as an accomplice in [such offenses]. 32
Thus, all states shall refrain from providing any form of support, active or
passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing
recruitment of members of terrorist groups, eliminating the supply of weapons to
terrorists, and to take necessary steps to prevent the commission of acts-the
commission of terrorist acts. Resolution 1373 was a unanimous Chapter VII act
that eliminates the ability of any state sponsor of terrorism to hide behind an
abstract geographic border.33 Does it logically follow that the inherent and
obligatory right of sovereign self-defense has now superseded the previously
binding right of states to control their airspace on a unilateral basis? Furthermore,
in light of the "all necessary means" mandate of Resolution 1373, couldn't some
states argue in an adjudicatory forum that a transnational drone strike was an a
priori authorized method for addressing the persistent threat of transnational
30. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
31. Id. 2.
32. SAARC Reg'] Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, U.N. Doc A/51/136, GAOR, 44th
Sess, (1989), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/Convi 8-english.pdf.
33. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 30.
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terrorism? All of these issues could be usefully addressed during negotiations over
a new Drone Protocol.
Let me close by observing that in one sense, the struggle to define the
contours of the legal regime and to correctly communicate those expectations to
the broader audience of civilians caught in the conflict is a recurring problem
unrelated to the current evolution of warfare. Shaping the expectations and
perceptions of the political elites who control the contours of the conflict is
perhaps equally vital. The paradox is that as the legal regime applicable to the
conduct of hostilities has matured over the last century, the legal dimension of
conflict has at times overshadowed the armed struggle between adversaries. As a
result, the overall military mission is intertwined with complex political, legal, and
strategic imperatives that require disciplined focus on compliance with the
applicable legal norms as well as the most transparent demonstration of that
commitment to sustain the moral imperatives that lead to victory. In his seminal
1963 monograph describing the counterinsurgency in Algeria, counterinsurgency
scholar David Galula observed that if "there was a field in which we were
definitely and infinitely more stupid than our opponents, it was propaganda." 34
The events at Abu Ghraib are perhaps the most enduring example of what General
Petraeus has described as "non-biodegradable events., 35 The very nature of drone
warfare is inextricably linked to the accomplishment of the mission and a larger
plethora perception and misperception. Indeed, the United States doctrine for
counterinsurgency operations makes a point that is equally applicable to drone
warfare in its opening section:
Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COHN) are complex subsets of warfare.
Globalization, technological advancement, urbanization, and extremists who
conduct suicide attacks for their cause have certainly influenced contemporary
conflict; however, warfare in the 2 1st century retains many of the characteristics it
has exhibited since ancient times. Warfare remains a violent clash of interests
between organized groups characterized by the use of force. Achieving victory still
depends on a group's ability to mobilize support for its political interests (often
religiously or ethnically based) and to generate enough violence to achieve
political consequences. Means to achieve these goals are not limited to
conventional force employed by nation-states.
36
There are many other examples of events during conflict that strengthen the
enemy even as they remind military professionals of the visceral linkage between
their actions and the achievement of the mission. I fear that drone strikes have
34. DAVID GALULA, PACIFICATION IN ALGERIA 1956-1958, at 143 (new ed. 2006) (1963).
35. General David H. Petraeus, A Conversation with General Petraeus at Vanderbilt University
(Mar. 1, 2010) (video available at http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/myvu/news/2010/03/0l/modern-
warfare-complex-but-winnable-petraeus-tells-vanderbilt. 108544); See also Uthman A1-Mukhtar, Local
Sunnis Haunted ht, the Ghosts ofAbu Ghraib, SUNDAY HERALD, Dec. 26, 2010, at 51; Joseph Berger,
U.S. Commander Describes Maria Battle as First Salvo in Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2010, at
A7.
36. COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL, supra note 19, at 1.
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taken on such a symbolism that reasoned dialogue with our adversaries and allies
is often precluded. In the context of a globalized and interconnected international
legal regime, drone warfare is a reality that cuts across the complexities of
competing legal theories to inflict very real damage on both enemies and all too
often the innocents among whom they hide. We must confront these issues
directly if we expect to resolve the underlying tensions and by extension to permit
military professionals to risk their lives and honor with no shadow of second
guessing.
I want to thank the organizers of this excellent conference. My task in this
keynote address was to highlight the trends and to generate the confusion, which
the panel will now dispel. Commenting on the impractical aspects of Additional
Protocol I, the eminent Dutch jurist Bert R61ing-who served on the bench of the
Tokyo International Military Tribunal--observed that treaty provisions ought not
"prohibit what will foreseeably occur" because the "laws of war are not intended to
alter power relations, and if they do, they will not be observed[.] ', 37  The
disconnects between aspirational legal rules and human experience are borne out in
operational experience by states that act decisively to protect the lives and property
of their citizens, which feeds an undercurrent of suspicion and politicization that
could erode the very foundations of humanitarian law. Unless we move towards
clarity in the conduct of drone warfare, we may well find ourselves paralyzed by
legal imprecision that erodes our ability to effectively apply available technologies
even in the exercise of the fundamental rights of individual or collective self-
defense. This imprecision could lead to a cycle of cynicism and second-guessing
that could weaken the commitment of some policy makers or military forces to
actually follow the law.
37. GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 391 (1994) (quoting Bert Raling, Criminal
Responsibility for Violations of the Laws of War, 12 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L 8, 25-26 (1976)).
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INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING THE STATUS AND MARKING OF
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT
IAN HENDERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent times, significant media and legal attention has been paid to the use
of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) in areas such as Pakistan and Yemen.' The
current terminology being used in the media and other areas debating this issue
varies. As well as RPA (the current term being preferred in some military circles),
other common terms include "drone", "armed drone", unmanned (or uninhabited)
aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned (or uninhabited) aircraft system (UAS); and when
some form of armament is also involved, sometimes the word "combat" is after
unmanned (or uninhabited), leading to the acronyms UCAS or UCAV. The legal
issues discussed have generally concerned the use of force, the status of the
operators of the aircraft (e.g., military or civilian intelligence agent), the status of
the intended target, or the injury caused to someone and the damage caused to
something other than the intended target. Comparatively little attention has been
paid to legal issues concerning the aircraft themselves; however, the rise in the use
and variety of RPA highlights some interesting legal issues concerning the aircraft
themselves. This article looks at the international law concerning the "status" of
RPA and the legal requirement, if any, for applying "markings" to RPA.
* Wing Commander, Royal Australian Air Force. This paper was written in a personal capacity
and does not necessarily represent the views of the Australian Department of Defence or the Australian
Defence Force.
1. See generally, Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the Future of War Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Nat!7 Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 111 th
Cong. 5 (2010), available at http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=comcontent&
view=article&id=621:03-23-2010-national-security-qrise-of-the-drones-unmanned-systems-and-the-
future-of-warq&catid=17; Rise of the Drones 11: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Gov't Reform, llth Cong. 5 (2010), available at http://oversight. house.gov/index.php?option
=com content&view=article&id=681%3A04-28-201 0-qrise-of-the-drones-ii-examining-the-legality-of-
unmanned-targetingq&catid=17%3Asubcommittee-on-national-security&temid=l; Gary Solis, CIA
Drone Attacks Produce America's Own Unlawful Combatants, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2010, at A17,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/11 /AR2010031
103653.html; Marc A. Thiessen, In CIA's Drone Mission, Who Will Protect the CIA?, WASH. POST
(June 8, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/07/AR20100
60701986.html?nav=hcmoduletmv; Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What are the Risks of the C.I.A. 's
Covert Drone Program?, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.newyorker.
com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fafactmayer; Ian Henderson, Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the
Use ofArmed Drones, Y.B. OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. (forthcoming 2011).
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While this article is concerned only with the aircraft, it is worth recalling that:
Unmanned aircraft systems generally consist of (1) multiple aircraft,
which can be expendable or recoverable and can carry lethal or non-
lethal payloads; (2) a flight control station; (3) information and retrieval
or processing stations; and (4) in some cases, wheeled land vehicles that
carry launch and recovery platforms.2
As for the RPA themselves:
Over 1100 makes and models of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) are
currently on the market or in development in more than 50 countries...
[involving] a diverse collection of fixed wing, rotorcraft, and lighter-
than-air flying machines, available in a wide variety of sizes and
capabilities. The known technologies range from "micro" UAVs that
are, in reality, flying robots designed to look and behave like a "bug," fit
in the palm of a hand, and carry a high-resolution camera, to 25,000-
pound turbojets with wingspans wider than a Boeing 737, operating at
or above 60,000 feet at speeds in excess of 530 miles per hour for over
35 hours at a time.4 Others designed for scientific research have flown
as high as 100,000 feet and have stayed in the air for nearly three days
without landing.
5
II. STATUS AND MARKING OF RPA: STATE AND CIVIL AIRCRAFT
International law divides aircraft into two broad categories: state aircraft and
civil aircraft.6 The distinction between civil and state aircraft, albeit not always
with the same terms, appears to date from the early 20th century. A reference to
state aircraft usually means, as a minimum, aircraft that are "used in military,
customs and police services." 8  It is possible, though, to use the term "state
aircraft" to mean all aircraft in the exclusive use or possession of a State and not be
limited by the definition in the Chicago Convention.9 As a result, there are two
current views of which aircraft are state aircraft. One view is that despite the
vague wording of the Chicago Convention, only military, customs and police
2. Rise of the Drones, supra note 1, at 4 (written testimony of Michael J. Sullivan, Director,
Acquisition and Sourcing Management).
3. Douglas Marshall, Unmanned Aerial Systems and International Civil Aviation Organization
Regulations, 85 N. DAK. L. REV. 693, 694-95 (citations omitted).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 3(a), Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S.
295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]; see also Definition of State Aircraft, THE EUROPEAN
ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OF AIR NAVIGATION (Dec. 22, 2004), http://www.eurocontrol.
int/mil/public/standardpage/stateac.html.
7. Jiri Homik, Article 3 of the Chicago Convention, XXVI ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 110,
111 (2001).
8. Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(b).
9. See Bin Cheng, State Ships and State Aircraft, II CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMs 225, 227-28
(1958).
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aircraft may be state aircraft.'l The other view is that other aircraft engaged in
purely state activities (e.g. coast guard or search and rescue) may also be state
aircraft."' Regardless of which position is correct, there are two main
consequences that flow from being a state aircraft. First, state aircraft are not
subject to the Chicago Convention, and particularly the detailed air navigation
rules. Second, state aircraft enjoy certain immunities and rights.12 There is no
reason not to apply the same legal divisions and consequences to RPA as defined
in the Chicago Convention.13 So, while the Chicago Convention is not directly
applicable to state aircraft (aside from article 3), there is no reason to treat RPA
differently from "normal" state aircraft.
No further requirements are specified in the Chicago Convention for an
aircraft to have the status of a state aircraft. For example, no particular markings-
national or otherwise-are specified. This is particularly noteworthy as article 20
of the Chicago Convention states: "Every aircraft engaged in international air
navigation shall bear its appropriate nationality and registration marks.'
14
However, the Chicago Convention applies to only civil aircraft and not to state
aircraft. 15 Accordingly, the Chicago Convention does not require any particular
markings, registration, etc., for state aircraft. 16 Interestingly, Article 10 of the 1919
Paris Convention stated: "All aircraft engaged in international navigation shall
bear their nationality and registration marks... 17  However, it is difficult to
10. ICAO, SECRETARIAT STUDY ON "CIVIL/STATE AIRCRAFT" ICAO Doc. LC/29 -WP/2-I,
Attach. 1, 5.2.1-5.2.6 (1994) [hereinafter ICAO Study]; see also SAN REMO MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 85, 13(1) (Louise Doswald-Beck ed.,
1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL]; Homik, supra note 7, at 122 n. 48; Lieutenant Colonel
Andrew S. Williams, The Interception of Civil Aircraft over the High Seas in the Global War on Tenor,
59 A.F. L. REv. 73, 113 (2007). But see ICAO Study, Attach. 2, 13 (calls into doubt part of 5.2.4).
11. Eur. Comm. for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of
Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of
Prisoners, 1 90, Doc. No. CDL-AD(2006)009 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter Venice Commission]; see also
Michael Milde, "Rendition Flights" and International Air Law, REDRESS, June 2008, at 8; Homik,
supra note 7 at 122-23; I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW 40, 42 (8th
rev. ed. 2006); ROYAL AUSTL. AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS LAW FOR RAAF COMMANDERS 1.4 (2004),
available at http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/Publications/Details/156/AAP1003-Operations-Law-for-
RAAF-Commanders-2nd-Edition.aspx.
12. The extent of those immunities and rights is discussed below.
13. See Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 8; DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 110-31, at 2-4
(1976) (no longer in force); Donald Ward, The Law of Military Aircraft in War and Peace, at 5 (1970)
(unpublished L.L.M. thesis, McGill University) (available at http://digitool.library.
mcgill.ca/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object-id=46681 &localbase=GENO1-MCG02); Marshall, supra
note 3, at 697-98.
14. Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 20.
15. Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(a).
16. See NICHOLAS M. POULANTZAS, THE RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 195
n.288 (2nd ed. 2002) (discussing the non-requirement for registration of state aircraft).
17. Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, art. 10, Oct. 13, 1919, 11
L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. It is "generally considered the forerunner to the Chicago
Convention." ICAO Study, supra note 10, T 2.1.2.
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determine whether article 10 applied to state aircraft. This is because article 30
provided that: "All State aircraft other than military, customs and police aircraft
shall be treated as private aircraft and as such shall be subject to all the provisions
of the present Convention. 18  A clear inference from this provision is that the
Paris Convention did not in general apply to certain types of state aircraft.19
In a discussion of the criteria for determining whether an aircraft is a military
versus a civil aircraft, Milde writes:
This wording ["used" and "services"], in the absence of any other
guidance, suggests that the drafters had in mind a functional approach to
the determination of the status of the aircraft as civil and military:
regardless of the design, technical characteristics, registration,
ownership etc.; the status of the aircraft is determined by the function it
actually performs at a given time.
20
Milde's argument and conclusion applies equally to other types of state
aircraft. Williams adopts a similar position, stating that whether an aircraft is a
state aircraft depends upon function, and not "design or technical characteristics,
call sign, registration, or markings-all of which fall within the competence of its
state of nationality." 21 Whether an aircraft is, for the purposes of the Chicago
Convention, a state or civil aircraft, it is the "usage of the aircraft in question [that]
is the determining criterion, and not, by themselves, other factors such as aircraft
registration and markings.....
22
Notwithstanding that there appears to be no strict legal requirement for state
aircraft to be marked as such, it often seems assumed that an aircraft will bear
some sort of marking.2 3 Other statements indicating an assumption of marking
include: "state aircraft, including military aircraft, are also marked to indicate their
nationality"; 24 and "state aircraft may include aircraft which, in light of their
mission, display appropriate state markings....25
The importance of the expectations of States cannot be over emphasized.
When one starts out with the somewhat ambiguous legal position expressed in
article 3 of the Chicago Convention,26 and the fact that States may essentially
18. Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 30.
19. Hornik, supra note 7, at 112-13 (discussing the application of the Paris Convention and not
just Chapter VII thereof to state aircraft).
20. Milde, supra note 11, at 9.
21. Williams, supra note 10, at 107 (emphasis added); see also ICAO Study, supra note 10,
5.3.3 (referring to use and other criteria to help ascertain the status of an aircraft).
22. ICAO Study, supra note 10, 1.3.
23. Id. 5.3.2.
24. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 13, 1 2-4; UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCH., AIR FORCE OPERATIONS & THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR AIR, SPACE & CYBER
FORCES 23-24 at n.52 (Tonya Hagmaier et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009) [hereinafter U.S. AIR FORCE JAG
SCHOOL].
25. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 11, at 42.
26. Homik, supra note 7, at 130 ("[I]t is almost impossible in accordance with the present wording
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choose how to classify one another's aircraft,27 then lack of markings only
exacerbates the issue.
Despite the aforementioned legal uncertainty, some general observations can
be made. At a minimum, state aircraft include aircraft used in military, customs
and police services. Whether an aircraft is being so used is primarily a functional
test.28 An aircraft need not bear markings to be a state aircraft, but absence of such
markings is likely to prejudice the finding that the aircraft is a state aircraft by
other States. RPA can be state aircraft and all of the proceeding points apply to
RPA. A unique feature of RPA compared to manned aircraft is that RPA can be
quite small in size. However, the relevant international law does not change.29
III. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF STATE AIRCRAFT
While this article is not primarily concerned with the detail of the rights and
liabilities of state aircraft, some discussion of the topic is important to illustrate the
importance of determining whether an RPA is a civil or state aircraft. State aircraft
enjoy certain rights and immunities, including immunity "from the jurisdiction of
the courts of a territorial state." 30 The applicable law on a state aircraft is the
jurisdiction, including criminal jurisdiction, of the "flag" State. 31 A significant
immunity is that state aircraft are not subject to "foreign jurisdiction in respect of
search and inspection" without consent.32 Interestingly, the 1919 Paris Convention
drew a distinction between types of state aircraft, with only military aircraft
enjoying "the privileges which are customarily accorded to foreign ships of war";33
while other types of state aircraft did not enjoy such privileges.34 Writing in 1970,
Ward expressed doubt as to whether States would generally accept this principle
with respect to military aircraft,35 while a nearly contemporary writer seemed to be
of Article 3 to determine with one hundred percent certainty the legal status of an aircraft, i.e. whether it
is a civil or state aircraft.").
27. Id. ("Neither the operator of an aircraft nor the state of registry can assure that the aircraft
concerned will not be treated in another state as a state aircraft . . Thus, a situation can easily occur in
which an aircraft is deemed in one state to be a civil aircraft and in another state to be a state aircraft.
The decision of the latter state, in many cases, might be deemed arbitrary (in many cases of a political
nature) rather than stemming from the legal term 'discretion."').
28. I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW 34 (Kluwer Law Int'l ed.,
7th rev. ed. 2001).
29. Marshall, supra note 3, at 699 ("There is no minimum size described, so even a radio-
controlled model aircraft would be covered under a literal reading of the definition, and no legal
authorities state otherwise. In the ICAO regulatory scheme, no distinction is made between manned
and unmanned aircraft.").
30. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 12.6.1 (Oxford
Univ. Press, 2004); MINISTRY PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH,
COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INT'L LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 53
(2010).
31. Williams, supra note 10, at 99.
32. Venice Commission, supra note 11, 95.
33. Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 32.
34. Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 33.
35. Ward, supra note 13, at 24.
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of the opposite view.36 The better view today is that military aircraft enjoy
sovereign immunity.37 Further, such immunity applies to all types of state aircraft
38and not just those used in military, police and customs services.
Separate from the immunity issue is the issue of the rights enjoyed by state
aircraft. For example, only certain types of aircraft may legally intercept suspected
pirate ships and aircraft on or over the high seas.39 That right is reserved to
military aircraft and "aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on
government service and authorized to that effect." 4° Similar rules apply to what
type of aircraft may exercise a right of visit of a foreign ship on the high seas, and
41may engage in hot pursuit. While some have stated that this right is limited to
military, police or customs aircraft,42 that view seems to be based on interpreting
article 3(b) of the Chicago Convention as an exclusive list of what may be state
aircraft for all purposes. The better view is that as long as the aircraft is "on
government service and authorized to that effect," then any aircraft may exercise
the function and the aircraft need not be a state aircraft per article 3(b) of the
Chicago Convention.
43
Conversely, State aircraft do not enjoy the rights afforded under the Chicago
Convention to civil aircraft. For example, non-scheduled civil aircraft do not need
permission from a contracting state to fly over or to make stops for non-traffic
purposes; assistance in distress; the non-use of weapons against civil aircraft in
flight; where an accident has occurred, the state of registry has a right to appoint
observers to be present at the investigation and to receive a copy of the report and
its findings; and none of the aviation security instruments apply to state aircraft.44
By way of analogy from the law of the sea and flagless vessels, States may
intercept Stateless aircraft over the high seas.45 In this respect, an aircraft showing
36. Abu Kasim Thaher, International Law and the Legal Status of Military Aircraft in Peacetime
62 (April 1969) (unpublished L.L.M Thesis, McGill University), available at http://digitool.
Library.McGill.CA:80/R/-? func=dbin-jump-full&object id=47234&current base=GEN01.
37. Cheng, supra note 9, at 256; J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES
RESPONSES TO ExcEssivE MARITIME CLAIMS 466 (2d ed. 1996); 73 ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 2.2.2 (A.R. Thomas & James C.
Duncan eds.) (1999) [hereinafter LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS]; U.S. AIR FORCE JAG SCHOOL, supra
note 24, at 23; ROYAL AUSTRL. AIR FORCE, supra note 11, 2.3; MINISTRY PROGRAM ON
HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, supra note 30, at 53.
38. ICAO Study, supra note 10, 5.2.6.
39. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 107, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter Law of the Sea].
40. Id.
41. Id., arts. 110(4), (5) and 111(5).
42. Williams, supra note 10, at 113.
43. POULANTZAS, supra note 16, at 194.
44. Williams, supra note 10, at 106 n.2 10.
45. Id. at 128; see also Law of the Sea, supra note 39, art. I I0(l)(d); ROBIN R. CHURCHILL &
ALAN V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 214 (3d ed. 1999); LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra note 37,
3.11.2.3.
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no national markings is the equivalent of a ship not flying a flag.46 So, consistent
with the conclusions made above, while technically there is no requirement for an
aircraft to bear markings to be a state aircraft under the Chicago Convention, the
lack of markings will operate to prejudice the finding that the aircraft is a state
aircraft by other States.
In summary, consistent with the law that applies to ships, the better view is
that a state can only claim the immunities and particularly the rights associated
with a state aircraft in international airspace if the aircraft displays its status as a
state aircraft via appropriate markings.47
IV. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER CONSORTIUMS
While state aircraft are automatically associated in people's minds with a
single State, that need not necessarily be the case. A reference to a state aircraft
can, in the abstract, merely be thought of as the opposite of a civil aircraft, with
civil aircraft essentially meaning private aircraft. 48 For example, early work on air
law did not use "state aircraft" but rather "public aircraft. ' '49  However,
international practice has developed to the point where aircraft are registered in
one State and one State only. Pursuant to the Paris Convention, an aircraft could
not "be validly registered in more than one State." 50 While not directly applicable
to state aircraft, this provision has influenced the development of the law. For
instance, in 1923 a proposed article, of application to all types of aircraft, stated
that "[n]o aircraft may possess more than one nationality."' 5' This theme continues
through to the present law, and applies not only to the non-availability of joint-
state registration/nationality, 52 but also requires that registration/nationality be
attributable to a State and not an international organization (not even one with
legal personality).53
As a matter of law, the foregoing applies strictly only to the
registration/nationality issue. So while a state aircraft must have the nationality of
an actual State (and only one State), this does not preclude international
organizations from performing some functions traditionally associated with a State.
For example, "[imn certain circumstances, such as managing specific aircraft or
managing the ICAO 24-bit aircraft addresses allocated to NATO, NATO can be
46. See Williams, supra note 10, at 129. Although note that Williams refers to article 20 of the
Chicago Convention, which is not applicable to state aircraft.
47. See Venice Commission, supra note 11, 103
48. This was the distinction adopted in the 1919 Paris Convention. See Paris Convention, supra
note 17, art. 30.
49. Draft Convention, 1910 Paris International Air Navigation Conference art. 40, May 8 - Jun.
28, 1910.
50. Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 8.
51. Hague Rules of Air Warfare art. 10 (1923), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR
139-49 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelffeds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter HRAW].
52. Williams, supra note 10, at 96.
53. See ICAO Study, supra note 10, 4.7.1.
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regarded as a State Aircraft operator. 5 4  However, this does not mean that
"NATO" can be the "State" for the purpose of an aircraft being a state aircraft. For
example, NATO aircraft are registered in Luxembourg and display the national
military markings of that State alongside NATO markings. 55
As a final point, it is worth noting that an aircraft could be truly stateless and
be neither a civil nor state aircraft for the purposes of the Chicago Convention. In
such a circumstance, the aircraft would not have the rights or privileges of either
class of aircraft. 6
V. MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
As discussed above, "military aircraft" are a subset of state aircraft. 7  In
addition, RPA can be military aircraft.58  Accordingly, the discussion below
applies equally to manned and unmanned aircraft. As discussed above, the
requirements for an aircraft to be a military aircraft so as to amount to being a state
aircraft are simply that the aircraft be used in military service. This is a functional
test and the absence of markings is not ipso facto fatal to a claim of military
aircraft status, though the absence of markings is likely to prejudice such a claim.
What is sometimes overlooked, though, is that separate law applies during an
international armed conflict.
5 9
54. European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, Mode S - Harmonisation of the
Transition Arrangements for State Aircraft -Process and Procedures for the Managing of the Mode S
Compliance Status and the Exemptions Granted to State Aircraft, EUROCONTROL (1.1 ed. Aug. 22,
2005), available at http://www.eurocontrol.int/mil/gallery/content/public/milgallery/ documents/Mode
%20S%20%20Process%20and%20Procedures%20for%20State%20Aircraft%20V 11%20Released%201
ssue%20220805%20A4.pdf.
55. Max S. Johnson, NATO Military Headquarters, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF VISITING
FORCES 257, 315 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2001); see also U.S. AIR FORCE JAG SCHOOL, supra note 24, at
188. For background on how and why Luxembourg was chosen, see NATO Airborne Early Warning &
Control Force E-3A Component, Frequently Asked Questions, NATO E-3A COMPONENT,
http://www.e3a.nato.int/eng/html/faq.htm (last visited May 5, 2011). A similar solution for
multinational airlines is discussed in DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 11, at 29. See Ishaq R.
Goreish, The Problem of Registration and Nationality of Aircraft of International Operating Agencies
and the I.C.A.O. Council's Resolution of the Problem (1969) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, McGill
University) (on file with McGill University). For civil aircraft, also see the last sentence of Article 77
of the Chicago Convention, "Nothing in this Convention shall prevent two or more contracting States
from constituting joint air transport operating organizations or international operating agencies and
from pooling their air services on any routes or in any regions, but such organizations or agencies and
such pooled services shall be subject to all the provisions of this Convention, including those relating to
the registration of agreements with the Council. The Council shall determine in what manner the
provisions of this Convention relating to nationality of aircraft shall apply to aircraft operated by
international operating agencies." Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 77.
56. See Williams, supra note 10, at 128-29.
57. Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 3(b); Ward, supra note 13, at 6.
58. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 108 (2004); Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, supra note 30,
at 1, 5-6; U.S. AIR FORCE JAG SCHOOL, supra note 24, at 23.
59. See UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 30, 12.1, 12.10.
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There is no treaty law dealing specifically with the marking of military
aircraft beyond that concerning the marking of medical aircraft with the distinctive
emblem (i.e., the red cross, crescent or crystal). 60 Therefore, in an international
armed conflict the relevant legal principles concerning military aircraft are drawn
from customary international law. Whether or not an aircraft is a military aircraft
is important because, unlike civil aircraft and other (i.e., non-military) state
aircraft, military aircraft may exercise belligerent rights.61
As early as 1914, the eminent author on air law, Spaight, proposed that, in
times of war, military aircraft shall bear "the distinctive sign of its character as a
military aircraft of the said Power, irremovable and recognizable at a distance."
62
The HRAW provided that military aircraft be required to "bear an external mark
indicating its nation; and military character ' 63 and non-military state aircraft bear
"an external mark indicating its nationality and its public non-military character., 64
In addition, the external marks should be "so affixed that they cannot be altered
during flight. They shall be as large as practicable and shall be visible from above,
from below and from each side."65 It is generally recognized that the rules laid
down in the HRAW reflect customary international law on these points.66 In
particular, after a thorough review of the literature, Ward concludes that a military
aircraft must bear distinctive marks of both its nationality and military character.
67
Ward also states that following "[t]his practice appears to be universal. 68 Indeed,
in the context of the discussion of markings, it is often assumed that military
aircraft will be marked.
69
It would seem that, strictly speaking, "'public non-military aircraft employed
for customs or police purposes" '70 should bear these marks at all times, whereas
public non-military aircraft "other than those employed for customs or police
60. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 39, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1950).
61. HRAW, supra note 51, art. 13.
62. JAMES SPAIGHT, AIRCRAFT IN WAR 114, 72-73 (1914).
63. HRAW, supra note 51, art. 3.
64. Id. art. 4-5.
65. Id. art. 7.
66. See IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY OBJECTIVES,
PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK UNDER ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I 26-27 (2009);
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, 57, n.103 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
67. Ward, supra note 13, at 17-18. See also Thaher, supra note 36, at 15-17; SAN REMO
MANUAL, supra note 10, at 13(j); UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 30, " 12.10.4; Knut Ipsen,
Combatants and Non-Combatants, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 79,
113-14 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2008); ROYAL AUSTL. AIR FORCE, supra note 11, 1.3. For a good review of
the history of military aircraft markings, see JAMES M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 76-99
(3rd ed. 1947).
68. Ward, supra note 13, at 12.
69. See DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 13, 2-4(d); LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra
note 37, at 114 n. 14. But see infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
70. HRAW, supra note 51, art. 4.
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purposes ' 71 would need to bear such marks only "in time of war., 72 However, as
the HRAW were never adopted, the main relevance of the Rules is a source for
customary international law. With the adoption of the Chicago Convention, the
HRAW do not reflect customary international law in peacetime concerning
marking of aircraft. However, those parts of the HRAW concerning marking of
military aircraft do appear to reflect the relevant customary international law
applicable during an international armed conflict. 73
As briefly mentioned above, the importance of satisfying the requirement for
being a "military aircraft" under the law of armed conflict is that during an
international armed conflict, "[m]ilitary aircraft are alone entitled to exercise
belligerent rights. 74  While "belligerent rights" are not defined, those rights
include engaging in hostilities, as well as firing on the enemy and attacking
military objectives. 75 "The term 'hostilities' includes the transmission during flight
of military intelligence for the immediate use of a belligerent., 76 This last point
needs to be understood in context. The issues concerning the transmission of
military intelligence are whether the person doing so is taking a direct part in
hostilities77 and/or whether the person is a spy.7 8 The more legally interesting
issue is probably the spy issue, as a civilian operator of an RPA that is transmitting
"military intelligence for the immediate use of a belligerent" is probably taking a
direct part in hostilities regardless of whether or not the RPA has military
markings.
Notwithstanding the conclusion above concerning the marking of military
aircraft, one view has been expressed that while military aircraft are "required to
be marked with appropriate signs of their nationality and military character....
circumstances may exist where such markings are superfluous and are not
required., 79 The example given is "where no other aircraft except those belonging
to a single state are flown." 80 It is arguable that where an aircraft silhouette is so
distinctive that both the nationality and military nature of the aircraft can be
deduced from the silhouette alone, then no markings are required. The marking
requirement originally arose at a time when military and civilian aircraft had
71. Id. art 5.
72. Id.
73. See Ward, supra note 13, at 12.
74. HRAW, supra note 51, art. 13; see also UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 30, 4.1,
4.4.1; ROYAL AuSTL. AIR FORCE, supra note 11, 2.4; Ward, supra note 13, at 9. While Ward refers to
only civil and military aircraft, that is probably due to the context in which he was writing.
75. See HRAW, supra note 51, art. 16.
76. Id.
77. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, arts. 51(1), (3), opened for signature Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
78. See Id. art. 46.
79. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 13, 7-4.
80. Id. While the 1976 Air Force Pamphlet is no longer in force, a similar position is expressed in
U.S. AIR FORCE JAG SCHOOL, supra note 24, at 23.
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similar designs and when civilian aircraft were adopted for military use." The
problem is that the requirement for military markings has become firmly
entrenched in customary international law. Practically, a problem exists in that the
silhouette would have to be distinctive from above, below and each side. Also, an
issue with relying on silhouette rather than markings arises with captured aircraft.
There have been many occasions where an enemy has flown captured aircraft.82
To avoid allegations of treachery, the captured aircraft should be clearly marked
"with the same markings as the captor's military aircraft., 83 Finally, as aircraft
cannot be operated solely by a coalition but must be attributable to a single nation,
an aircraft type would have to be operated by only one nation.84 Accordingly, for
both legal and operational reasons, the better view is that military aircraft should
be marked, and not rely on silhouette. If, however, a State were of the view that
legally it could rely on a silhouette providing the required level of distinction, then
it would be highly desirable to notify the other belligerent parties that that is the
85State's position.
The above applies only during an international armed conflict. In a non-
international armed conflict, there is no customary international law requiring the
marking of military aircraft. As long as the government forces operate within the
other rules of international law applicable during a non-international armed
conflict, the government forces may use any type of aircraft with or without
markings - noting that misuse of symbols of protection, like the red
cross/crescent/crystal (the distinctive emblem), is still prohibited. Use of the
distinctive emblem on a RPA that fulfilled the criteria for being a medical aircraft,
not including combat search and rescue, would not be misuse.
8 6
As the non-state actors in a non-international armed conflict have no legal
rights to participate in a conflict in the first place, the issue of the marking of an
aircraft operated by a non-state actor is a legal irrelevancy. Regardless of whether
a non-state actor wears a uniform or operates a "marked" aircraft, the non-state
actor has no legal right to participate in belligerent acts.
8 7
Cheng appears to be of the view that an aircraft can be an "'aircraft in military
service, though not technically a military aircraft." 88 This would mean that the
aircraft would be a State aircraft under ICAO, but not an aircraft that could
81. See DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, supra note 13, 2-4(c).
82. Ward, supra note 13, at 15.
83. Id.; SPAIGHT, supra note 67, at 89-91.
84. Examples of more than one nation in a coalition operating the same RPA type are provided at
note 94 infra.
85. HRAW, supra note 51, art. 8. "The external marks, prescribed by the rules in force in each
state, shall be notified promptly to all other Powers." Id.
86. Use of an RPA in a medical role is not hypothetical. The Israel Defense Forces are planning
the use of an RPA for evacuation of wounded. Sapphire Itscovich, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to
Evacuate Injured During Combat, ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (Aug. 6, 2009, 3:46 pm),
http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/News/Tech/09/08/0601 .htm.
87. This issue is dealt with in greater detail in Henderson, supra note 1, at 15.
88. Cheng, supra note 9, at 235.
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exercise belligerent rights. This is similar to a related but distinct position that an
aircraft can be a civil aircraft for the purposes of the Chicago Convention but
concurrently a "state aircraft" (used in a broad sense of the term) for non-Chicago
Convention purposes. 89  This type of aircraft has been referred to as auxiliary
aircraft in the San Remo ManuaP° and some military manuals.9' The Commentary
to the Air and Missile Warfare Manual prefers to draw no further distinction and
notes that such aircraft can be simply thought of as state aircraft.92 One example is
a transport aircraft. If the aircraft was owned and operated by the military with
only national markings and no military markings, the aircraft would be a state
aircraft for the purposes of the Chicago Convention (as an aircraft being used in
military service) but would not be a military aircraft for the purposes of the law of
armed conflict.
93
The markings, or lack thereof, on RPAs provide a useful way to illustrate the
above points. Publicly available pictures of RPAs operating in Afghanistan show
that the practice of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and
Australia on markings varies from platform type to platform type - with some
platforms bearing military markings and others having no such markings.94
89. ICAO Study, supra note 10, 5.2.6.
90. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 10, §5(13)(k).
91. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 30, 12.5.
92. MINISTRY PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, supra note 30, at
52.
93. U.S. AIR FORCE JAG SCHOOL, supra note 24, at 23-24.
94. For the USA see: Image of a Global Hawk, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE,
http://www.afmil/shared/media/photodb/photos/061003-F-7441T-003.jpg (last visited May 9, 2011);
Image of a Raven, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE, http://www.af.mil/shared/media
photodb/photos/070706-f-6751b-204.jpg (last visited May 9, 2011); Image of a Reaper, THE OFFICIAL
WEBSITE OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE, http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/090127-F-7383P-
OOI.JPG (last visited May 9, 2011). For the UK see: Image of a Reaper, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceIntemet/Templates/LargeImageTemplate.aspx?img-/NR/rdonlyres/99A043
OA-A361-47C2-9E26-07DDOB8F71B5/0/reaper.jpg&alt--Reapero20UAV (last visited May 9, 2011);
Image of an Hermes 450, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, http://www.mod.uk/Defencelnternet/
Templates/LargeImageTemplate.aspx?img=/NR/rdonlyres/DD6ECD25-DE1 B-4F41-9A03-
092EF 1 2B92FB/0/3.jpg&alt=Hermes%/ 20450%/o20unmanned%/ 20air%/o20vehicle%/o20at%/ 20an%/ 20airfiel
d (last visited May 9, 2011). For Australia see: Image of a Scan Eagle, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT -
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, http://www.defence.gov.aulopEx/global/opcatalyst/images/gallery/
20061222/20061206adf8205214_0011.jpg (last visited May 9, 2011); Image of a Scan Eagle,
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, http://www.defence.gov.au/news/
armynews/editions/1174/images/14%20-%20UAV%201aunch%20pad.jpg (last visited May 9, 2011);
Image of a Scan Eagle, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE,
http://www.defence.gov.au/op/afghanistan/gallery/2010/20100201 c/201001 25adf8246638 374.jpg (last
visited May 9, 2011); and Image of a Scan Eagle, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT - DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENCE, http://www.defence.gov.au/op/afghanistan/gallery/2010/20100201c/ 20100125adf8 24663
8_370.jpg (last visited May 9, 2011). See also Image of a Heron, NATIONAL DEFENCE AND THE
CANADIAN FORCES, http://www.cefcom-comfec.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/potd/photos-eng.asp?id=346 (last
visited May 9, 2011) (The Heron is also operated by Canada in Afghanistan, and can be seen here
showing the distinctive maple-leaf mark).
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Indeed, there is even variation among the same type. 95 Publicly available pictures
of the Australian Scan Eagle on one occasion show a low-visibility kangaroo (a
standard military marking on Australian Army military aircraft), but this marking
does not appear on the other pictures.96 Based on this small sample, what can be
deduced is that the majority of the RPAs have markings, but some of the smaller
RPAs are not marked.
The reasons for this are not known; however, a few observations can be made.
First, the conflict in Afghanistan is, at most, a non-international armed conflict.
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Accordingly, military aircraft operating in Afghanistan are not required by the law
of armed conflict to be marked. Second, the manner of operation of the RPA may
be evidence of State practice towards an evolving customary international law
norm that smaller RPA that are not armed need not be marked. If this is an
accurate assessment, such practice makes operational sense. There is a point at
which markings no longer serve a useful purpose. The United States Air Force
currently operates an RPA called Wasp III with a wingspan of only 72.3 cm and a
length of 25.4 cm (weighing 453 grams). 98 A RPA called the Defly Micro is under
development that is just "3 grams and has a size of 10 cm from wing tip to wing
tip." 99 Any marking on such RPA, even if "as large as possible,"' 00 would be
practically unobservable in flight.
VI. CONCLUSION
Markings on aircraft are important indicators of an aircraft's status.
Particularly in peacetime, international law makes a distinction between civil and
state aircraft. During an international armed conflict, the primary distinction is
between military aircraft and other aircraft. Where an RPA is used in military
service, an RPA can be a state aircraft, a military aircraft, or both.
Whether an aircraft is a state aircraft is principally a functional test. Strictly
speaking, an aircraft need not have any particular markings to have the status of a
state aircraft. Nonetheless, the lack of markings is likely to prejudice the finding
that an aircraft is a state aircraft - particularly by States other than the operating
State. For example, where an aircraft lacks national markings, a State may have
problems with successfully asserting the rights usually associated with state
aircraft (e.g. sovereign immunity from foreign search and inspection).
An aircraft can only have the nationality of one State and there is no concept
of a state aircraft having the "nationality" of an international organization.
95. Id.
96. AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, supra note 94.
97. Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1333, 1408 (2007).
98. Factsheets: Wasp III, U.S AIR FORCE (Nov. 19. 2009), http://www.af.mil/information!
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id= 10469.
99. Delfly Micro, DELFLY, http://www.delfly.nl/?site=DIII&menu=home&lang-en (last visited
May 5, 2011). While it has been referred to here as an RPA, the goal is for fully autonomous flight. As
such, it will ultimately be a misnomer to call it remotely piloted.
100. HRAW, supra note 51, art. 7.
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However, an aircraft can have the nationality of one State while at the same time
displaying markings showing its relationship to an international organization.
Unlike for state aircraft, the law is much clearer on the requirement that
aircraft have markings in an international armed conflict for that aircraft to have
the status of a military aircraft. This is important, because in an international
armed conflict, only military aircraft should exercise belligerent rights. The law of
marking for military aircraft is customary in nature, and the law may be evolving
toward not requiring such markings on small RPA where the size of the RPA
means that any markings will be so small as to serve no practical purpose.
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I. INTRODUCTION
They are most commonly referred to as "drones." The United States Air
Force (USAF) calls them "Remotely Piloted Aircraft" (RPAs) or "Unmanned
Aircraft Systems" (UASs). 2 Pilots and operators might call them "Reapers" or
"Preds." No matter the name or acronym, these remotely-controlled machines
have risen dramatically during the last decade to the forefront of war fighting
capabilities-and international law debate. However, the employment of drones
on the battlefield is not new. During at least the last 50 years, the United States
(U.S.) military has employed drones and RPAs principally as a platform for
reconnaissance-allowing operators, far removed from danger, to safely observe
the battlefield.3 Over the last decade, however, RPAs have evolved into a
comprehensive "combat support asset," being used for both reconnaissance
operations and targeting operations, among other functions.4
Remotely Piloted Aircraft targeting operations, sometimes called strikes, have
become a prominent feature of the U.S.'s worldwide battle against individual
terrorists and terrorist organizations. One of the U.S.'s first notable strikes of this
modem RPA era occurred in Yemen on November 3, 2002. 5 The U.S. and Yemeni
Governments had been tracking several men who were allegedly involved in the
bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000.6 On several occasions, officials
attempted to apprehend the men, but were unsuccessful. 7  The priority target
among them, Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harithi, was believed to be the top al Qaeda
operative in Yemen.8 Wanted and pursued by both governments, Harithi had been
hiding amongst and moving between armed tribal villages. 9 On at least one
occasion, villagers had demonstrated their willingness and ability to forcefully
2. In 2009, Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Donley, officially replaced the name Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle, or UAV, with Remotely Piloted Aircraft, or RPA. The change was to emphasize the
fact that UAV operations are anything but "unmanned." Bruce Rolfsen, Unmanned a Misnomer When
it Comes to UAVs, AIR FORCE TIMES (June 11, 2010), http://www.airforcetimes.
comnews/2010/06/airforce uav personnel_061110w/; A Drone by Any Other Name.... REUTERS
SUMMIT NOTEBOOK (Dec. 14, 2009) http://blogs.reuters.com!summits/2009/12/14/a-drone-by-any-
other-name/. Numerous acronyms exist to describe drones of varying sizes and capabilities. The most
common among them are: Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
(UCAV), Micro Aerial Vehicle (MAV), Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), Force Protection Aerial
Surveillance System (FPASS), Small Unmanned Aircraft System (SUAS), and Lethal Miniature Aerial
Munitions System (LMAMS).
3. U.S. AIR FORCE, THE U.S. AIR FORCE REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT AND UNMANNED
AERIAL VEHICLE STRATEGIC VISION 1 (2005), [hereinafter STRATEGIC VISION], available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/policy/usaf/afd-060322-009.pdf.
4. Id. at 2.
5. Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Civil and Political
Rights, Including the Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions: Report of the Special
Rapporteur, 1 37, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/3 (Jan. 13, 2003) (prepared by Asma Jahangir).
6. Id. 38.
7. Id.
8. NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 41(2008); CIA 'Killed Al-
Qaeda Suspects' in Yemen, BBC NEWS (Nov. 5, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/middle east/2402479.stm.
9. CIA 'Killed Al-Qaeda Suspects'in Yemen, supra note 8.
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repel Yemeni government security forces, turning back a raid and killing 18
Yemeni soldiers in the process.
10
It was against this backdrop that the U.S., with cooperation from the Yemenis,
tracked, targeted, and killed Harithi and five of his associates using a Predator
drone armed with Hellfire missiles.1 The strike took place in Yemen as the men
traveled in a vehicle near a tribal stronghold.12 The strike was notable because in
conducting so-called "covert action,' ' 13 the U.S. took an unmanned reconnaissance
aircraft, attached missiles to it, and used it to kill people in a country where
arguably no armed conflict existed. 14 This was not the first time an RPA had been
used to deliver a lethal strike in this manner and it certainly would not be the last.
In December 2008, then-CIA Director Michael Hayden briefed President-elect
Barack Obama on the numerous covert activities then underway at the CIA.
15
Reportedly, foremost among the activities discussed was the multitude of RPA
strikes "on terrorists and terrorist camps worldwide."'16 "80 percent" of the CIA's
worldwide RPA strikes, Director Hayden told the president-elect, were taking
place in Pakistan.' 7 A 2009 congressional report noted that
[t]he accelerated drone campaign in western Pakistan that began in mid-
2008 appears to have taken a significant toll on Al Qaeda
operatives... According to Pakistani intelligence officials, who
reportedly are now providing targeting information to the United States,
drone attacks have eliminated more than half of the top 20 Al Qaeda
"high-value targets" in western Pakistan since mid-2008.' 8
Even by al Qaeda members' own admissions, RPAs have been critical to
knocking out top leaders in the Taliban and al Qaeda organizations.' 9 In January
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Paragraph 3.5(b) of Executive Order 12333, defines "'covert action" as "an activity or
activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or
acknowledged publicly .. "Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), amended by
Exec. Order No. 13, 470, 73 FR 45, 325 (Jul. 30, 2008), available at http://www.fas.
org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo- 12333-2008.pdf.
14. Anonymous U.S. officials who were cited attributed the Yemen strike to the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), although the CIA did not comment publicly on the strike. CIA 'Killed Al-
Qaeda Suspects' in Yemen, supra note 8.
15. BOB WOODWARD, OBAMA'S WARS 50-56 (2010).
16. Id. at52.
17. Id.
18. K. ALAN KRONSTADT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RE 33498, PAKISTAN-U.S. RELATIONS 34
(2009), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/127297.pdf; but see David Kilcullen & Andrew
McDonald Exum, Op-Ed., Death From Above, Outrage Down Below, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html (arguing that using the unseen, unheard
RPAs often with collateral damage actually serves to further destabilize these regions and turn power to
insurgents).
19. AI-Qaida Leader Admits Facing Pressure from Drones, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan. 27, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/01/27/al-qaida-leader-admits-facing-pressure-drones/.
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2011, al Qaeda's chief of media and preaching in Pakistan admitted in a broadcast
to his followers that its network is losing territory, people, and resources as
"drones are flying in the sky.''2° The USAF has described RPAs and their effects
as "one of the most 'in demand' capabilities the USAF provides....21 In the fall of
2010, the U.S. government revealed that RPAs had proven the key to success in
Afghanistan against U.S. troops' formidable foe, the Improvised Explosive Device
(IED).22  In less than a two-week period, an RPA task force contributed to the
killing of at least 26 individuals who were taking part in planting IEDs Among
this and various other operational benefits that will be discussed in this article,
RPAs also provide the USAF reduced operation and maintenance costs24 and, of
course, the ability to keep pilots and operators out of harm's way as they control
their aircraft from remote locations.
Strikes like the Yemen strike described above, often referred to as "targeted
killings, 25 began largely under President George W. Bush and have increased
significantly under President Barrack Obama. 6 These strikes now occur regularly
20. Id.
21. U.S. AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT PLAN
2009-2047, 3 (2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA 505168&Location
=U2& doc=GetTRDoc.pdf [hereinafter FLIGHT PLAN].
22. Yochi J. Dreazen, Using Drones to Counter JEDs, NAT'L J. (Oct. 2, 2010),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/id_20101002_1678.php; Terry McCarthy, Afghanistan's
Most Dangerous Job: Finding IEDs, CBS NEWS (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2010/08/19/eveningnews/main6788192.shtml (citing an exponential increase in US fatalities
caused by IEDs, with as many as 60% of fatalities caused by IEDs in Afghanistan during 2010).
23. Dreazen, supra note 22.
24. STRATEGIC VISION, supra note 3, at 15.
25. MELZER, supra note 8, at 3. Melzer, a legal advisor to the International Committee of the Red
Cross, has explained targeted killings as having five essential elements. Those are first, the "use of
lethal force" against a person; second, that the targeting was done with "premeditation and deliberation
to kill;" third, that the targeting is of "individually selected persons" as opposed to "collective,
unspecified, or random targets;" fourth, that the actor lacked "physical custody" of the targeted person;
and fifth, that the act is attributable to a "subject of international law," which refers to "primarily
States," but also includes certain "non-State actors." Id. at 3-4. Various other definitions exist, although
no definition seems to be widely agreed upon under IHL. One international law scholar suggests a
more restrictive definition, describing a targeted killing as "the intentional killing of a specific civilian
or unlawful combatant who cannot reasonably be apprehended, who is taking a direct part in hostilities,
the targeting done at the direction of the state, in the context of an international or non-international
armed conflict." GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 538 (2010).
26. While exact numbers are elusive, as most of these attacks are not publicly acknowledged or
discussed by the U.S. government, rough estimates indicate the attacks at a rate of just a few during
2007, steadily increasing to as many as twenty per month in 2010. See Ishtiaq Mahsud, AI-Qaida Figure
Believed Killed In US Drone Strike, The WASH. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2011),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 1/feb/21/al-qaeda-figure-believed-killed-us-drone-strike/
(discussing strikes in Pakistan during 2011 occurring about once per week); Mark Mazzetti & Eric
Schmitt, C.IA Steps Up Drone Attacks On Taliban In Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/world/asia/28drones.html (citing seventy-four attacks year-to-date
in September 2010); Interview by Ari Shapiro with Peter Bergen, Senior Fellow, New American
Foundation (Sept. 28, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=130180992 (citing roughly twenty drone strikes along the Afghan border during September
2010); Eric Schmitt, Pakistans Failure to Hit Militant Sanctuary Has Positive Side for U.S., N.Y.
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along and inside Pakistan's northwestern border with Afghanistan. 27 For reasons
to be discussed in this article, some war fighters, politicians, and scholars praise
the relatively new weapon system and its many capabilities-including targeted
killings. However, questions exist as to whether the U.S. has the legal right,
domestic or international, to resort to the use of force outside the traditional
battlefield, especially to the extent the CIA is involved.29 Some have condemned
targeted killings as "extrajudicial executions" and failing to comply with
international human rights law, 30 as well as international humanitarian law (IHL). 3"
The U.S., however, maintains that being in a state of "armed conflict with al-
Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces" justifies using "force
consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law."3 2 The
TIMES (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/world/asia/I8terror.htm (explaining that
number of strikes in North Waziristan was 104 in 2010, up from 22 in 2009); Craig Whitlock, In Hunt
for Bin Laden, a New Approach, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/contentlarticle/2008/09/09/AR2008090903404.html (discussing three strikes reported by Pakistani
officials in 2007 and eleven strikes in 2008).
27. Mahsud, supra note 26; Mazzetti & Schmitt, supra note 26; Shaprio, supra note 26; Schmitt,
supra note 26; Whitlock, supra note 26.
28. Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of
Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237, 276 (2010); Kenneth Anderson, Predators Over
Pakistan, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Mar. 2010, at 26, available at http://www.weekly
standard.com/articles/ predators-over-pakistan; Noah Shachtman, CIA Chief: Drones 'Only Game in
Town'Jor Stopping Al Qaeda, WIRED (May 19, 2009), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/05/cia-
chief-drones-only-game-in-town-for-stopping-al-qaeda (CIA Director Leon Panetta describes UAV
operations as "the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al Qaeda
leadership").
29. MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones, A Case Study of Pakistan,
2004-2009, in Shooting to Kill: The Law Governing Lethal Force in Context (forthcoming Simon
Bronitt ed., Hart Publishing), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-1501144; Noah Shachtman,
Call Off Drone War, Influential U.S. Adviser Says, WIRED.COM (Feb. 10. 2009),
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/02/kilcullen-says/; but see Barton Gellman, CIA Weighs
"Targeted Killing Missions, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2001), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn/A63203-2001Oct27 (Apparently based on certain classified documents, "the Bush administration
has concluded that executive orders banning assassination do not prevent the president from lawfully
singling out a terrorist for death by covert action.").
30. In situations where no armed conflict exists and where a state may not lawfully use lethal
force in self-defense, international human rights law, including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), prohibits the arbitrary taking of life. Article 6 of that covenant states: "Every
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Mar. 23,
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#part3.
31. Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 5, at 37-39 (Special Rapporteur concluding that
the Yemen strike was a "clear case of extrajudicial killing."); Gary Solis, Targeted Killing and the Law
oJ'Armed Conflict, 60 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 127, 134-35 (2007) (stating that targeted killing only takes
place "in the context of an international or non-international armed conflict").
32. Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting
of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. Long recognized in customary international law,
a State's right to self-defense is also provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
U.N. Charter art. 51, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. However,
the U.S. position seems to be at odds with certain aspects of the following decisions reached by the
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U.S. further maintains that even lethal force is justified inasmuch as it is used in
compliance with the IHL principles of distinction and proportionality.33
This article does not further address the U.S.'s legal basis for use of force in
current conflicts, 34 nor does it address RPA operations conducted by the CIA.35
Rather, this article focuses specifically on U.S. Air Force (USAF) RPA operations.
The first section gives an overview of a typical USAF RPA operation in terms of
command and control. The first section also addresses compliance with IHL
principles which govern the use of force-particularly distinction and
proportionality. The next section addresses the evolution of semi or fully
autonomous drones and their implications for command and control on the
battlefield. The final section identifies command responsibility as the principle
under IHL that holds accountable those commanders and military members who
might fail to comply with IHL during RPA operations.
II. COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING USAF RPA OPERATIONS
"Command and control" is a term of art in the military. 36  The military is
trained to understand that uncontrolled force or indiscriminate application of force
is nothing more than violence. The U.S. Marine Corps teaches that "[w]ithout
command and control, campaigns, battles, and organized engagements are
impossible, military units degenerate into mobs, and the subordination of military
force to policy is replaced by random violence. 37
International Court of Justice; but see, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 191-96 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf, see, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep.
Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168 at 1 301, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/i16/10455.pdf; see, e.g., Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 1.C.J. 161 at 51, available at:
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/90/9715.pdf.
33. See Koh, supra note 32.
34. ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 1 (2000) ("The
reason for this lies in the cardinal principle thatjus in bello applies in cases of armed conflict whether or
not the inception of the conflict is lawful underjus ad bellum").
35. This article discusses USAF RPA operations specifically, as opposed to CIA RPA operations.
However, conclusions drawn here regarding RPA weapon systems are not necessarily specific to the
operator who employs those systems. The author has no personal knowledge of CIA RPA operations
other than that information which is found in open or publicly available sources. According to those
sources, the CIA uses the same RPA systems as the USAF-namely MQ- 1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper
RPAs. Thus, conclusions drawn as to these particular weapons systems could apply equally to the
USAF and to the CIA.
36. The U.S. Department of Defense defines command and control as:
"The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed
through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed
by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the
accomplishment of the mission."
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEP'T OF DEF. DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 65 (2010)
[hereinafter Terms].
37. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMAND AND CONTROL 35 (1996),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/j el/service_pubs/mcdp6.pdf.
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The U.S. Air Force defines command and control as "the exercise of authority
and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached
forces.. .performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures employed.. .in the accomplishment of
the mission., 38 Accordingly, command and control is required at all times and
over all aspects of the military mission. This is no less true when it comes to RPA
operations. As a former RPA pilot for a small research team at the U.S. Air Force
Academy, this author can provide a personal account of the requirement for
continuous command and control, even during small-scale RPA research flights.
The next several paragraphs will detail the command and control experience.
With final ground safety checks complete, an operator inside the ground
control station (GCS) 39 gives control of the aircraft to me, the "aircraft
commander., 40 During takeoffs and landings, I stand outside the GCS and fly the
RPAs by sight, using a hand-held controller. I add power to the RPA, direct it
down the runway and lift off. Once airborne, I ensure the RPA is functioning
properly, fly the RPA to a specific altitude, and say, "Passing off RPA 1." When
the operator inside the GCS verifies that he (via the autopilot software on his
computer) has control of the aircraft, command and control goes to this operator in
the GCS, who is accountable for the remainder of that portion of the mission. We
follow the same process for each aircraft until all aircraft are airborne and
controlled by the GCS (usually two or three at a time for each research mission).
Once the flying objective or experiment is complete, we follow a similar process in
landing the aircraft. The GCS directs the RPA to a designated point in the airspace
and I say, "Taking RPA ." I take control of the aircraft and land them in the same
order I took them off.
Current USAF RPA operations on the battlefield are similar in that
commanders at various levels exercise command and control during their
corresponding mission segment. At no time during the operation is there a
command and control void, where the RPA might command itself. The following
overview of current USAF RPA operations illustrates this point.
38. U.S. AIR FORCE, COMMAND AND CONTROL: AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2 (2007).
39. The GCS here (specific to the U.S. Air Force Academy research team and as opposed to that
of a larger-scale RPA) is a small enclosed trailer with several computers, several very smart computer
scientists, and a collection of communications equipment such as antennas, receivers, and transmitters.
40. The "'aircraft commander" in any USAF air operation, manned or unmanned, is personally
responsible for the aircraft commanded by that person. They cannot delegate or otherwise abrogate
that responsibility-similar to the way the driver of a car cannot abrogate responsibility for the car he or
she is operating. The U.S. Department of Defense defines "aircraft commander" as "[t]he aircrew
member designated by competent authority as being in command of an aircraft and responsible for its
safe operation and accomplishment of the assigned mission." U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DEP'T OF DEF.
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS (2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
dod dictionary/data/a/2309.html (follow "aircraft commander" hyperlink).
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A. Overview of Current USAF RPA Operations
During the summer of 2010, the USAF operated as many as 40 RPA combat
air patrols (CAPs) at any given time in Iraq and Afghanistan.4' As of March 2011,
the worldwide total for the USAF was 48.42 A CAP signifies one aircraft-and
more specifically, one aircraft fulfilling a flying mission, or patrol, usually
dedicated to monitoring or protecting an assigned battle pace, whether overland,
oversea, or in the air. 3 These CAPs can consist of various RPAs, including the
MQ-1 Predator, the MQ-9 Reaper, and in a much more limited and specialized
reconnaissance role, the RQ-4 Global Hawk.44  Smaller scale hand-launched or
catapult-launched Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, such as the RQ-1 lB Raven
and the Scan Eagle are not included in these CAPs but instead are dedicated almost
exclusively to providing commanders "situational awareness" in a smaller battle
space.4 5
Predators and Reapers are similar in that they are both "multi-role" aircraft.46
The principal strength of both these RPAs is their ability to perform various
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasks.4 v The U.S. Department
of Defense defines ISR as "[a]n activity that synchronizes and integrates the
planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and
41. Bruce Rolfsen, Unmanned a Misnomer when it Comes to UA Vs, AIR FORCE TIMES, June 11,
2010, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2010/06/airforce-uav personnel_061110w.
42. Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Air Force Acad. (Mar. 4, 2011),
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid= 1543 ( "The Air Force now has forty-eight
Predator and Reaper combat air patrols currently flying-compared to eighteen CAPs in 2007").
43. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 36, at 60.
44. The Global Hawk is a high-altitude, long-endurance RPA dedicated entirely to specialized ISR
missions. It has a ceiling of 60,000 feet and can remain aloft for as many as thirty-six hours. See U.S.
AIR FORCE, RQ-4 GLOBAL HAWK (2009), http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/
factsheet.asp?id = 13225.
45. See U.S. AIR FORCE, RQ-I1B RAVEN (2010), http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/
factsheet.asp'lid=10446; See U.S. AIR FORCE, SCAN EAGLE (2009), http://www.af.mil/information
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id= 10468.
46. The "M" designator in MQ-l Predator and MQ-9 Reaper signifies "multi-role." See U.S. AIR
FORCE, MQ-1B PREDATOR FACT SHEET (2010), http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/
actsheet.asp?id=122; See U.S. AIR FORCE, MQ-9 REAPER (2010), http://www.af.mil/information/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6405.
47. For an argument that the Obama administration, based on political expediency, prefers to kill
targets as opposed to track and capture them, see Kenneth Anderson's Blog. Kenneth Anderson, Why
Targeted Killing? And Why is Robotic So Crucial an Issue in Targeted Killing?, KENNETH
ANDERSON'S L. OF WAR AND JUST WAR THEORY BLOG (Mar. 27, 2009, 12:36 PM) ("Moreover, the
political costs for any U.S. administration taking and holding detainees are now enormous. Once you
hold them, over time they will likely be accorded quasi-Constitutional protections by the courts, at least
some version of habeas corpus. Politically, the most powerful institutional incentive today is to kill
rather than capture them. The intelligence losses of killing rather than capturing in order to interrogate
them are great. But since the U.S. political and legal situation has made interrogation a questionable
activity anyway, there is little reason to seek to capture rather than kill. And if one intends to kill, the
incentive is to do so from a standoff position, because it removes messy questions of surrender."),
http://kennethandersonlawofwar.blogspot.com /2009/03/why-targeted-killing-and-why-is.html; See
Tara McKelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 2011, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2011/02/13/inside-the-killing-machine.html.
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dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations." 48 The
USAF describes ISR as the means of providing "accurate, relevant, and timely
intelligence to decision makers.. .the life blood of effective decision making.'4 9 In
addition to ISR capabilities, both aircraft are capable of carrying munitions and
delivering those munitions on a selected target.5 °
RPAs are successful in their multiple roles largely because they fly as high as
50,000 feet (well out of sight or earshot of those on the ground) and loiter over an
objective for as many as 22 hours at a time-or less, depending on payload
weight.5 This kind of "persistent surveillance," as it is called, gives operators the
ability to watch points of interest almost indefinitely, considering multiple RPAs
can rotate in an out of airspace to hand off surveillance tasks.52 Increased time
aloft also means fewer sorties (a take-off, flight, and landing), which minimizes
strain on operators, ground crew, and the aircraft.53
However important prolonged loiter time might be, the key enabler of RPAs
is the "suite of sensors" or "targeting system" included onboard each RPA.54
These sensors allow operators from miles away to zoom in on unsuspecting
subjects. 55 The high-definition images provide operators a detailed picture of the
battlefield and more importantly, of specific individuals on the battlefield.
Included in a typical sensor package on a Reaper, for example, are an "infrared
sensor [to provide night vision], a color/monochrome daylight TV camera, an
image-intensified TV camera, a laser designator and a laser illuminator...'
56
Regardless of primary mission, RPAs might also carry sensors for weather data
collection or other communications purposes-all designed to enhance
commanders' situational awareness on the battlefield.57
Deployed in early 2011, and carried by Reaper RPAs, is the U.S. Air Force's
newest and most powerful sensor system-the "Gorgon Stare.",5' This 1,100
48. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 36, at 183.
49. U.S. AIR FORCE, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS: AIR
FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 1 (2007).
50. Compare MQ-1B Predator, U.S. Air Force (July 20, 2010),
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=122 (explaining that the Predator will carry
no more than two AGM-1 14 Hellfire missiles-which is a payload capacity of 450 pounds), with MQ-9
Reaper, U.S. Air Force (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.af.mil/information!factsheets/
factsheet.asp?id=6405 (explaining that the Reaper's payload capacity rivals that of the more traditional
fighter aircraft, the F-16. The Reaper has a payload capacity of almost 4,000 pounds. With this
capacity, the Reaper can be armed with various combinations of AGM-1 14 Hellfire missiles, GBU-12
Paveway II laser guided munitions, and GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions).
51. FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 26-27.
52. STRATEGIC VISION, supra note 3, at 5.
53. Id.
54. MQ-9 Reaper, supra note 50.
55. Lara Logan, Drones: America's New Air Force, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES (Aug. 14, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/05/08/60minutes/main500l439.shtml.
56. MQ-9 Reaper, supra note 50.
57. STRATEGIC VISION, supra note 3, at 9.
58. Ellen Nakashima & Craig Whitlock, With Air Force's Gorgon Drone 'We Can See
Everything', WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/201 1/
2011
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pound 15 million dollar system is capable of viewing a five-mile diameter area at
one time, as opposed to the "soda-straw" perspective offered by some previous
sensor systems. 59 It accomplishes this by stitching together images from multiple
cameras aimed at various points within the viewing area. This one sensor system
can also simultaneously broadcast one viewpoint to one user-perhaps a ground
commander on the battlefield; another view point to another user-perhaps an
intelligence analyst at a base in the United States; a third viewpoint to another
user-perhaps a decision maker at the Pentagon or the White House; and so on.
This is critically important during USAF RPA operations because a successful
mission may involve a team composed of multiple individuals, each with their own
specialties, perspectives, roles, and geographic locations. Furthermore, one can
imagine greater control of the battlefield, as well as situational awareness, given
multiple sets of eyes focusing on multiple points.
1. A Typical USAF RPA Combat Air Patrol
60
A USAF RPA Combat Air Patrol (CAP) might be responsible for any number
of tasks including monitoring and covering (providing close air support for)
friendly forces' movements or positions, tracking and observing enemy forces'
movements or positions, protecting a defended target, observing and defending a
boundary or border, searching for missing, downed, or captured friendly forces, or
61finding, tracking, and targeting an enemy combatant or objective.
These missions typically begin at an overseas location where a ground crew
readies the RPA for flight. The ground crew fuels, arms, and otherwise prepares
the RPA for its mission. While at or near the launch base, the RPA is controlled
by a crew of operators working from a ground control station (GCS) located at the
launch base. That aircrew is responsible for getting the RPA airborne and
preparing it for handoff to the crew of operators (working from a base other than
the launch base--often located in the U.S.) who will complete the operational
mission.
At the designated time, the remotely-located aircrew takes control of the RPA
62 tiand proceeds with the mission, which could last upwards of 22 hours. At this
point, the mission is considered a "remote split operation., 63 The aircrew now in
control of the RPA is comprised of several operators, including at a minimum, a
01/01/AR2011010102690. html?sid=ST2011012204147.
59. Michael Hoffman, New Reaper Sensors Offer a Bigger Picture, AIR FORCE TIMES, Feb. 16,
2009, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/02/airforceWAAS_021609/.
60. Information used in the following section, unless otherwise noted, was taken from interviews
with two U.S. Air Force RPA pilots (including one RPA Squadron Commander) who, while working
from bases in the continental U.S., have spent considerable time conducting RPA operations in the
Middle East and Southwest Asia. In addition to piloting RPAs, these pilots also fly, respectively, the F-
16 multirole fighter and the KC-135 tanker. Interview notes are on file with the author.
61. FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 26-27.
62. Given the long duration of RPA flights, multiple crews in shifts will work the GCS for any
given CAP. At shift change, command of the RPA and of the CAP is passed from the outgoing pilot to
the incoming pilot.
63. FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 26.
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pilot, a sensor operator, and a mission intelligence coordinator. 64 The pilot serves
as the aircraft commander and at all times controls the RPA--even if the RPA
happens to be flying with an "auto-pilot" function.65 The pilot is solely responsible
for the safe operation of the RPA and for the appropriate and legal use of force
during operations. The sensor operator is responsible for operating the suite of
sensors aboard the RPA. The mission intelligence coordinator, or MIC, who is
trained as an imagery analyst, oversees the immediate analysis, collection, and
flow of intelligence gathered and used during the mission. The mission
intelligence coordinator also assists with airspace coordination, compliance with
rules of engagement during use of force, and mission reporting.
In addition to the aircrew working the GCS, any number of intelligence
analysts and military decision makers might also take part in the mission.
Available at all times in the GCS are at least three voice lines--one to military
forces on the battlefield and two lines linking headquarter elements overseas and
command centers at various places around the world-whether airborne or land-
based. In addition to the voice lines, individuals at all levels of military operations,
including in the GCS, have access to "chat rooms," as they are called, where
"secure" networks are used to discuss, share, compare, and further analyze
intelligence data.
The various types of intelligence used and discussed might include human
66intelligence (information gained directly from human sources), communications
intelligence (information gained from intercepted communications),6 7 or electronic
intelligence (information gained from exploitation of an adversary's electronic
systems), 68 to name a few. All of this information, or intelligence, is in addition to
that gained by the RPA operators during the particular mission.
By comparison, an F-16 pilot relies almost entirely on instinct and training in
analyzing a given situation. This is due to significant time constraints during
battlefield engagements. The pilot takes into account whatever can be observed
through the canopy with the naked eye, whatever can be observed in the cockpit on
a small screen displaying images obtained with the targeting pod system attached
to the aircraft, and any additional information the pilot might learn from a
controller at an operations center. An F-16's array of sensors often includes an
infrared detector, a CCD-TV camera, a laser rangefinder and a laser designator.
69
Notably, however, an F-16 pilot is alone in operating all flight controls, sensors,
communications equipment, and munitions. The pilot's job is further complicated
64. Id. at 28-29.
65. Currently, the pilot is restricted to operating a single aircraft although immediate USAF plans
call for a single pilot to control four aircraft simultaneously during "benign operations." FLIGHT PLAN,
supra note 21, at 55.
66. Terms, supra note 36, at 167.
67. Id. at 70.
68. Id. at 120.
69. See U.S. Air Force, Fact Sheet, http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheetjprint
.asp?fslD= 114&page = 1.
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by the fact that the F-16 will likely have only enough fuel to loiter over a target for
60-90 minutes.
70
Due to these limitations, F-16 pilots might find themselves in situations where
choosing not to engage a target and returning for fuel will discontinue observation
of the target-meaning the target will likely be lost. In discussing the many people
with many perspectives and specialties collaborating during USAF RPA
operations, a former F-16 pilot with considerable combat experience in the F-16-
now also an RPA pilot-spoke of RPA operations saying, "You get better answers
at every tum with all these people in the room." With "better answers at every
turn," RPA pilots are uniquely able to comply with core IHL principles that govern
the use of force-particularly the principles of distinction and proportionality.
7
'
70. See U.S. Air Force, Fact Sheet F-16 Fighting Falcon (Oct. 30, 2009),
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id= 103.
71. This is not to say that USAF RPA operations do not allow for compliance with other core IHL
principles of military necessity and humanity. A U.S. Navy handbook for commanders explains that
the goal of military necessity is "to limit suffering and destruction to that which is necessary to achieve
a valid military objective." U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (2007), http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-4779-9925-
Odefea93325c/l-14M_%28Jul 2007%29_% 28NWP%29. The weapon system itself has little
relevancy in the analysis of what comprises a valid military objective. The weapon system becomes
relevant only to the extent it causes more suffering and destruction than is necessary to achieve a valid
military objective. This is similar to the analysis under the IHL principle of humanity, or human
suffering. Humanity, as addressed in Article 35(2) of AP I, prohibits employing "'weapons, projectiles
and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering."
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol t) art. 35 2, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/COM/470-750113?OpenDocument [hereinafter Protocol I].
This limitation is similarly stated as a principle of customary international humanitarian law: "The use
of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering" is prohibited. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME 1: RULES 237 (2005); see also Michael J. Matheson,
The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 424 (1987). USAF
RPAs currently employ the same precision-guided munitions that have been employed for years by
other conventional manned aircraft. The MQ-9 Reaper, for example, employs the GBU-12 Paveway II
bomb, the GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munition bomb, and the AGM-1 14 Hellfire missile. See U.S.
Air Force, Joint Direct Attack Munition GBU 31/32/38 (Nov. 21, 2007),
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/ factsheet.asp?id=108. The weapon platform from which these
munitions are employed does not change the nature of the injury of suffering caused by the munitions.
Therefore, any analysis as to military necessity or humanity does not change relative to the platform
from which the munitions are deployed-in this case, an RPA.
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2. USAF RPA Operations in Compliance with Distinction and
Proportionality
72
Regardless of the classification of any particular armed conflict, certain
fundamental principles of IHL govern the use of force. 73 The principles of
distinction and proportionality are memorialized in treaty, long accepted as
customary international humanitarian law, and applicable during targeting
operations.74 These principles apply whether targeting is conducted with manned
aircraft, long-range cruise missiles, small arms, or RPAs.
In the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) study on customary
international humanitarian law, distinction is literally "Rule 1 .,,75 It states: "The
parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and
combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not
be directed against civilians., 76 Article 57 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, 77 as well as customary international humanitarian law,
72. Similar to a previous footnote regarding the previous section, the information used in the
following section, unless otherwise noted, was taken from interviews with two U.S. Air Force RPA
pilots (including one RPA Squadron Commander) who, while working from bases in the continental
U.S., have spent considerable time conducting RPA operations in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.
In addition to piloting RPAs, these pilots also fly, respectively, the F-16 multirole fighter and the KC-
135 tanker. Interview notes are on file with the author. See supra note 60.
73. This statement recognizes an understanding in IHL that certain laws and types of law apply in
certain contexts depending upon classifications of armed conflict. For example, during an international
armed conflict, as described by common article two of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP I) would be applicable. Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287; Protocol 1, supra note 71. Similarly, in a non-international armed conflict, as described by
common article three of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (AP II) would be applicable. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]. In addition to various provisions of treaty
law, another body of international law applies during both types of armed conflict described by the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Treaties and Customary Law: Overview
(Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/overview-treaties-and-
customary-law.htm. This law is known as customary international humanitarian law. Thus, certain
treaty provisions are referred to in remaining sections of this article with the understanding that
although they may not apply in one type of armed conflict or another, unless otherwise stated they are
nonetheless customary international humanitarian law and binding upon nation States employing RPAs
in armed conflict.
74. See Protocol I, supra note 71, at arts. 35, 51.
75. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 71, at 3.
76. At the heart of the principle of distinction is the protection of civilians and civilian objects.
Distinction has been described as "the foundation on which the codification of the laws and customs of
war rests." Id. at 427. According to the principle of distinction, attack may be directed against a person
who is a "combatant" or against "civilians... for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." Id. at
3, 19. These same core concepts are codified in several articles of AP I, including 48, 51(2), 51(3) and
52(1) and Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP II). Protocol 1,
supra note 71, at arts. 48, 51 2-3, 52 1; Protocol I, supra note 73, at art. 13.
77. Although the U.S. has not ratified AP I, it apparently recognizes a majority of its articles as
customary international law. In 1987, a U.S. Department of State Deputy Legal Advisor, Michael
Matheson, gave a speech in which he outlined very specifically the many articles and principles of AP I
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prescribes "precautionary measures" that one must take in planning or deciding
upon an attack.78 Prior to launching any attack, one who plans or decides upon an
attack must "do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are
neither civilians nor civilian objects.... 79 It seems, therefore, that IHL would favor
a weapon system that enhances an operator's ability to verify that an objective to
be attacked is a combatant, as opposed to a civilian.
One criticism levied against RPAs, however, is that operators, finding
themselves far from the battlefield, must rely on what they see via the RPA's
1180sensors and that perhaps the decision to use lethal force has become "too easy.
Commentary on AP I states that "those who plan or decide upon.. an attack will
base their decision on information given them, and they cannot be expected to have
personal knowledge of the objective to be attacked and of its exact nature." 8'
Although perhaps not possessing first-hand "in-person" knowledge of their
targets, RPA pilots are often better able to distinguish between civilians and
combatants on the battlefield-more so than pilots of other manned aircraft-due
to an RPAs' capabilities. As previously discussed, RPAs can observe a potential
target from altitudes as high as 50,000 feet, where the RPAs are neither seen nor
heard. This unedited, uninterrupted observation of the unaware subject takes place
during day or night and can go on for hours and even days at a time, as RPAs
rotate in and out of airspace, handing off observation of a particular target if
necessary to allow for more deliberate consideration of a decision to use force.
When analyzing a potential attack, an RPA pilot has at his or her fingertips a
collection of intelligence data and information regarding the target, including the
live video feed of events in progress. The pilot is also able to rely on the assistance
of fellow crew members, intelligence analysts, ground forces, and other operators
that are all linked to the operation. Most importantly, at all times during RPA
operations the aircrew's conduct is governed by rules of engagement. Rules of
engagement (ROE) are a set of internal rules governing the use of force in
compliance with IHL. 82 Remotely Piloted Aircraft operators rely on ROE in
that the U.S. considered customary international law. See Michael J. Matheson, The United States
Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 422-29 (1987). Since that time, the U.S. has
not repeated, refined, or otherwise retracted Mr. Matheson's statements. With the exception of Articles
36 and 48, all of the AP I articles referenced or relied on by the author in this current article were
included in Mr. Matheson's comments as having been accepted by the U.S. as customary international
law. Id.
78. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK,supra note 71, at 336-44.
79. Protocol I, supra note 71, at art. 57 2(a)(i).
80. Chris Cole, Growing Concern over Drone Attacks, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 9, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 0/jun!09/growing-concern-over-drone-attacks; Eric Hagerman,
Point. Click. Kill: Inside The Air Force's Frantic Unmanned Reinvention, POPULAR SCIENCE (Aug. 18,
2009, 1:43 PM), http://www.popsci.com/drones.
81. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 71, at 680.
82. The U.S. Department of Defense defines "rules of engagement" as: "Directives issued by
competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States
forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered." Terms, supra
note 36, at 393. ROE are specific to a particular fighting force engaged in a particular armed conflict in
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making decisions that might ultimately lead to the decision to use force. Current
USAF ROE for RPA operations requires a person, as opposed to artificial
intelligence, to authorize the use of force.83
In the event that operators believe use of force against a particular target is
necessary, the resort to force is never instantaneous or automatic. Occasionally,
the use of force might be rushed in order to meet an emerging target or emergency
situation on the battlefield but even in these situations operators are bound to fully
comply with ROE. More often than not, operators have considerable time to
monitor and track a target while ensuring full compliance with ROE prior to a
strike because of an RPA's ability to observe a target undetected over a long period
of time.
In preparation for a strike, the pilot positions the RPA for optimal observation
of the target and deployment of weapons. The sensor operator might switch to a
different sensor or adjust the viewing angle on a sensor to enhance images of the
target and surrounding area. The mission intelligence coordinator analyzes the
images, looking to verify the identity of the target and gauge possible collateral
damage. At all times, all members of the aircrew, as per their ROE, are looking for
civilians, civilian objects, and other protected objects, such as religious or medical
facilities. Depending on the ROE, a less-than-favorable collateral damage estimate
might require the pilot to seek approval to carry out a particular strike.
At issue in procuring approval for these airstrikes is the IHL principle of
proportionality, which seeks to minimize or eliminate collateral damage during
armed conflict. This principle, recognized in treaty as well as customary
international humanitarian law, prohibits "an attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects,
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated....84 Although relevant portions of current
ROE are classified and cannot be discussed here, it appears that ROE take into
account that operators at lower levels, including RPA operators, might not be in a
position to determine the excessiveness of collateral damage relative to the direct
a particular theatre of war and often to a particular mission. Currently, U.S. fighting forces in
Afghanistan operate under ROE promulgated by a unified geographic commander who commands the
International Security Assistance Force. Although ROE is not itself IHL, the "competent military
authority" who promulgates ROE is responsible for ensuring that force used in accordance with ROE is
also necessarily used in accordance with IHL. Thus, proposed ROE undergo several levels of review
by commanders, operators, legal advisors and senior politicians before they become effectual. ROE
may be more restrictive on the use of force than IHL otherwise would be. A subordinate's violation of
ROE might result in military discipline administered by a commander.
83. USAF Colonel Eric Mathewson is quoted in a February 2010 Popular Mechanics article as
saying, "If you look at the way we employ unmanned aircraft in the current fights, the rules of
engagement require that someone [in charge at the rear] has to approve it, to say, 'Yes, indeed, you're
cleared hot' for every single case." Joe Pappalardo, The Future For UAVs in the U.S. Air Force,
POPULAR MECHANICS, Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology
/aviation/military/4347306.
84. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 71, at 46, 621-22.
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military advantage anticipated from a strike.85  In other words, such a
determination likely entails more than simply a tactical assessment of the
battlefield; compliance with proportionality typically entails larger operational,
strategic, and policy considerations.
For example, during the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 and for some time
after, ROE required Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to personally
authorize any strike that had the potential to result in more than 30 civilian
casualties. 86 In the current conflict in Afghanistan, it appears, based on statements
from the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, that at least some form of approval
could be required for a strike that might cause any collateral damage at all. 87
Obtaining this approval, regardless of the source of the approval, is almost
seamless during USAF RPA operations. If such an approval is required, the
mission intelligence coordinator instantly shares the video feed and other known
intelligence with the approval authority. This real-time sharing of information can
take place whether the approval authority happens to be on the ground in the battle,
at an operations center, at a command headquarters, or at the White House or
Pentagon.88 Furthermore, operators, analysts, and approvers alike have access to
chat rooms where data, intelligence, analysis, and observations can be shared. The
advantage of the chat rooms, of course, is that all participants in the chat rooms
have equal access to the flow of information.
Once in compliance with ROE, the RPA pilot is authorized to use force. An
RPA provides several options for striking targets and ultimately, the RPA pilot
decides on the specific application of force. Depending on availability of weapons
85. For some commentators, compliance with the principle of proportionality seems to come
down to numbers alone. Occasionally, "'numerous civilian casualties" can be seen as "excessive
civilian casualties" without the relative comparison of the direct military advantage anticipated through
the strike. See David Kilcullen & Andrew McDonald Exum, Death From Above, Outrage Down
Below, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html ("Press
reports suggest that over the last three years drone strikes have killed about fourteen terrorist leaders.
But, according to Pakistani sources, they have also killed some 700 civilians. This is fifty civilians for
every militant killed...."); but see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 131 (2004) (Dinstein states that the principle of proportionality
applies even where a belligerent uses a civilian objective to shield its military forces or weapons from
attack. "However," he adds, "even if that is the case, the actual test of excessive injury to civilians must
be relaxed. That is to say, the appraisal whether civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the
military advantage anticipated must make allowances for the fact that -- if an attempt is made to shield
military objectives with civilians -- civilian casualties will be higher than usual.")
86. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF THE AIR WAR 19 (2003),
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/I 2207/section/. 1.
87. Jason Motlagh, Petraeus Toughens Afghan Rules of Engagement, TIME, Aug. 6, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2008863,00.html ("General Petraeus has reportedly
expanded the ban on air strikes and artillery fire to all types of buildings, tree-lined areas and hillsides
where it is difficult to distinguish who is on the ground.")
88. David Zucchino, U.S. report faults drone crew, command posts in Afghan civilian deaths, L.A.
TIMES, May 29, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/201 0/may/29/world!la-fg-predator-20100530
(Although this seamless sharing of information clearly did not happen in the situation referred to in this
news article, it supports the premise that such sharing of information is not only possible during RPA
operations but vital.).
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and desired effects, a pilot might use laser-guided missiles, or laser-guided or gps-
guided bombs.89 RPAs also provide the ability to "buddy-laze" a target, which
occurs when the pilot uses the RPA's laser designator to guide a weapon fired from
a separate platform, such as an attack helicopter. 90 In all cases, RPA systems are
capable of striking targets with high accuracy using precision-guided munitions,
thereby reducing collateral damage.
Current USAF RPA operations are such that, absent operator error, operator
misconduct, or malfunction of equipment, it is difficult to launch a strike without
first distinguishing between civilians and combatants-assuming intelligence
provided to RPA operators by other sources is accurate. 91 Due to RPAs' enhanced
capabilities, the USAF actually has an increased burden in doing "everything
feasible" to avoid targeting civilians and civilian objects. 92 Certainly, "everything
feasible" is a much higher burden now than it was even just a decade ago.93
B. USAF RPA Systems' Vulnerabilities
The U.S. Department of Defense defines "vulnerability" as "[t]he
characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation
(incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been
subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (man-made) hostile
environment. 94  Military planners and war fighters assess and mitigate
vulnerabilities on a regular basis due to the dramatic effects that systems'
vulnerabilities can have on military outcomes. In a related vein, the assessment of
a system's vulnerabilities becomes relevant here to the extent that a system's
"degradation" or "incapability to perform the designated mission" might cause
noncompliance with IHL. More specifically, an RPA system's vulnerabilities are
89. USAF REAPER FACT SHEET, http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheetprint.
asp?fsID=6405&page=I (last visited April 22, 2011).
90. FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 26.
91. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia addressed the issue of mistake,
or negligence, as opposed to intentional or reckless abandon in the context of distinction. The Tribunal
stated: "The parties to the conflict are obliged to attempt to distinguish between military targets and
civilian persons or property.... Such an attack must have been conducted intentionally in the
knowledge, or when it was impossible not to know, that civilians or civilian property were being
targeted not through military necessity." Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 180
(Int'l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000).
92. In commentary on AP I, it was recognized that "the identification of objectives depended to a
large extent on the technical means of detection available to the belligerents.'" An example was given
that "some belligerents might have information owing to a modem reconnaissance device, while other
belligerents might not have this type of equipment." HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 71.
93. It seems that given the requirements of "precautionary measures" and the increased
capabilities provided by RPAs, that the USAF might be obliged to use this technology (i.e., track a
target for hours, confirm the identity of the target with multiple analysts, view the target with an
enhanced image, etc.) in every targeting scenario. However, there is no basis in law to suggest that
once a capability is possible that it must be used in every scenario. In other words, "everything
feasible" does not necessarily mean "everything possible." See generally, Danielle L. Infeld, Precision-
Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; but is a Country Obligated
to Use Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage, 26 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 109 (1992).
94. Terms, supra note 36, at 393.
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relevant in that like other medium and larger sized manned aircraft, an RPA has
the potential to significantly harm civilians and civilian objects-especially when
in a degraded state.95 In May 2009, the USAF released its most comprehensive
written guidance to date on RPA policy and technology-the United States Air
Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-204 7.96 However, the version
of the report released to the public says nothing of RPA systems' vulnerabilities.
Rather, in place of the page that would otherwise address vulnerabilities is the
word "Classified., 97  Even with little public acknowledgment or discussion of
existing vulnerabilities by the USAF, something can be learned of these
vulnerabilities through inference, assumption, and history.
For example, the USAF recently published a document soliciting vendor
participation in test flights for vehicles that would meet the USAF's needs for a
small hand-launched aircraft capable of delivering lethal force-the Lethal
Miniature Aerial Munitions System.98  Included in the solicitation is a list of
questions that must be answered before a vendor may conduct test flights for the
Air Force.99 Of the 45 questions asked, 26 of them directly address the "command
link" for controlling the vehicle. 100 Among the questions are: "What frequency will
you use?" "What happens when the command link is lost?" "How does the
vehicle recognize that loss of command link has occurred?" "Is there a backup
command transmitter and receiver?" "Does this vehicle have an automatic "return
home" (also called "reversion mode") in the event of loss of link?"'101 By
inference, it seems that losing control of the vehicle is foremost among the USAF's
concerns.
The command link has historically been the "Achilles heel of unmanned
systems," as the Air Force has previously put it.10 2 Think back to the "remote
control" toy car you got for your sixth birthday-where the car was literally
tethered to the controller by a wire. Yes, you could control the car "remotely" but
the fun only lasted about five minutes: the amount of time it took for you to realize
no surprise attacks on little brother, no chasing the cat, and certainly no racing.
The problem was you were never truly "remote." Such was the case when, during
World War II, Germany deployed remote controlled mini tanks laden with
95. In addition to lethal munitions carried as payload, "these platforms have significant kinetic
energy based on their weight and speed, [and] they can cause significant damage." FLIGHT PLAN, supra
note 21, at 36.
96. Id. at21.
97. Among the topics in the document that are listed as classified are "threats," "vulnerabilities,'"
and "application of gaps and shortfalls." FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 21, 23. This classification is
not only understandable but expected, given military members' desire to mitigate known threats,
vulnerabilities, and shortfalls. To publicize these in detail would be to invite exploitation by
adversaries.
98. Dep't of the Air Force, Lethal Miniature Aerial Munitions System (Sept. 10, 2010), available
at https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=50e5cl 13e29c09b2d7c3c8d5f5dd3 bO1 &tab=
core&_cview=0 [hereinafter BAA].
99. Id. at § D.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. STRATEGIC VISION, supra note 3, at 5.
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explosives. The "Achilles heel," of course, was the fact that to disable the tanks,
Allied forces simply had to cut (or otherwise sever) anywhere along the 2,000 feet
of cable connecting the vehicle to the controller!
10 3
While command link technology has evolved exponentially since World War
II, the inherent weakness remains. Cut the "virtual wire" and the drone could be
lost. Or at least direct control of the drone is lost. In the event the command link
is lost, most RPAs are pre-programmed to try to reconnect the lost link, return to
base autonomously, or complete the mission autonomously. 0 4 Understandably,
flying autonomously or completing the mission autonomously-especially where
use of force is involved--only enhances concerns relating to the vehicle's loss of
control.105
This vulnerability was dramatically exposed when a U.S. Navy drone
helicopter flew "autonomously" through restricted airspace near Washington D.C.
During a 2010 demonstration flight, a U.S. Navy "Fire Scout" unmanned
helicopter lost contact with controllers at Naval Air Station Patuxent River in
southern Maryland. 106 In what the U.S. Navy described as a "software issue," the
helicopter flew its own course for approximately 30 minutes during which it
traveled 23 miles, flew within 40 miles of Washington D.C., and entered restricted
airspace. 107
Another example, while not of a command link loss, illustrates a similar
vulnerability in the context of current U.S. RPA operations. Using $26 dollar
(USD) off-the-shelf software, militants were able to intercept live video feed from
U.S. RPAs in Iraq in 2009.1"8 U.S. officials maintained the intercept never affected
control of the RPAs or otherwise affected their mission. 10 9 Nonetheless, the breach
of the RPA system exposed the vulnerability for what it was.
In addition to intercepting data transmission from RPAs, adversaries may
seek to otherwise jam, hack, interfere with or interrupt the communications link,
including by physical attack of the communication nodes (e.g., antennae, receiver,
satellite, or other hardware node)."0 Furthermore, current USAF RPA operations
rely for their communications "almost exclusively" on leased bandwidth from
commercial satellites, which is an "open commodity.""'  This leased bandwidth is
subject to interference and attack; but this also means that the USAF must compete
103. The vehicle was called the "Goliath" and was of limited effect during the war-due
significantly to the fact that they were relatively easily disabled and captured by the Allies. U.S. WAR
DEP'T, HANDBOOK ON GERMAN MILITARY FORCES 411-13 (1945).
104. STRATEGIC VISION, supra note 3, at 17.
105. This also brings with it a host of legal and ethical issues. These issues are briefly discussed in
the next two sections of this article.
106. Elisabeth Bumiller, Navy Drone Violated Washington Airspace, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/us/26drone.html.
107. Id.
108. Siobhan Gorman et al., Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 126102247889095011 .html.
109. Id.
110. FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 45; see also, STRATEGIC VISION supra note 3, at 17.
111. FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 43.
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for bandwidth with a number of other communications users, including TV, phone,
and data users. 1 2 This reliance on commercial satellites appears to be of significant
concern for the USAF, as it recognizes that in "using remote split operations, it is
critical that communications be as robust and assured as possible."
' 13
RPAs also suffer some of the same vulnerabilities and limitations as manned
aircraft, such as effects of extreme weather, kinetic and non-kinetic weapon
threats, and "reliability" issues.' 4 During the last four years, dozens of RPAs have
crashed due to pilot error, mechanical failure, and/or electrical failure.' 1 5 The
USAF refers to these "human and material factors" as the "root causes leading to
mishaps."' 1 6  Also like other manned aircraft, RPA crashes occur most often
during the takeoff and landing sequences of the flight.' 17 Not surprisingly then, the
USAF's short-term projections for RPAs include the ability to take off and land
autonomously." 8 The USAF has also projected other advances in RPA technology
to address or overcome current vulnerabilities or limitations. Many of these
advancements will include, at least to some degree, increasing levels of vehicle
autonomy.
III. ADDRESSING VULNERABILITIES WHILE ADVANCING TOWARD AUTONOMY
In a 2009 address, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force said, "[T]oday, the
evolution of the machine is beginning to outpace the capability of the people we
put in them. We now must reconsider the relationship of man and woman,
machine, and air." 119 In reconsidering that relationship, the USAF finds the value
of RPAs particularly "compelling where human physiology limits mission
execution (e.g. persistence, speed of reaction, contaminated environment)."' 2°
Given the evolving nature of the relationship between humans and machines, it
seems the thrust of advancing RPA technology is a move toward fully autonomous
drones. While relative autonomy is certainly important, there is much more to the
evolution of drone warfare than automation.
At least for now, U.S. RPAs have their place in airspace over rugged
battlefields in underdeveloped countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan, where air
superiority' 22 is virtually guaranteed. However, in more advanced battlefields
where air superiority is anything but certain, RPA systems must continually evolve
112. Id.
113. Id. at 44.
114. STRATEGIC VISION, supra note 3, at I 1-12.
115. Drone Crash Database, DRONE WARS UK, http://dronewarsuk.wordpress.com/drone-crash-
database/ (compilation of reports on RPA crashes since 2007).
116. FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 81.
117. Id. at 58.
118. Id. at 17-18.
119. General Norton Schwartz, Chief of Staff, Air Force Ass'n Convention (Sept. 15, 2009),
available at http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090915-240.pdf.
120. FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 14.
121. Air superiority, as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense, is "[tjhat degree of dominance
in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its
related land, maritime, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the
opposing force." Terms, supra note 36, at 17.
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to meet the many mission demands of a modem military. A few of the key
capabilities of future USAF RPA systems include secure, proprietary
communications links, radar avoidance or jamming, increased sensor capabilities,
interoperability between drones, extended loiter time, and of course, increased
autonomy.
To reduce dependence on leased commercial satellite bandwidth, the USAF
has already begun transitioning RPA system communications to a military
constellation of satellites-the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS)
constellation. 122 By 2016, almost half of Predator and Reaper CAPs will count on
WGS for secure communications. 123 The USAF is also exploring a "surrogate
satellite" system. 124 This high altitude lighter-than-air system (also known as a
blimp) would function essentially as a satellite, relaying voice, video and data over
a secure network-although not in a space orbit and functioning at a fraction of the
cost of commercial or proprietary satellites. 121
Three RPAs-the Global Observer, the X-47B, and the Phantom Ray-are in
testing phase in early 2011 and already promise to fulfill many USAF projections
for enhanced RPA capabilities. 126 The Global Observer flies as high as 65,000 feet
for several days at a time and can survey an area of 280,000 square miles in an
instant. 127  Obviously, this constitutes an ISR capability entirely unrivaled by
aircraft in use today. The X-47B and the Phantom Ray are both jet-powered and
built to evade enemy radar using stealth technologies. 128  Both will perform
precision attacks behind enemy lines, including attacks of enemy air defenses.
129
To meet geographical mission demands, the X-47B is designed to take off from
and land on an aircraft carrier.
130
The U.S. has also participated in development of nanotechnology. Among
recent advances is a six-inch flying vehicle called the Nano Hummingbird, which
is capable of hovering in small spaces for as long as eight minutes. 131
Additionally, the USAF in March 2011 launched its X-37B unmanned spacecraft
on only its second acknowledged space flight.' 32 The first flight began in April
122. FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 43-44.
123. Id. at 44.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. W.J. Hennigan, Drones Becoming Speedier, Deadlier, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 1I, 2011, 12:57 PM),
http://www.standard.net/topics/business/20 11/01 / 11/drones-becoming-speedier-deadlier.
127. Id
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Nathan Hodge, Drone Will Call Aircraft Carriers Home, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748703507804576130493035362556.html.
131. W.J. Hennigan, It's a Bird! It's a Spy! It's Both, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/20 11/feb/17/business/la-fi-hummingbird-drone-20110217.
132. W.J. Hennigan, Air Force X-37B Space Plane Launched into Orbit, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6,
2011), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-space-plane-launch-20110306,
0,7354977 story [hereinafter Air Force X-37B].
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2010 and lasted 224 days-concluding with a fully autonomous landing. 133
According to the USAF, the X-37B is capable of orbiting earth for 270 days and is
said to be a platform for testing new technologies in space.
134
As for autonomy, the USAF plans to include autonomous capabilities in RPA
systems "where it increases overall effectiveness..... 135 The immediate future will
include RPAs with the ability to autonomously takeoff and land, as well as
-swarm," which is to fly autonomously in a group while "sensing" each other to
avoid collisions. 136 "Medium-sized" RPAs, such as the Reaper, are expected by
2020 to be able to employ air-to-air weapons.1 37 By 2030, RPAs would be able to
conduct air refueling of other RPAs.1 3 8 Larger RPAs of the future are expected to
incorporate autonomous takeoff and landing, cargo transport, air refueling,
humanitarian assistance airlift, strategic attack, global strike, and even ground
operations such as pallet loading and ground refueling.' 39 The role of humans in
these future ground operations would be that of "monitoring of autonomous
actions. ,1
4 0
The concern, however, is that as drone technology evolves, commander
involvement will become marginalized-not just during ground operations but
during all aspects of RPA operations. Most disconcerting, of course, is the
marginalized human (or commander) involvement during RPA operations that
entail the use of force. As drone technology advances toward increasing
autonomy, especially in the context of armed conflict, the single most important
military function is and will always be command and control.
A. Command and Control during Deployment of Fully Autonomous Vehicles
Much has been made of the danger of including semiautonomous,
autonomous, and other robotic weapons in military arsenals. One recent
publication asserted that "[e]very time you hear about a 'drone attack'... that's an
unmanned robot dropping bombs.... Push a button and it flies away, kills, and
comes home."' 14 1 Another author concludes that "if contact is lost with the drones,
they begin making their own decisions. 142 Yet another author asserts that a fully
133. Id.
134. Leonard David, Secretive Air Force X37-B Robotic Space Plane May Be Nearing Mission's
End, SPACE.COM (Nov. 22, 2010, 2:45 PM), http://www.space.com/9575-secretive-air-force-37b-
robotic-space-plane-nearing-mission.html.
135. FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 33.
136. Id. at 33-34; see also William Matthews, Project Would Empower UA Vs to Fly Themselves,
A.F. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2010, 2:05 PM), http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2010/10/air-force-uavs-to-
fly-themselves- 101010/.
137. FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 38.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 40.
140. Id.
141. Johann Hari, The Age of the Killer Robot is no Longer a Sci-Fi Fantasy, THE INDEPENDENT
(Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/Johann-hari/johann-hari-the-age-
of-the-killer-robot-is-no-longer-a-scifi-fantasy-1875220.html.
142. Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What are the Risks of the C.I.A. 's Covert Drone Program?,
THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/ reporting/2009/
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autonomous robot is a "weapon[]... so abhorrent", its use should be discontinued
immediately. 43 And finally, another author suggests that current RPA systems are
becoming de facto autonomous as human pilots tend to "defer" to conclusions
reached by a computer, even over their own judgment, given the many decisions
pilots are required to make in "split seconds. 144
A former USAF RPA squadron commander laughed when asked about "fully
autonomous" drones and the idea, in particular, that an operator could push a
button as if to "unleash" a drone to go hunt and kill a target. "I'm ok with my
vacuum being fully autonomous," he replied, flippantly. 145 He clarified that he
knows of no RPA or drone that autonomously and unilaterally selects, tracks, and
kills targets. When asked why such a weapon was not employed, he stated simply,
"The ROE wouldn't allow it-nothing in the ROE would allow for those decisions
to be automated." Pressed further on his understanding of the Rules of
Engagement (ROE), he described them as very specific rules for using force that
he and his operators were obligated to follow. Of note, he did not cite a lack of
technology as a barrier to employing a fully autonomous capability-only a
concern that it would violate the ROE. 1
46
The USAF has planned for the potential use of force using autonomous
weapons systems, recognizing that "advances in [artificial intelligence] will enable
systems to make combat decisions and act within legal policy constraints without
necessarily requiring human input."'147 Assuming political and military leaders
resolve ethical, legal, and policy issues in favor of allowing varying degrees of
autonomy in RPA operations, the USAF believes that
commanders must retain the ability to refine the level of autonomy the
systems will be granted by mission type, and in some cases by mission
phase, just as they set rules of engagement for the personnel under their
command today. The trust required for increased autonomy of systems
will be developed incrementally. The systems' programming will be
based on human intent, with humans monitoring the execution of
operations and retaining the ability to override the system or change the
level of autonomy instantaneously during the mission.
148
In other words, the USAF is committed to retaining command and control of
all RPA operations, regardless of the relative autonomy of the vehicles. This
concept is not new. Several weapons already in use by the U.S. military are
10/26/091026fa fact mayer.
143. The Editors, Terminate the Terminators, SCI. AM. (June 29, 2010), http://www.scientific
american.com/article.cfm?id=terminate-the-terminators.
144. O'Connell, supra note 29, at 6. (suggesting that this tendency to rely on conclusions reached
by a computer will increase as RPA pilots are required to command multiple aircraft-stating that
"while the computer is not technically 'autonomous' in deciding to strike, that is becoming the
reality.").
145. Neither offense to nor endorsement of any robotic carpet cleaning system is intended.
146. See supra note 80 and accompanying text on ROE.
147. FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 41.
148. Id.
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capable of operating, essentially, in fully autonomous modes. However, the
specific methods in which they are employed by commanders ensure their
compliance with IHL.
The U.S. Navy's Phalanx Close-In Weapons System, for example, is a 20-mm
Gatling Gun mounted on the deck of U.S. Navy ships that autonomously performs
"search, detect, evaluation, track, engage and kill assessment functions.', 149 The
Phalanx is employed to confront "Anti Ship Missiles (ASM), aircraft, and littoral
warfare threats that have penetrated other fleet defenses."' 50 It accomplishes this
mission by autonomously identifying a target as it moves toward the defended
ship, tracking the target with radar, and eliminating the target by firing hundreds of
rounds of armor piercing ammunition at the incoming target.15' This entire process
requires mere seconds to accomplish, obviously exceeding human abilities. Use of
this autonomous weapon system complies with IHL because commanders utilize
the system only after having already analyzed its employment in terms of
compliance with IHL. Commanders can be certain that any object speeding
toward and threatening their ship is indeed a valid military objective. Furthermore,
given that U.S. Navy battles are fought over open water, commanders are certain
that the Phalanx's armor piercing rounds will cause little or no collateral damage
as they fall to the ocean. Of course, while in littoral waters or in port, a
commander would need to further assess the implications of employing this
weapon.
During the last six years, the U.S. Army has employed a variant of the
Phalanx-the Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM). The C-RAM is
essentially the same system but is employed on land as a defense against incoming
rocket and mortar rounds.1 52 The C-RAM was introduced in 2005 at U.S. bases in
Iraq and was shown in tests to have a 60-70% shoot-down capability. i 3 As the C-
RAM is employed on land, collateral damage is a concern. To address that
concern and thereby comply with IHL, the C-RAM fires self-destructing
(exploding) munitions, as opposed to hardened, armor piercing munitions. 154
Consequently, the danger to civilians on the ground is that of falling fragments
from the exploding rounds or from a detonated mortar or rocket-which can be
deemed by commanders to not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military
advantage of taking out an incoming threat. Thus, these "autonomous" weapon
systems comply with IHL principles of distinction and proportionality.
The essence of complying with IHL in employing autonomous weapons is the
retention of command and control by commanders. A fully autonomous drone
149. MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), United States Navy Fact File (Nov. 5,
2010), http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=800&ct 2.
150. Id.
151. Phalanx Close-In Weapon System, Raytheon (Mar. 2008), http://www.raytheon.
com/capabilities/products/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/cms04 019379.pdf.
152. Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM), GlobalSecurity.org (Feb. 10, 2006),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/cram.htm.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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could be programmed to complete a battlefield mission and yet still be controlled
by commanders. However, in the event an autonomous weapon takes an action not
intended by its commander, command and control is lost and that commander who
has lost control risks violating IHL if his or her weapon system becomes
indiscriminate. This same risk is true for a commander who loses control of his or
her troops. The bottom line is that a commander's duty is to command, whether
the movement and action of troops or the employment of weapon systems on the
battlefield.
Apart from losing control of a weapon system, a commander or operator can
also misuse a fully autonomous drone or weapon. In case of misuse, commanders
and operators risk violating IHL. The potential for misuse of a weapon, however,
does not necessarily render that weapon system incompatible with IHL.
Commentary on Article 36 of Additional Protocol I confirms this, providing that
"[a] State is not required to foresee or analyze all possible misuses of a weapon, for
almost any weapon can be misused in ways that would be prohibited." '155 Thus, the
risk of misuse exists for RPAs just as it does for any weapon.
Notwithstanding the ability to employ autonomous weapons in compliance
with IHL, drafters of Additional Protocol I provide the following warning on the
subject of automated warfare:
The use of long distance, remote control weapons, or weapons
connected to sensors positioned in the field, leads to the automation of
the battlefield in which the soldier plays an increasingly less important
role. The counter-measures developed as a result of this
evolution... exacerbates the indiscriminate character of combat. In short,
all predictions agree that if man does not master technology, but allows
it to master him, he will be destroyed by technology." 
t 56
In other words, even though advanced technology may allow autonomous
weapons to be used in compliance with IHL, commanders or operators must
nonetheless retain command and control.
B. Indiscriminate Weapons and Attacks
So as to not violate the principle of distinction, "indiscriminate attacks" and
"indiscriminate weapons" are prohibited under IHL. Article 51(4) of Additional
Protocol I prohibits indiscriminate attacks, describing such an attack as one "not
directed at a specific military objective," or one which employs "a method or
means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective," or one
that employs a "method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited
as required by the Protocol.' 5  The rationale for these prohibitions is that these
described attacks are "of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or
civilian objectives without distinction., 58  The ICRC study on customary
155. Protocol I, supra note 71, at art. 36, 1469.
156. Id. at art. 36 1476.
157. Id. at art. 51 1 4 (a, b, c).
158. Id. at art.51 4 (c).
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international humanitarian law states that "[t]he use of weapons which are by
nature indiscriminate is prohibited."'' 59 Such a weapon is described as one that
"cannot be directed at a military objective or whose effects cannot be limited as
required by international humanitarian law."'
' 60
Some have argued that RPAs are inherently indiscriminate weapons and a per
se violation of IHL, based apparently in part on multiple civilian casualties
(collateral damage) in the vicinity of targeted individuals.' 6 1 One author even
claims that "[m]issiles from errant drones have already killed as many as 1,000
civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan."' 62 On the contrary, it is precisely
because of these advanced RPA systems that it is difficult for RPA operators to say
after an ill-advised attack that it was a "case of mistaken identity," assuming
intelligence provided to RPA operators by other sources is accurate.163
Indeed, certain weapons are by their very nature indiscriminate (e.g.,
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons). The United Nations General
Assembly described chemical and biological weapons as "inherently reprehensible
because their effects are often uncontrollable and unpredictable." ' 164 RPAs, as
currently employed by the USAF, do not in any way fit this profile.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions agreed, stating that "a missile fired from a drone is no different from
any other commonly used weapon, including a gun fired by a soldier or a
helicopter or gunship that fires missiles.' 165 "The critical legal question...," he
added, is "whether its specific use complies with IHL. 166 In the event an operator
employs an RPA in an uncontrollable or unpredictable manner, such that civilians
or civilian objects are indiscriminately attacked, that operator, or even the superior
commander of that operator, can be held accountable under the IHL principle of
command responsibility.
IV. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COMPLIANCE WITH IHL
The primary duty of a military commander is to exercise command. Inherent
in exercising command, a commander creates within an armed force a hierarchical
regime through which the commander ensures internal discipline.167  Military
159. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 71, at 244.
160. Id.
161. Murray Wardrop, Unmanned Drones Could be Banned, Says Senior Judge, THE TELEGRAPH,
July 6, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/5755446/Unmanned-drones-could-be-
banned-says-senior-judge.html.
162. The Editors, Terminate the Terminators, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (June 29, 2010),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=terminate-the-terminators.
163. Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, INT'L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS, 455 (Sept. 2005), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc859 schmitt.pdf.
164. G.A. Res. 2603 (XXIV), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7630, at 16
(Dec. 16, 1969).
165. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted
Killings, Human Rights Comm'n, 79, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip
Alston).
166. Id.
167. Protocol I, supra note 71, art. 87.
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members know this hierarchy as the chain of command. Using this chain of
command, commanders properly have command and control of subordinates and
are thereby empowered to ensure compliance with IHL during armed conflict. A
commander is of course held accountable for his or her own actions that violate
IHL-the same as all other individuals on the battlefield. 168 However, pursuant to
the principle of command responsibility, a commander might also be accountable
for a subordinate's violation of IHL.
169
Article 87(1) of Additional Protocol I provides that High Contracting Parties
must "require military commanders.. .to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress
and report" breaches of IHL. Commanders must also "ensure that members of the
armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations" under IHL.
170
And finally, commanders must "initiate disciplinary or penal action against
violators" of IHL.17 1 These duties are also recognized as customary international
humanitarian law, which certainly pre-dates Additional Protocol I , as evidenced
by the trial of Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita.1
72
A. The "Yamashita" Standard for Command Responsibility
On December 7, 1945, a military commission sentenced Japanese General
Tomoyuki Yamashita to death by hanging 173 in what has been described as "the
first time a military commander had been found guilty of war crimes committed by
his soldiers because of his failure to adequately supervise them.' 74 The findings
and decisions by the military commission were subsequently reviewed by the
Supreme Court of the United States, which upheld the Commission. 175 The
original charge during the military commission was that Yamashita,
while commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United
States of America and its allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to
discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the
168. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 71, at 551.
169. See generally Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility For War Crimes, 62 MIL. L.
REV. 1 (1973) (discussing war crimes involving command responsibility and including in his
"examination a view of the criminal responsibility of the combat commander, possible offenses, and the
degree of intent required under both domestic and international law").
170. Protocol I, supra note 71, at art. 87(2).
171. Id. at art. 87(3).
172. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 71, at 556-63; see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1
(1946) (holding it is a violation of the laws of war when a commander fails to control the operations of
members of his command who commit atrocities).
173. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 5.
174. Major Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in
Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 177 (2000); see also U.N. WAR CRIMES
COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS VOLUME IV 4 (1948), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/Law-ReportsVol-4.pdf [hereinafter LAW REPORTS]; see
generally Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (holding it is a violation of the laws of war when a commander
fails to control the operations of members of his command who commit atrocities).
175. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 25-26.
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members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities
and other high crimes.., thereby violat[ing] the laws of war.
176
A bill of particulars filed by the prosecution alleged 123 specific acts
committed by General Yamashita's subordinates. 77 Among the acts alleged was
the carrying out of "a deliberate plan and purpose to massacre and exterminate a
large part of the civilian population... and to devastate and destroy public, private
and religious property therein, as a result of which more than 25,000 men, women
and children, all unarmed noncombatant civilians, were brutally mistreated and
killed.... ' ' 78 Other acts alleged included "beating, wounding, torturing, mutilating,
maiming, raping, attempting to rape, killing, attempting to kill, executing, burning
alive, massacring and exterminating.'
7 9
Yamashita argued that the charge against him did not constitute a violation of
the law of war because it neither alleged that he committed nor alleged that he
directed the specific acts described in the bill of particulars. 80 Notably, the charge
did not even allege that Yamashita had knowledge of the commission of the acts
alleged.' 8' In considering this issue, the Supreme Court found that "the law of war
presupposes that its violation is to be avoided through the control of the operations
of war by commanders who are to some extent responsible for their
subordinates."' 82  Referencing several provisions of international law regarding
duties of commanders, the Supreme Court further found that Yamashita had "an
affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in
the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population."' 8 3 In
essence, the Commission held Yamashita accountable for his subordinates'
violations of IHL based on the fact that he must have known of those violations
and failed to prevent or repress them. 1
84
This standard for command responsibility has since been reiterated and
further refined in multiple instances under IHL. 85 Each instance reflects, with
176. Id. at 13-14; LAw REPORTS, supra note 174, at 3-4.
177. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 14; LAw REPORTS, supra note 174, at 4.
178. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 14; LAW REPORTS, supra note 174, at 5.
179. U.N. COMM'N, supra note 174, at 5.
180. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 14.
181 Id. at 28. Justice Murphy, in a vigorous dissent, noted perceived insufficiencies in the charge.
He wrote: "[Yamashita] was not charged with personally participating in the acts of atrocity or with
ordering or condoning their commission. Not even knowledge of these crimes was attributed to
him ... The recorded annals of warfare and the established principles of international law afford not the
slightest precedent for such a charge." Id.
182. Id. at 15.
183. Id. at 16.
184. U.N. COMM'N, supra note 174, at 35. The Commission's judgment read as follows:
"General Yamashita: The Commission concludes: (1) That a series of atrocities and other high crimes
have been committed by members of the Japanese armed forces under your command...that they were
not sporadic in nature but in many cases were methodically supervised by Japanese officers and
noncommissioned officers; (2) That during the period in question you failed to provide effective control
of your troops as was required by the circumstances." Id.
185. The standard for command responsibility has been codified in numerous instances, to include:
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
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slight variation, the standard set out and recognized as customary international
humanitarian law-which is:
Commanders and other superiors are criminally responsible for war
crimes committed by their subordinates if they knew, or had reason to
know, that the subordinates were about to commit or were committing
such crimes and did not take all necessary and reasonable measures in
their power to prevent their commission, or if such crimes had been
committed, to punish persons responsible.1 6
Generally speaking, as summarized in a 1994 United Nations Security
Council letter, responsibility for a subordinate's conduct attaches 1) where the
commander knew of a subordinate's criminal behavior and failed to take steps to
prevent it, 2) where the commander showed "serious personal dereliction" such as
to "constitute a willful and wanton disregard of the possible consequences" of a
subordinate's criminal behavior, or 3) where "despite pleas to the contrary, the
commander, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, must have
known of the offences charged and acquiesced therein., 187
B. Command Responsibility during USAF RPA Operations
We assume the requirements of command responsibility apply at the highest
levels of command, but might they also apply to a commander of an RPA
squadron? To the aircraft commander (pilot) of an RPA? To the ground
commander of a special forces team calling in strikes by an RPA? Absolutely!
Commentary on article 87 of Additional Protocol I explains:
There is no member of the armed forces exercising command who is not
obliged to ensure the proper application of the Conventions and the
Protocol. As there is no part of the army which is not subordinated to a
military commander at whatever level, this responsibility applies from
the highest to the lowest level of the hierarchy, from the Commander-in-
Chief down to the common soldier who takes over as head of the
platoon to which he belongs at the moment his commanding officer has
fallen and is no longer capable of fulfilling his task. 188
Commanders then, at all levels of command, are accountable for the weapons
they employ, the method in which they employ them, and the consequences
resulting from such employment.
This is the case during RPA and other drone operations as a drone, at most, is
a weapon or part of a weapon system employed on the battlefield either by
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 86; Updated Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7(3); Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., art. 6(3), U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); and finally, Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, art. 28, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (Jan. 16, 2002).
186. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 71, at 558.
187. Letter, United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, 58 (May 27, 1994).
188. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 71.
2011
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
commanders or at the direction of commanders. 189 Regardless of the mission or
weapon system employed, every member of an armed force who commands, at
whatever level, must be held accountable under the principle of command
responsibility. No legal or military regime exists to place accountability on
machines, drones, androids, or RPAs-nor should it exist.
For example, if a soldier used a pistol to kill a surrendering adversary, no one
would suggest that the pistol committed a war crime. Clearly, the soldier
committed the war crime. Further, if the crime was ordered by, acquiesced in or
ignored by a commander, that commander also committed the war crime. A drone,
no matter how technologically advanced, is similar to the pistol. Someone must
use it before it can take any effect. If during the course of its use a war crime is
committed, responsibility for the results will be on the person who employed it-
and certainly not on the machine itself. IHL, by design, properly holds individuals
and commanders accountable for their behavior during armed conflict. A recent
case from the U.S. military demonstrates this principle.
In February 2010, a failed U.S. RPA operation took the lives of as many as 23
civilians in Afghanistan.19 A report found that a Nevada-based Predator crew
gave incomplete and inaccurate reports to a ground commander in Afghanistan.'
9
'
The Predator crew ignored numerous indications that the people they were tracking
during three and a half hours were, at least in part, civilians. 92 They also failed to
acknowledge or forward messages from their intelligence analysts noting that
children were visible among the individuals being tracked. 193 Based on the faulty
reports (and lack of reports), the ground commander authorized and assisted in a
missile strike by a nearby attack helicopter. 194 The missile strike took the lives of
the Afghan civilians.195  Upon completion of a thorough investigation, General
Stanley McChrystal "issued formal letters of reprimand to four high-ranking
officers, including brigade and battalion commanders, and letters of admonishment
to two junior officers," almost certainly career-ending administrative actions,
especially for the commanders.'
9 6
Two aspects of this case are noteworthy in demonstrating the principles of
command responsibility. First, commanders even at lower levels who failed to
comply with IHL were punished for their dereliction. Second, a commander at
nearly the highest level, General McChrystal, complied with his obligations under
189. ZACHARY TUMIN ET AL., UNMANNED AND ROBOTIC WARFARE: ISSUES, OPTIONS, AND
FUTURES 10 (President and Fellows of Harvard 2008), http://www.boozallen.
com/medialfile/Unmanned and Robotic Warfare.pdf. This Harvard study pointed out that "unmanned
warfare is now, and has always been, in fact a hybrid system comprising many individual actors and
platforms.'" Id.
190. Dexter Filkins, Operators of Drones Are Faulted in Afghan Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/world/asia/30drone.html.
191. Zucchino, supra note 88.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Filkins, supra note 190.
195. Zucchino, supra note 88.
196. Id.
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command responsibility in holding his subordinates accountable for their
noncompliance with IHL. Given that he knew nothing of the violations before
they happened or as they happened, his obligation was to "punish the persons
responsible," as required under IHL.1
97
V. CONCLUSION
Drones and other automated war-fighting capabilities have existed for at least
the last 50 years. 198 It is therefore appropriate to refer to this past decade as a
"modem" era of robotic warfare. However, "modem" has already given way to
the newest advances, as we are only at the beginning of this technological
revolution. The USAF admits to being in the "early stages" of drone warfare and
technology, adding that "[a]rming the RQ-1 Predator with Hellfire missiles can be
compared to the mounting of guns on biplanes early in the last century." 199
Already, the USAF "is training more pilots for advanced UAVs than for any other
single weapons system.,
200
Without a doubt, technology will someday exist which would allow a Soldier,
Sailor, Airman, or Marine to completely automate the dirty business of fighting
wars. In preparation for that coming evolution, it has been suggested that IHL
should appropriately evolve. It is true that with evolution of warfare often comes
the need for evolution in IHL. The Additional Protocols to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions have been attributed to the fact that "developments in the character of
warfare led to the growing realization that the laws of war required further
adaptation to the conditions of contemporary hostilities. 22 '
However, given the fact that RPA technology is developmentally comparable
to mounting guns on biplanes in the early 2 0 th century, an adjustment to IHL at this
point would likely be incomplete, uninformed, and shortsighted. Notwithstanding
best efforts at predicting future drone technologies, the rapid evolution of these
technologies suggests that we cannot accurately predict the various implications of
such advancements. IHL drafted specifically to address concerns related to drone
warfare would likely be outdated even before it is promulgated.
For the moment, current IHL, especially long-standing customary
international humanitarian law concepts, seem well-poised to address foreseeable
issues relating to employment by military members of drone technology on the
battlefield. At all times, commanders must exercise command and control over
their troops and weapon systems. Furthermore, force under a commander's control
must be used in compliance with core IHL principles-including distinction and
197. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 71, at 58.
198. THOMAS P. EHRHARD, AIR FORCE UAVS: THE SECRET HISTORY 4 (2010),
http://www.afa.org/mitchell/reports/MSUAV_071 0.pdf.
199. STRATEGIC VISION, supra note 3, at 6.
200. Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, Speech delivered at the United States Air Force
Academy (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1543.
201. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 419 (ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF eds., 3d ed.
2000).
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proportionality. 20 2 And finally, in the event a commander fails to comply with
these principles, that commander should be held accountable under the IHL
principle of command responsibility.
202. Undoubtedly, RPAs comprise a highly-advanced, highly-effective weapon system for military
commanders. Furthermore, USAF RPA operations as described in this article (RPA's unique
capabilities coupled with the USAF's internal policies and ROE) enable operators to conduct a broad
spectrum of military missions in full compliance with IHL. (As mentioned previously throughout the
article, compliance with IHL using RPAs assumes accurate intelligence provided to RPA operators by
outside sources.)
VOL. 39:4
CLARIFYING THE LAW RELATING TO UNMANNED DRONES AND THE
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1. INTRODUCTION
By now it is common knowledge that the United States employs weaponized
unmanned drones in its conflict with al Qaeda. Predator drones, equipped with
Hellfire Missiles, were first deployed shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks to target al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan.' The first reported drone strike
outside Afghanistan occurred in 2002 in Yemen.2 The basic facts of the United
States' conflict with al Qaeda are relatively well known. However, the law that
governs the conflict is murky at best, and there is little consensus among the legal
experts on many relevant legal issues. This article is designed to lay out the basic
framework of the law and highlight the major areas of contention, providing the
foundation for understanding the intricacies and nuances discussed by the eminent
publicists writing in this edition of the Denver Journal of International Law &
Policy.
To explain the laws governing the use of force, applied in a modern context,
this article first briefly describes in Section 1I the historical context in which the
law surrounding the use of force developed. Then, Section III explains the basic
legal paradigms that apply to an analysis concerning the legality of drones as
weapons of war, including human rights, self-defense, the law of armed conflict,
and international humanitarian law (IHL). A brief examination of terrorism and
the background history relating to difficulties in defining terrorism follows in
Section IV. Section V examines the different approaches to the jus ad bellum
analysis, which is the first step in determining legality of the use of force. Finally,
* Both authors graduated from the University of Denver, Sturm College of Law in May 2011
with J.D.s and Certificates in International Law. Additionally, both authors were members of the
Jessup International Moot Court Team. They would like to thank Professor David Akerson for his
dedication to research on the use of force law and for his invaluable assistance during the research and
writing process. The authors would also like to thank Anjali Nanda, John Gaudette, and Megan
Moriarty for their immense contributions.
1. Douglas Waller, How the CIA Fights its New War, TIME, Nov. 5, 2001, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,183002,00.html.
2. U.S. Missile Strike Kills al Qaeda Chief, YEMEN TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, available at
http://articles.cnn.com/2002-11-05/world/yemen.blast-lsuccessful-tactical-operation-international-
killers-marib? s=PM:WORLD.
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Section VI lays out the jus in bello assessment that governs how a State may use
force when carrying out a specific campaign.
II. BACKGROUND
In the mid-1600's, Hugo Grotius, the Dutch scholar widely considered the
father of international law,3 recognized the paramount principle of territorial
sovereignty, and that all sovereigns are perpetually either in a state of peace
governed by human rights law or a state of war governed by humanitarian law.4
These revelations were considered to be new concepts of international law
designed to reflect new legal realities. 5 Such a paradigm shift is now termed a
"Grotian Moment." 6 Some scholars argue that September 11 th created a Grotian
Moment regarding the use of force to combat terrorism,7 while others argue the
traditional bipartite legal paradigm of humanitarian law and human rights law
ensconced by Grotius' original Grotian Moment prevails8 and the fundamental
principle of territorial sovereignty9 remains inviolable.10
3. Milena Sterio, A Grotian Moment: Changes in the Legal Theory of Statehood, 39 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 209, 211 (2011).
4. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (A.C. Campbell trans., London, 1814)
(1625); L. Ali Khan, The Extinction of Nation States, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 197, 197 (1992).
5. John W. Head, Throwing Eggs at Windows: Legal and Institutional Globalization in the 21st-
Century Economy, 50 KAN. L. REV. 731, 771 (2002).
6. Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the "Grotian Moment": Accelerated Formation of Customary
International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 439, 443-44 (2010).
7. E.g., Ian Johnstone, The Plea of "Necessity" in International Legal Discourse: Humanitarian
Intervention and Counter-Terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 370 (2005) (arguing that a
"constitutional moment" occurred in the aftermath of September 1 1th, which is the same concept
embodied by the term "Grotian Moment"); Benjamin Langille, It's "Instant Custom ': How the Bush
Doctrine Became Law After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 145 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional
Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2002).
8. See, e.g., 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 79, 80, 85, U.N. GAOR, 60th
Sess., 8th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/I (Sept. 16, 2005), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdfOpenElement (reaffirming that the
traditional restrictions on the use of force prescribed by the U.N. Charter remains the legal framework
under which States must operate in combating terrorism) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit Outcome];
The Secretary-General, Note by the Secretary-General, Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium
Summit, 189-92, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf (rejecting a new writing or re-interpretation of Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter which lays out the requirements for self-defense) [hereinafter Note by Secretary-
General, Millennium Summit]; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 745 (7th
ed. 2008); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, State Sponsors of Terrorism: Issues of International Responsibility, in
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 3, 13 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004);
Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Redefining Sovereignty Via International Constitutional Moments?. The
Case of Afghanistan, in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR 335,
362-63 (Michael Bothe, Mary Ellen O'Connell & Natalino Ronzitti eds., 2005) (arguing that Anne-
Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White's contention that September 11th constituted a
"constitutional moment" and, accordingly, a valid legal norm, is unsupportable and instead,
"constitutional moments" merely reflect norm projections).
9. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131,
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Regardless of whether September 1 1th constituted a Grotian Moment, the
challenge the international community faces today is applying law, which
developed over the course of the last four centuries, to new situations and
technologies that were previously unimaginable. While international law
continuously evolves, arguing that September 11th caused total destruction to the
foundational principles governing the use of force is unsupportable. Rather, use of
force law may have evolved in some manners, but it did so within the confines of
well-established basic principles.
Since Grotius, significant evolution of the foundational concept of war and
peace has occurred. Two of the most momentous developments emerged from the
rubble of World War II. First, the United Nations (U.N.) was formed, and now,
virtually all States are party to the U.N. Charter.11 Accordingly, Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter, which codifies a general prohibition on the use of force, is binding
upon nearly every State.12 This prohibition can only be overcome in very narrow
exceptions, one of which is a State's inherent right to self-defense, laid out in
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
3
The second post-World War II development was the introduction, and
subsequent adoption, of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides for the
protection of civilians during armed conflicts. 14 The Additional Protocols of 1977
to the Geneva Conventions supplemented these essential civilian protections.
Additional Protocol I provides greater security for civilians,' 5 and Additional
Protocol II further elucidates the requirements for States engaging in conflicts
against non-State actors, such as al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations.
1 6
Following the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, there have
been significant changes in both the parties to war and the methods of warfare.
The World Wars involved great sovereign powers marching on a foreign sovereign
territory, but now the "enemy" often involves non-State actors possessing no
U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1408th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/20/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965); Declaration on
Principles in International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), pmbl., U.N. GAOR 25th
Sess., Supp. No. 18, Annex (Oct. 24, 1970) [Declaration on Friendly Relations].
10. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of
International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993, 997 (2001); Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition,
Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO WASH. L. REv. 1201, 1225 (2007).
11. U.N., Member States, http://www.un.org/en/members/ (last visited April 9, 2011).
12. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
13. U.N. Charter art. 51. The other exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force are discussed
briefly in Section III.
14. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
15. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Additional Protocol 1].
16. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
2011
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
territory, no formal military, and no official constituency. Similarly, military
technology has developed greatly. In traditional warfare, tanks, planes, and well-
organized battalions marched across enemy territory. Today, the means and
methods of warfare are imbalanced between the parties. Non-State actors employ
rudimentary technology that allows a single combatant to carry out an entire attack
with a road-side improvised explosive device or suicide vest. 17  Meanwhile,
developed nations use state-of-the-art unmanned drones with laser guided missiles
to target military objectives located thousands of miles away from the drone
operator. 18 Due to these evolutions, international law has been stretched, adapted,
and sometimes contorted to fit a mode of combat unimaginable to the drafters of
the U.N. Charter and the Geneva Conventions in the aftermath of World War II.
III. THE BASIC LEGAL PARADIGMS
The general prohibition on the use of force is codified in U.N. Charter Article
2(4), and is also well established customary international law.' 9 Customary
international law is universally binding and formed by widespread and consistent
state practice coupled with opinio juris, a State's belief that it has a legal
obligation. 21 The prohibition on the use of force is so engrained in customary
international law and viewed by the international community as an inherent
obligation of all States that it is considered ajus cogens norm, or peremptory norm
from which no derogation is permitted.22
There are several limited exceptions to this prohibition. The first is a State's
inherent right to use force in self-defense, either individually or collectively. 23 The
second exception is for use of force upon Security Council authorization for the
purposes of maintaining international peace and security. 24 Such Security Council
17. Alissa J. Rubin, In Kandahar, Another Suicide Bomber Kills 2, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2011,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/08/world/asia/08afghanistan.html?ref =
improvisedexplosive devices; Thorn Shanker, Makeshift Bombs Spread Beyond Afghanistan, Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/world/29military
.html?ref-improvisedexplosivedevices.
18. See Aaron Drake, Current U.S. Air Force Drone Operations and Their Conduct in
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law - An Overview, 39 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 629,
630-32, 636-38 (2011). In discussing the unmanned vehicles employed by the U.S., Israel, and other
States and their legal implications, this article will refer exclusively to the terms drone or unmanned
drone. A variety of other terms are utilized to describe these vehicles, including: remotely piloted
aircraft (RPA), "'armed drone', unmanned (or uninhabited) aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned (or
uninhabited) aircraft system (UAS)" and a handful of other technical names. Ian Henderson,
International Law Concerning the Status and Marking of Remotely Piloted Aircraft, 39 DENY. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 615, 615 (2011).
19. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 267 (1963);
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 64-65 (2d. ed. 2005).
20. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./De., F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 171 (Feb. 20).
21. Id. T 77.
22. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 510-12.
23. U.N. Charter art. 51; Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 176 (June 26).
24. U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51.
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authorization was recently given in order to protect civilian populations in Libya.25
Finally, regional enforcement actions are permitted under Article 53 of the U.N.
Charter, but the legality of such action is also predicated upon Security Council
authorization.26
The law governing the use of force is split into two parts: jus ad bellum
dictates the conditions under which a State may resort to the use of force,27 andjus
in bello controls the means and methods of force a State may legally employ. 28
The former determines the right to use of force and the latter regulates how that
right is executed.
Within thejus ad bellum analysis, there are three possible legal paradigms in
which a State may be acting. First, during times of peace, States are governed by
human rights law and may only use law enforcement methods to ensure security.29
Second, a State acting within the self-defense paradigm, under which a State
confronted with violence or threatened with imminent violence, may, under U.N.
Charter Article 51 and customary international law, 30 use force in self-defense so
long as it is necessary and proportionate. 31 Finally, a State may use force within
the context of an armed conflict, under the parameters of international
humanitarian law.32 If the State is not operating within the self-defense or armed
conflict paradigms, it must be operating in the human rights paradigm. Simply put,
if a State does not meet the legal criteria of self-defense or armed conflict, but uses
force without Security Council authorization, it is doing so unlawfully. Thus, it
becomes imperative for a State utilizing military force to justify and legitimize its
actions as either a lawful right to self-defense or engagement in an armed conflict.
Once a State finds itself in one of the two categories that permits the use of
force, it must comply with jus in bello principles that govern how that force is
used.33 The primary source forjus in bello principles are the Geneva Conventions
and the Additional Protocols, but virtually every principle codified in the
Conventions are universally accepted as customary international law as well.34
25. Libya. Ban Welcomes Security Council Authorization of Measures to Protect Civilians, U.N.
NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37809&
Cr=libya&Cr1.
26. U.N. Charter art. 53.
27. MYRES McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR, 132-33
(1994).
28. Marco Sass6li, Ius ad Bellum and Jus in Bello-The Separation Between the Legality of the Use
of Force and Humanitarian Rules to be Respected in Watfare: Crucial or Outdated?, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 242 (2007).
29. See infra, Section V(A).
30. See infra, Section V(B).
31. See infra, Section V(B)(iv).
32. See infra, Section V(C).
33. See infra Section VI.
34. ICRC, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, INTRODUCTION (2001), available
at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl cha in in [hereinafter ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL].
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IV. THE RELEVANCE OF DEFINING TERRORISM
Combating terrorism is one of the primary purposes for the employment of
armed drones by States such as Russia, Israel, and the United States.35 The use of
military action to respond to terrorism is controversial. To fully understand the
debate, it is necessary to understand the essential elements of terrorism in order to
properly place it as a cog within the legal clockwork relating to the use of force
and drones. An ad hoc approach by States in addressing terrorism has developed
due to the failure of the international community to either adopt a unified
definition of terrorism or to create a binding instrument relating to the prevention
or punishment of terrorism in all contexts.
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and States began making concerted
efforts to create a legal framework for addressing terrorism well before the creation
of the United Nations.36 States notably began to address the topic of terrorism in a
unified effort beginning with the League of Nations and the 1937 Convention for
the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. 37  States involved in the drafting
were unable to reach consensus on the definition of terrorism and the instrument
was abandoned.38
Since then, States have struggled to agree upon a comprehensive definition of
terrorism. 39 After the 1972 Munich Olympics, where the terrorist group, Black
September, massacred eleven Israeli athletes, the United Nations stepped into the
international efforts to find a unified definition.40  That same year, the United
States proposed a Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain
Acts of International Terrorism. 41 This draft focused on defining terrorism as
violence by non-State actors against a State, without any exception for legitimate
35. See P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS EVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 263-78 (2009); Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, Addendum, Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 14, 18-24 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) [hereinafter Alston Report]; Mary
Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan 2004-2009 (Notre
Dame Law School, Legal Series Research Paper No. 09-43, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1501144; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRECISELY
WRONG: GAZA CIVILIANS KILLED BY ISRAELI DRONE-LAUNCHED MISSILES 3 (2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/06/30/precisely-wrong-0.
36. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Terrorism and Human Rights, 6-7,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/27 (June 7, 1999) (by Kalliopi K. Koufa, Special Rapporteur)
[hereinafter Koufa, Terrorism and Human Rights].
37. Id. 6; HELEN DUFFY, THE 'WAR ON TERROR' AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 18-19 (2005).
38. Koufa, Terrorism andHuman Rights, supra note 36, 6; DUFFY, supra note 37, at 18-19.
39. Koufa, Terrorism andHuman Rights, supra note 36, 7; TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE
STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 84-85 (2006); DUFFY, supra note 37, at 18-
19.
40. BECKER, supra note 39, at 89; BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 198
(2008); 11 Israelis, 4 Arabs, German Die in Munich Olympics Terrorism, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 6,
1972, at 1.
41. SAUL, supra note 40, at 198.
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struggles of self-determination.42 Because this proposed instrument arrived during
an era of political upheaval in developing States attempting to cast off the chains of
colonialism, the draft was not adopted and vehement disputes ensued between
developed and developing States concerning an accurate definition of terrorism.
43
In place of a united approach, States attacked the task of addressing terrorism in a
"sectoral" method 44 by drafting and adopting conventions to combat terrorism for
very specific situations, such as an airplane hijacking or extortion.45
After the tragic events of September 1 1 th, the United Nations reignited its
efforts in creating an inclusive and acceptable definition of terrorism, as well as
adopting an instrument to condemn and punish acts of terrorism. 46 A string of
Security Council Resolutions were issued which simultaneously condemned acts
of terrorism, urged States to aid in international efforts to combat terrorism, and
reminded States that aiding terrorists constituted a breach of their international
obligations. 47  In an effort to steer clear of the controversy over terrorism's
definition, the Security Council failed to issue a definition within these
resolutions.48  Unfortunately, to date, the feasibility of "a global terrorism
convention [and] its precise content or scope . . . remain shrouded in
uncertainty. 49
Ultimately, a fairly universal definition of terrorism has evolved from the
elements littered in multiple conventions. Jurists and scholars generally agree that
terrorism is defined, at the least, by three essential elements: 1) an act of violence
that causes death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants (or
threatens such violence, such as the taking of hostages); 2) for the purpose of
causing terror or intimidation; and 3) to compel a government or organization to do
42. BECKER, supra note 39, at 90.
43. BECKER, supra note 39, at 90-91; SAUL, supra note 40, at 199.
44. BECKER, supra note 39, at 92.
45. E.g., Convention on Offenses and Certain Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963,
20 U.ST. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, entered into force Jan. 26, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 178;
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
entered into force Feb. 20, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Convention to Prevent and
Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that
are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, OAS T.S., No. 37; International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Marine Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S.
221; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S.
256; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178
U.N.T.S. 197.
46. DUFFY, supra note 37, at 20-21; BECKER, supra note 39, at 100-01.
47. S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doe. S/RES 1378 (Nov. 14, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doe.
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001);; S.C. Res. 1566,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004).
48. BECKER, supra note 39, at 101.
49. DUFFY, supra note 37, at 23.
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or abstain from doing an act.50  This basic definition, however, does not
definitively specify whether terrorism is considered an organized crime (putting it
within the human rights paradigm) or if the law of self-defense or armed conflict
can also govern, and thereby fails to provide sufficient guidance for States
attempting to combat terrorists.
Because no comprehensive treaty law exists and no customary lex specialis
has developed relating to terrorism, States are left to address terrorism within the
binding corpus of existing treaty and customary international law. The debate
continues to rage over whether terrorism falls under the purview of human rights
law or under the self-defense and armed conflict paradigms.
V. ANALYZING JUS AD BELLUM
This section will walk through each of the jus ad bellum paradigms. There is
significant disagreement in the international community as to which paradigm
governs the U.S.'s use of force against al Qaeda in the Middle East and Africa.
The human rights, self-defense, and armed conflict paradigms have all been
asserted, and legitimate arguments exist for each applying at certain times and
places in the conflict.
A. Human Rights Law
Under Grotius' original bipartite legal structure, any act by a sovereign State
that is not within the context of an armed conflict or is legally responding to an
armed attack in self-defense,51 automatically falls under the framework of human
rights law. A requisite level of violence is required for a State to respond to any
type of attack or threat against its citizens or sovereignty.52 If a State has not
suffered from an armed attack, thereby activating a right of self-defense, or the
violence does not rise to a protracted intensity sufficient to constitute an armed
conflict, then a State's response to an attack or perceived threat is governed by
human rights law.53
Additionally, even where a State is legally employing military force, human
rights law governs where gaps exist in IHL. 4 Some argue that IHL is in fact a
subset of human rights law functioning as a lex specialis during armed conflicts,
thus accounting for the broad application of human rights law where gaps in IHL
50. See, e.g., Note by Secretary-General, Millennium Summit, supra note 8, at 164; Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and
Terrorism, U.N. GA/SCOR, 57th Sess., Annex, 13, U.N. Doc. A/57/273-S/2002/875 (2002), available
at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC GEN/N02/512/97/IMG/N0251297.pdfOpenElement;
Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 359, 361 (2009).
51. The definitions and legal applications of both self-defense and armed conflict will be
addressed in Sections V(B) and V(C) respectively.
52. Alston Report, supra note 35, T 31-32.
53. ld. 31-33.
54. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 25
(July 8); Dinah Pokempner, Terrorism and Human Rights: The Legal Framework, in TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 19, 19 (Michael N. Schmitt & Gian Luca Beruto,
eds. 2002).
VOL. 39:4
CLARIFYING THE LAW
exist.55  Michael Newton, Professor of Vanderbilt University Law School,
however, disagrees with this contention, arguing that "[i]t is an oxymoron to argue
that humanitarian law is a mere subset of human rights law [because] IHL has a
much richer, longer, and diverse history."
56
1. The Law Enforcement Model
A State acting within the corpus of human rights law must operate under the
"law enforcement model., 57  The law enforcement model permits non-military
tactics, such as arrests, extradition, detention, and trial.58 This term refers to the
type of force that can be used, not who may employ the force. All government
officials authorized to execute police powers, "including a State's military and
security forces," may utilize such methods under the law enforcement model.
5 9
Organized crime and armed violence failing to rise to the level of an armed conflict
remains in the purview of domestic law enforcement.6 °
As discussed above, because no comprehensive definition of terrorism exists,
it is contentious as to whether terrorism is merely organized crime exclusively
governed by human rights or whether terrorism may rise to a sufficient level of
violence to warrant self-defense or armed conflict governed by IHL. Scholars,
such as Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell of the University of Notre Dame Law
School, argue that isolated acts of terrorism do not rise to the level of an armed
conflict.61 She specifically contends that terrorism, generally, "is a crime" and
because "[t]errorist acts are usually sporadic," they do not rise to the requisite level
of violence to constitute an armed attack or an armed conflict. 62 Accordingly,
O'Connell argues that States do not have a right to act in self-defense or to use
military force against terrorists, and instead, must use law enforcement measures to
combat terrorism.
63
55. Pokempner, supra note 54, at 19; see Alston Report, supra note 35, 29.
56. Michael Newton, Flying into the Future: Drone Warfare and the Changing Face of
Humanitarian Law, 39 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 601, 602 (2011).
57. Alston Report, supra note 35, 31.
58. See Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 175 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008); Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of
Unmanned Targeting: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
lllth Cong. 2 (2010) (written statement of Mary Ellen O'Connell), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2010hr/042810oconnell.pdf [hereinafter O'Connell Congress
Statement]
59. Alston Report, supra note 35, 31 (citing Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials,
G.A. Res. 34/169, Annex, art. 1, U.N. Doc A/RES/34/169 (Dec. 17, 1979)).
60. NILS MELZER, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 24 (2009);
O'Connell Congress Statement, supra note 58, at 2.
61. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY
& POL'Y 344, 355 (2010); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Remarks: The Resort to Drones under International
Law, 39 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 585,597 (2011) [hereinafter O'Connell, Remarks].
62. O'Connell, Remarks, supra note 61, at 593.
63. Id.
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O'Connell's argument is grounded in State practice and evidence of opinio
juris demonstrated by States treating terrorism as a crime. A sufficient body of
State practice exists evidencing that States regularly employ law enforcement
tactics against terrorists. 64  For example, when combating terrorist attacks
perpetrated by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the United Kingdom (U.K.) used
its police force to conduct surveillance and execute arrests. Even when a suit was
brought against the U.K. questioning the lethal force used against suspected IRA
terrorists carrying out a plot to bomb British interests, the court applied the
arbitrariness standard under human rights.65 Additionally, the U.K. employed law
enforcement measures to locate and target the perpetrators (later discovered to be
members of al Qaeda) of the London subway and bus bombings in 2005.66
Similarly, the Spanish successfully captured and tried the individuals responsible
for the Madrid train bombing of March 2004.67 The Security Council has likewise
used its Article 42 powers68 on several occasions requiring States to respond to
terrorism with law enforcement measures, such as calling upon States to extradite
terrorists, 69 freeze the bank accounts of suspected terrorists, 70 and even to
domestically prosecute terrorists.7 1
Further, a wealth of evidence establishes States' opinio juris that terrorism is
a crime and does not fall under the scope of IHL. The U.K. and France expressly
stated in their reservations to the Additional Protocols of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions 72 their understanding that "the term 'armed conflict' denotes a
situation of a kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes
including acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation., 73  Similarly, the
64. See, e.g., William K. Lietzau, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement or War?, in
TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 75, 77 (Michael N. Schmitt &
Gian Luca Beruto, eds. 2002); Lois M. DAVIS, ET AL., LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENTS
POST-9/11 Focus ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY xv (2010).
65. McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 140 (1995).
66. Alan Cowell, Subway and Bus Blasts in London Kill at Least 37, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2005,
available at http://www.nytimes.comI/2005/07/08/intemational/europe/08bombings.html; Paul
Reynolds, Bomber Video 'Points to al Qaeda ', BBC NEWS, Sept. 2, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/4208250.stm; London Police Investigation Timeline, CBC NEWS
ONLINE, Aug. 11, 2005, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/london bombing/investigation
timeline.html (detailing the law enforcement measures carried out by British police to catch the
perpetrators of the bombing by investigating, arresting, and detaining individuals).
67. Paul White, Madrid Train Bombings Probe Finds No al Qaeda Link, USA TODAY, Mar. 9,
2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-03-09-madrid-x.htm.
68. U.N. Charter art. 42.
69. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1044, 4(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1044 (Jan. 31, 1996).
70. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 47, 11 (c); S.C. Res. 1735, 1 1(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735
(Dec. 22, 2006).
71. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 47, 2(e).
72. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15; Additional Protocol II, supra note 16.
73. Reservation of France (Apr. 11, 2001) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/D8041036
B40EBC44C1256A34004897B2?OpenDocument; Reservation of United Kingdom (July 2, 2002),
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has recognized that
"terrorist activities.., are not subject to international humanitarian law.",
74
2. Requirements for the Use of Force Under Human Rights Law
The use of force under human rights law is laid out primarily in Article 6 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), prescribing an
"arbitrary" standard.7 5  Under Article 6, "[e]very human being has the inherent
right to life .. .[and] [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.",76 Within
the human rights context, the use of lethal force is permissible only as a last resort.
Only killing that is "strictly and directly necessary to save life
' 77 is permitted; 78
killing that is arbitrary79 or not necessary to save a life is an illegal killing.
80
Law enforcement officials may take life where their lives or the lives of
82
others are imminently threatened, 8' but killing may not be the sole objective.
Where law enforcement methods alone are reasonably certain to end a threat of
violence, including terrorism, use of additional force is impermissible. 83 In sum, a
State may not act in self-defense or use military force against threats or acts of
violence if law enforcement measures, on their own, will, with a reasonable degree
of certainty, bring the perpetrators to justice.84 However, as O'Connell recognizes,
a State is permitted to derogate from the prohibition against lethal force only in
85
situations constituting an emergency.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9E03FOF2EE757CC 1256402003FB6D2?OpenDocument.
74. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Appeal, 562 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T,
Judgment, ] 175 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008).
75. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
76. Id.
77. Alston Report, supra note 35, 32-33.
78. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6 (art. 6), T 3, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1
(1994); Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 116, doc. 5 rev. I
corr. 86-87 (2002).
79. ICCPR, supra note 75, art. 6(1).
80. See Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990); Michael N. Schmitt, State Sponsored Assassination in
International and Domestic Law, 17 Yale J. Int'l L. 609, 644 (1992).
81. Alston Report, supra note 35, 32.
82. Alston Report, supra note 35, 9.
83. Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus as Bellum: A
Normative Framework, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES,
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF YORAM DINSTEIN 157, 171 (2007).
84. Id.
85. O'Connell, Remarks, supra note 61, at 597.. However, what constitutes an emergency
situation great enough to trigger the exception is highly controversial.
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3. Targeted Killings
One of the primary concerns within the international community regarding the
use of drones is that States utilize drones for their extraordinarily precise targeting
capabilities to kill terrorists, which many argue constitute extrajudicial or "targeted
killing. ',16  As the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary
Executions, Philip Alston, explains, a "targeted killing is the intentional,
premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force . . . against a specific individual
who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator., 87 The main criterion of a
targeted killing is that "lethal force is intentionally and deliberately used, with a
degree of pre-meditation, against an individual or individuals specifically
identified in advance by the perpetrator."'
States may legally employ targeted killing tactics within the context of a valid
act of self-defense or armed conflict, as long as the killing conforms to the jus in
bello requirements of necessity, proportionality, and distinction, which will be
further examined in Section VI. Targeted killings occurring during peacetime,
however, are illegal. 9 As discussed above, States acting in peacetime (outside of
the self-defense and armed conflict paradigms) and within the human rights
framework must limit acts of lethal force to situations where lives are imminently
threatened. Additionally, because killing may not be the sole objective, a targeted
killing is, by definition, illegal under the human rights paradigm.
In limited circumstances, a State's law enforcement personnel might
justifiably employ targeted killing tactics where an imminent threat exists to the
civilian population, but only if the overall goal of the mission is not to kill. 90
Interestingly, O'Connell posits that because drones use military force, they "are
therefore lawful only in armed conflict hostilities," 9' without acknowledging
limited exceptions for imminent threats. Her argument might be in response to the
way in which States are using drones. Currently, States are often employing
drones for targeted killings, but where no imminent threat exists.
By way of example, one of the first known U.S. drone attacks using a Hellfire
missile occurred on November 3, 2002, which struck a car in Yemen, killing
alleged al Qaeda leader Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harithi and five other men.92  In
86. Many scholars also refer to this practice as "extrajudicial killing", "summary execution",
"assassination", or other similar terms. This article will refer exclusively, however, to the term
"targeted killing" without prejudice to these other terms of art.
87. Alston Report, supra note 35, 1.
88. Alston Report, supra note 35, 11 9 (citing NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (2008)).
89. See O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 599; Michael N. Schmitt, State Sponsored
Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 614 (1992).
90. Alston Report, supra note 35, 1, 9.
91. O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 589.
92. Alston Report, supra note 35, 19 (citing Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What are the Risks
of the C.I.A. 's Covert Drone Program?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa fact mayer).
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response to this incident, then Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, and
Arbitrary Killings, Asma Jahangir, reported that the incident constituted "a clear
case of extrajudicial killing., 93 Another such occurrence perpetrated by the U.S.
Central Intelligent Agency was the targeting of wanted terrorist Baitullah Mehsud,
the leader of the Taliban in Pakistan. 94 Mehsud was in a civilian home with his
family and not engaging in any violent activity at the time of the attack. This
attack will be discussed in greater detail in Section VI regarding the principles of
IHL. However, under O'Connell's argument that terrorism must be combated with
law enforcement measures, this attack would be an illegal targeted killing.
In contrast to O'Connell and Alston, Professor Jordan Paust of the University
of Houston Law Center contends that the targeted killing policies of the United
States, Israel, and other States do not violate the arbitrary killing standard of
human rights.9 5 Instead, he reasons that a State's extraterritorial targeted killings
of individuals does not violate the "general human right to freedom from arbitrary
deprivation of life" because it "will only be applicable with respect to those
persons who are within the jurisdiction, actual power, or effective control of the
state or other entity using a drone.",
96
Both the ICCPR and ICESCR are limited in scope territorially, binding only
upon State parties, requiring them to extend human rights protections to their
citizens or persons within that State's sovereign territory. However, because the
requirement that a State not arbitrarily deprive individuals of the right to life is an
erga omnes duty9 7 (an obligation owed to all States by all States)98 and most likely
a jus cogens norm,99 States are obligated to ensure individuals the right to life
regardless of a State's jurisdiction, actual power, or effective control of an
individual. Therefore, any targeted killing of an individual committed by a State
outside of the context of lawful self-defense or an armed conflict, and when no
individual is imminently threatened, including those carried out by weaponized
drones, implicate human rights violations.
B. The Law Governing the Right of Self-Defense
A State may use force in self-defense in response to an armed attack.' 00 This
is an inherent right of all States, codified in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which
93. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Civ. and Pol. Rights, Including the
Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions, Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary
Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Asma Jahangir, 19, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/3 (Jan. 13,
2003).
94. Mayer, supra note 92.
95. Jordan J. Paust, Permissible Self-Defense Targeting and the Death of bin Laden, 39 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 569, 569-70 (2011) (arguing that the U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan are permissible
acts of self-defense, not requiring consent from Pakistan).
96. Id. at 573-74.
97. Paul Gormley, The Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability: Peremptory Norms of Jus
Cogens, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120, 147 (B.G. Ramcharan ed. 1985).
98. Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5).
99. Gormley, supra note 99, at 147.
100. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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states that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security." A parallel right exists under customary
international law.10' The customary right to self-defense "exist[s] alongside treaty
law" and is not superseded by the U.N. Charter.'0 2 The co-existence of the right to
self-defense under both treaty and customary law is rooted in the very nature of
sovereignty; the State, as the supreme authority under international law, must be
empowered to respond to threats against its territorial sovereignty or nationals.
Newton argues that it is "modern consensus that the sovereign right of self-defense
did not originate in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and is not restricted to
responses enumerated therein."
1
'
0 3
The right to self-defense includes both individual and collective self-
defense.10 4 A State may simultaneously possess both an individual and a collective
right to self-defense, and the State may act under both or either. For example,
State A and State B both suffer an armed attack from the same actor and State A
requests State B's assistance in self-defense. State B may use force in individual
self-defense for the original attack, as well as use force in collective self-defense
because of the request from State A. It was this precise scenario the United States
attempted to claim it was operating under in its submission to the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in the Nicaragua case.105 The U.S. defended its financial
and logistical support of military and paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua
by contending it was acting under both a right to individual self-defense as well as
collective self-defense on behalf of several Central American countries.' 16 The
Court found, however, that because the U.S. had not received a request from the
States it was claiming to be acting on behalf of, it could not invoke collective self-
defense. 107
Three basic issues arise when a State invokes a right to self-defense, and each
is contested to some degree in international legal scholarship: 1) whether the State
has suffered an armed attack; 2) whether the armed attack must be attributable to
another State; and 3) where the State may use force in responding to the armed
attack. These three issues essentially define the parameters for a State's right to
self-defense. Once these threshold issues are settled, the State must comply with
101. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
176 (June 26).
102. Id.
103. Newton, supra note 56, at 604.
104. U.N. Charter art. 51; Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at 176.
105. Counter Memorial of United States, Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Pleadings, 202 (Aug. 17, 1984).
106. Id. at 202, 254.
107. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at
T 165.
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two restrictions, requiring that any use of force in self-defense be both necessary
and proportionate. 108
1. Armed Attack
Most, but not all, scholars agree that the right of self-defense is limited to
situations where a State has suffered an armed attack.0 9 The more controversial
issue relates to what constitutes an armed attack, as the term itself provides little
guidance.
A minority of scholars argue that a State may respond in self-defense to any
threat, even those that do not rise to the level of an armed attack." ° The reasoning
is that a State should not be required to withhold a response of self-defense until
the threat escalates into an armed attack.' 1 1 Requiring so would create a gap in the
law where a State could not respond to serious threats against its nationals or
territory, which would render the right to self-defense meaningless. 1 2 It is also
argued that the language of U.N. Charter Article 51, which preserves the inherent
right to self-defense that preexisted the U.N., does not require an armed attack."1
3
Article 51 articulates that a State has "the inherent right of... self-defence if an
armed attack occurs,"'"14 and the lack of conditional language could indicate that
the framers did not intend to limit the right to self-defense to "if and only if' an
armed attack occurs." 15
The majority of scholars agree, however, that a State must suffer an armed
attack as a prerequisite to invoking the right to use force in self-defense.' 16 The
I.C.J. has loosely defined armed attack in several cases, including Nicaragua"
17
and Oil Platforms. 18  Armed attack, as a concept, exists less as a cohesive
108. CASSESE, supra note 19, at 355.
109. ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE:
BEYOND THE U.N. CHARTER PARADIGM 154-55 (1993); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND
SELF-DEFENCE 182-85 (4th ed. 2005); Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 803 (Bruno Simma ed., 2002); Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the
Legality of Pre-Emptive Force, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 227, 229 (2003).
110. MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER (1961); STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defense in Modern
International Law, in JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JUDGE STEPHEN M.
SCHWEBEL 530, 580 (1994); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1620, 1634 (1984).
111. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 26) (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel 173).
112. SCHWEBEL, supra note 110, at 580.
113. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
(dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel 173); BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 732.
114. U.N. Charter art. 51.
115. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
(dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel 173).
116. See supra note 109.
117. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
191, 195 (June 26).
118. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. 161, 64, 72 (Nov. 6).
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definition and more as an interplay of multiple sub-definitions. According to the
I.C.J., only the "'most grave forms of the use of force" constitute an armed
attack." 9 An armed attack must reach a certain significant scale of violence, 20
above "mere frontier incidents." As O'Connell points out, sporadic rocket fire
or small groups of persons crossing the border would not rise to the level of an
armed attack. 1
22
Some argue, however, that smaller scale attacks constitute armed attacks
triggering a State's right to self-defense, "[u]nless the scale and effects are trifling,
below the de minimis threshold.' ' 23  In fact, the I.C.J. determined that even a
solitary attack on a ship rises to the level of an armed attack.1 24 In line with this
thinking, I.C.J. Judge Jennings argued that it would be dangerous to unnecessarily
restrict the right to self-defense, as it would limit the State's ability to legally
respond to a threat to its sovereignty.
25
Another area of contention regarding an armed attack is whether a string of
small-scale attacks can be evaluated as a whole in order to rise to the level of an
armed attack. This primarily becomes an issue when discussing acts of terrorism
that generally employ "needle prick tactics" to achieve results that could not be
achieved by a single concentrated attack.126 As O'Connell argues, the sporadic
nature of terrorist attacks is precisely the reason why States should be required to
respond with law enforcement methods rather than military force.1 27 O'Connell
and others maintain that strings of terrorist attacks must be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis and cannot accumulate to produce an armed attack.128 However, others
contend that the accumulation of attacks is justified when violence is carried out as
a coordinated campaign.
29
119. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at
1191.
120. Id. 195.
121. Id.
122. O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 591.
123. DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 195.
124. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. at T 72.
125. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
(dissenting opinion of Judge Jennings, pp. 543-44).
126. Yehuda Blum, State Response to Acts of Terrorism, 19 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 223, 233 (1976).
127. O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 593.
128. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 889, 898
(2002).
129. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J.
168, 146 (Dec. 19); Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. at 231; see Schmitt, supra note 83, at 169-70 (referencing the I.C.J.'s reasoning in
Nicaragua that mere frontier incidents do not rise to the level of an armed attack but then adopting
Yoram Dinstein's dismissal of the Nicaragua holding by arguing that mere frontier incidents and small
scale attacks will constitute an armed attack when they rise above the de minimis threshold).
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2. Attribution of Armed Attacks: State or Non-State
The second issue relates to attribution of the armed attack. It remains
unsettled as to whether a State suffering an armed attack must be able to attribute
that attack to another State in order to legally use force in self-defense, or whether
a State may respond to an armed attack carried out by a non-State actor, including
terrorists groups like al Qaeda. Some scholars like O'Connell maintain that
attribution to a State is absolutely required, and without it, a State must operate
within the law enforcement/human rights paradigm.' 3M This argument is supported
by I.C.J. cases such as Nicaragua,13 1 Oil Platforms,3 2 and The Wall Advisory
Opinion,'3 3 which consider attribution of an armed attack to a State actor as a
necessary requirement for self-defense. These holdings draw from the U.N.
General Assembly's Definition of Aggression, which includes acts of aggression
as "[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State." Put
differently, an armed attack may be carried out by non-State actors acting on
behalf of a State.
Several tests exist to determine State responsibility in this context, including
"effective control" as set forth in Nicaragua,'34 "overall control" derived from the
Tadic decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Formal
Yugoslavia, 35 and applicable provisions from the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility. 36  Regardless of the test applied, the attribution requirement
predicates a lawful act of self-defense upon the occurrence of an armed attack
attributable (under one of the aforementioned tests) to a foreign State. Violent acts
carried out unilaterally by a non-State actor would not trigger the right of self-
defense.
Other scholars maintain that attribution is not required and that a State has a
right to use force in self-defense against a non-State actor, regardless of the
involvement of another State.137 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter articulates a State's
130. See O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 590-91.
131. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at
195.
132. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. 161, 72 (Nov. 6).
133. The Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. 136, 139 (July 9).
134. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. at
115.
135. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal, 77 120-21 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
136. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts arts. 2, 8, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N.
GAOR 56th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
137. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. 168
(Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans 28); The Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. (separate opinion of Judge Higgins 7 33); The
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J.
(declaration of Judge Buergenthal 6); CASSESE, supra note 19, at 355; DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at
206, 216; Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L
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inherent right to self-defense "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations,"'' 38 without mentioning attribution to another State. In response to
the increased threat from non-State transnational terrorist organizations, I.C.J.
Judge Kooijmans stated in his separate opinion in the Armed Activities case that "it
would be unreasonable to deny the attacked State the right to self-defence merely
,,139because there is no attacker State, and the Charter does not so require.
In contrast to O'Connell's argument for attribution based on I.C.J.
jurisprudence, this stance relies heavily on State practice. During the Caroline
Incident of 1837, Canada faced an armed insurrection mounted from U.S. soil led
by non-State actors. The United Kingdom, Canada's sovereign at that time,
responded to the armed insurrection by sinking the insurgent's supply ship, the
Caroline, while it was in U.S. waters. 140 Both States recognized that self-defense
was appropriate when an armed attack emanated from a non-State actor acting
alone, and neither State attempted to attribute the insurgent's actions to the U.S.
141
More recently, the U.S. based its use of force in Afghanistan against al Qaeda for
the 1998 embassy bombings on the right to self-defense under Article 51.142
Additionally, after the attacks of September 1 1 th, Security Council Resolutions
1368 and 1373 recognized "the inherent right of... self-defence as recognized by
the Charter" in response to "any act of international terrorism," regardless of
attribution to a State.
143
3. Location of the Use of Force in Self-Defense
Arguably the most controversial issue regarding self-defense is the location
where a State may lawfully use force in exercising its right to self-defense. As
O'Connell points out, while there are concerns about the attacks carried out in
Afghanistan against al Qaeda, the real concern is whether the attacks carried out
against al Qaeda in third States, such as Yemen and Somalia, are lawful. 144
O'Connell asserts that without attribution to the State where the targeting is
occurring, the use of force is unlawful. 145 Conversely, Paust and others contend
that a State's right to territorial integrity is not absolute and that under certain
L. 559, 563-64 (1999).
138. U.N. Charter art. 51.
139. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J.
(separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans T 30).
140. R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 83-84 (1938).
141. Id.
142. Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense, ASIL TASK FORCE ON
TERRORISM, 10 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf.
143. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 47; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 47; Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. (separate opinion of Judge Simma T
11); The Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J.
136 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans 35); Schmitt, supra note 83, at 161; Jordan J.
Paust, Self-Defense Targeting of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan,
19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237, 238-39 (2010).
144. O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 592.
145. See id. at 590-91, 594.
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circumstances a State may exercise its right to self-defense in the territory of a
State not responsible for an attack.
1 46
The argument against the legality of targeting terrorists in States outside of
the traditional notion of a battlefield relies on the foundational principle of
territorial integrity of all States, codified in U.N. Charter Article 2(4). Under
Article 2(4), all States have the right to be free from other States using force in
their territory. In determining where a State may target terrorists, this fundamental
concept of territorial integrity couples with the previously mentioned attribution
requirement. Together, these two notions form the asserted rule that under the law
of self-defense a State's territorial integrity prevails unless the armed attack, which
instigated the right to self-defense, is attributable to a foreign State.1 47 Only then
may the victim State use force in self-defense in the sovereign territory of the
foreign State. Should the non-State actor be located in the territory of a State that
was not responsible for the armed attack, the victim State must rely solely on law
enforcement methods governed by human rights.
In contrast, scholars such as Paust assert that territorial integrity is only one of
many values enshrined in the U.N. Charter, and the right to self-defense may
supersede territorial integrity, provided it is carried out within the confines of the
law of self-defense. 148 Paust's argument is premised upon the notion that a State
may target individuals directly participating in the armed attack, regardless of the
location of those individuals. For example, the U.S. is permitted to target members
of al Qaeda operating from Yemen, despite the fact that an armed attack is not
attributable to the State of Yemen. However, the U.S. must limit its targeting to
the combatants alone, and not the State of Yemen. This is a fine, but important
distinction.
Proponents of this point of view rationalize infringing another State's territory
based on that State's failure to meet its obligation to deny safe haven to non-State
actors, including terrorists. 149 A State is considered to be providing safe haven
when it knows or should know that non-State actors are carrying out attacks
against other States from any portion of its territory.150  All States have an
affirmative obligation to deny safe haven to terrorists,' and a State that is unable
or unwilling to meet this obligation cannot expect to preserve its territorial
integrity against lawful measures of self-defense. 152  The porous, mountainous
146. Paust, supra note 98, at 572-73.
147. The Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J., at T 139.
148. U.N. Charter art. 51; Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 55 (Apr. 9); Schmitt, supra
note 83, at 179.
149. DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 244.
150. Id.
151. S.C. Res. 1378, supra note 47; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 47; Declaration on Friendly
Relations, supra note 9.
152. DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 247; see Ved P. Nanda, Terrorism, International Law and
International Organizations, in LAW IN THE WAR ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 1, 10 (Ved P. Nanda
ed. 2005); Alston Report, supra note 35, 35; Wedgwood, supra note 137, at 565.
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border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is often considered a safe haven, as
Pakistan is not able to consistently prevent that portion of its territory from being
used as a terrorist stronghold."5 3 U.S. Department of State Legal Advisor Harold
Koh used this reasoning to justify the U.S.'s ability to kill suspected terrorists in
Pakistan's and other States' territory based on their lack of "willingness and ability
... to suppress the threat the target poses.
'
,154
The general affirmative obligation that every State not knowingly allow "its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States" was first
articulated by the I.C.J. in the Corfu Channel case.155 This concept was confirmed
in the context of transnational terrorism in Security Council Resolution 1373,
passed shortly after September 11, 2001.156 Security Council Resolution 1373
confirms that a State's failure to prevent its territory from being used as a safe
haven triggers the right to self-defense against the non-State actors located within
the host State's territory. 57  The exercise of self-defense in this context is an
exception to the host State's right to territorial integrity, waived because of its
failure to comply with international obligations.
58
Simply put, if a State does not exercise due diligence in preventing terrorist
attacks on other States, the victim State may take action in self-defense and has no
obligation to wait until the host State comes into compliance with its international
obligations. As Lord Ashburn queried in response to the Caroline Incident, "[h]ow
long could a Government, having the paramount duty of protecting its own people,
be reasonably expected to wait for what they had then no reason to expect?"'' 59
When the argument is framed in such a manner, it becomes evident that a State
should not have to defer to another State's territorial sovereignty or await consent
to use force in self-defense in that State's territory where that State does not
control its territory or has no legitimate means of controlling its territory, such as
Somalia or other failed or failing States.
153. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, Country
Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 3 - Terrorist Safe Havens (2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64333.htm.
154. Harold Koh, The Obama Administration and International Law, Address at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm [hereinafter Koh Speech].
155. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9); accord U.S. Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) 1980 I.C.J. 3, 1 67 (May 24); S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A)
No. 10, at 4 (Sept. 7).
156. S.C. Res 1373, supra note 47.
157. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 247; Schmitt, supra note 83, at 176-77.
158. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 55.
159. Jennings, supra note 140, at 82 (quoting letter from Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster, July 28,
1842).
VOL. 39:4
CLARIFYING THE LAW
4. Conditions on a State's Exercise of the Right to Self-Defense -
Necessity, Proportionality, and Imminence
International law restricts the use of force in self-defense to that which is
necessary to quell an imminent attack, and proportionate to this purpose. 6 ° The
terms necessity and proportionality are also used in other contexts, including in the
jus in bello analysis.' 6' The terms have different meanings and legal standards
depending on which area of the law they are being applied. Thus, it is imperative
to understand which type of necessity and proportionality are being referred to.
Certain scholars, including O'Connell, contend that these words derive from a
fundamental common definition,' 62 while others, such as Newton, argue they are
highly distinguishable. 63 Regardless of the academic debate on the fundamental
similarities of the terms, the basic legal definitions of both sets of terms and their
application are different. Thus, this article completely distinguishes necessity and
proportionality under the law of self-defense from their use within thejus in bello
framework.
The principle of necessity in the context of self-defense requires that force
only be used when there is no other alternative course of action to deter the attacks
against the State. 64 If the State cannot rely on diplomatic, 65 or law enforcement
measures166 to stop the attacks, it may respond with necessary force. This
restriction on self-defense essentially requires that a State use force only when no
other viable option exists to deter the attacks.'
67
Proportionality limits a State's response "to those actions necessary to defeat
the armed attack"'168 but does not require "symmetry between the mode of the
initial attack and the mode of the response.' ' 169  One method of gauging
proportionality is to use an objective standard,170 comparing the quantum of force
and counter-force used, as well as the casualties and damages sustained.'
7
'
160. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. 161, T 43 (Nov. 6); Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 41 (July 8): Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1176 (June 26).
161. See infra Section VI.
162. O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 591.
163. Newton, supra note 56, at 610.
164. DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 221; Alston Report, supra note 35, 43.
165. Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J., at 43; DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 237.
166. Schmitt, supra note 83, at 171.
167. ld.; DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 221.
168. Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing October 7rh: A Case Study in the Laifulness of
Counterterrorist Militaty Operations, in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND
RESPONSES 39, 42 (Michael N. Schmitt & Gian Luca Beruto eds., 2002); see also Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge
Higgins 5); Alston Report, supra note 35, 43.
169. Alston Report, supra note 35, 43; accord Schmitt, supra note 83, at 172.
170. Enzo Cannizzaro, Contextualizing Proportionality: Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the
Lebanese War, 88 INT'L. R. RED CROSS 779, 787-88 (2006).
171. DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 237.
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A State may use force in self-defense against an imminent threat where the
necessity of self-defense "is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment of deliberation. 1 72 The debate in this area revolves around
the meaning of imminent. Do the missiles have to be in the sky and on their way?
Or does the finger have to be on the trigger? Or is concrete planning of an attack
sufficient? It is clear that the missile in the air scenario satisfies the imminence
requirement. After that, one finds little agreement and a variety of terms to
describe the different levels of imminence.
Three terms are often employed when describing the varying degrees of
imminence: preventive, anticipatory, and preemptive. Preventive describes a use
of force to combat an intangible and theoretical prospective threat in order to
prevent that threat from coming to fruition. 173 Under the Bush administration,
preventive self-defense was misnamed as "preemptive," most likely in an effort to
justify U.S. military action after September I1 th to quell potential future al Qaeda
attacks.1 74 Preventive self-defense is almost universally regarded as an illegal use
of force and not a valid exercise of the right to self-defense.1
75
Preemptory and anticipatory are used sometimes interchangeably and there
are multiple definitions for each. In general, these terms encompass acts of self-
defense in response to attacks that are on the brink of being launched or where one
attack has already occurred and the State learns more attacks are planned.
176
Anticipatory self-defense allows a State to respond when a group harbors the intent
and means to carry out attacks, there is no effective alternative for preventing
them, and the State must act immediately or risk missing the opportunity to thwart
the attacks.177 Yoram Dinstein also employs the term "interceptory" to define a
category of preemptive self-defense in response to acts which are already
launched, arguing that anticipatory self-defense is unlawful while interceptory self-
defense is permitted, 78 but in essence, the distinction between interceptory and
anticipatory is academic.
172. Caroline Incident, Letters from Webster to Fox, 29 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1129, 1137-
38 (1840-41).
173. O'Connell, supra note 142, at 2, n.10.
174. See id. (citing Mike Allen & Karen DeYoung, Bush: U.S. Will Strike First at Enemies; In West
Point Speech, President Lays Out Broader U.S. Policy, WASH. POST, June 2, 2002, at A01); Miriam
Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Deftnse, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599, 599 (explaining
that, "Although the administration has characterized its new approach as "preemptive," it is more
accurate to describe it as "preventive" self-defense. Rather than trying to preempt specific, imminent
threats, the goal is to prevent more generalized threats from materializing.").
175. See, e.g., Note by Secretary-General, Millennium Summit, supra note 8, ' 189-91 (explaining
that unilateral acts of preventive self-defense, as opposed to collective preventive actions with Security
Council authorization, contravene the U.N. Charter).
176. Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defence, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597,
601 (1963); Schachter, supra note 110, at 1634.
177. Schmitt, supra note 83, at 174.
178. DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 168, 182-85.
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Scholars in favor of a preemptory or anticipatory right to self-defense
maintain that any other interpretation would render the right to self-defense
meaningless 79 by requiring States to "assume the posture of 'sitting ducks"' in the
face of an imminent threat.1 80 This is often asserted in the context of self-defense
against terrorists because their attacks are designed to be undetectable until they
are launched.1 81  Between attacks, terrorists continue to plan future attacks,
creating a threat which is "underway, not simply potential."1 82 Under this theory,
the principle of imminence is satisfied when there is a group with the avowed
purpose of carrying out attacks and the group possesses the means to carry out the
attack. 183 Such a situation creates a continuous attack and a State may use self-
defense to ward off the imminent and ongoing terrorist attacks.1
84
On the other side of the issue, scholars argue that such a broad interpretation
of imminence is dangerous, allowing for the overly aggressive use of force when
not absolutely necessary, and thus violating the previously described principle of
necessity. Proponents of a narrow interpretation of imminence usually rely upon
the Caroline Incident and contend that any act of self-defense must be in response
to a threat that "is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment of deliberation."' 85 Any preemptive right of self-defense is limited to
interceptive prevention, requiring that an attack be already mounted 86 and
corroborated by "substantiated evidence."'
18 7
C. Armed Conflict
The last way in which a State may combat terrorism is while acting within the
context of an armed conflict. If the use of force rises to the level of an armed
conflict, international humanitarian law applies,'8 but human rights law continues
to govern any legal gaps.' 89 As is discussed within thejus in bello portion of this
article, IHL provides a State greater legal latitude when using lethal force. The
human rights standard prescribes that killing is only permitted to prevent an
imminent threat to law enforcement officials or to the public. Under IHL,
179. Schmitt, supra note 83, at 174.
180. McDougal, supra note 176, at 601.
181. Id. at 173.
182. Wedgwood, supra note 137, at 564-65.
183. Schmitt, supra note 83, at 174.
184. Wedgwood, supra note 137, at 564-65.
185. Caroline Incident, Letters from Webster to Fox, supra note 172.
186. DINSTEIN, supra note 109, at 187; Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing
Norms Governing the Use of Force bti States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 821 (1970); W. Michael Reisman
& Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT'L
L. 525, 531 (2006).
187. Franck, supra note 186, at 821.
188. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art, 2; Ved P. Nanda, Introductory Essay:
International Law Implications of the United States' "War on Terror", 37 DEN'. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
513, 514 (2009).
189. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ' 25
(July 8); Pokempner, supra note 54, at 19.
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however, a State is permitted to kill designated "combatants" and to incur civilian
casualties so long as they comply with thejus in bello principles.
The advantage of using lethal force under more lenient legal standards is
likely the reason behind the U.S. and Israel's arguments that each is involved in an
armed conflict against known terrorist organizations. 190  Alston recognizes the
inherent danger of allowing States to "unilaterally extend the law of armed conflict
to situations that are essentially matters of law enforcement that must, under
international law, be dealt with under the framework of human rights .,,91 He
voices concerns that in so doing, States "are not only effectively declaring war
against a particular group, but eviscerating key and necessary distinctions between
international law frameworks that restricts States' ability to kill arbitrarily."' 192 In
essence, Alston contends that States abusing the distinctions between human
rights, self-defense, and armed conflict could lead to potential catastrophic results
on the existing legal frameworks which limit States' right to use force.
193
The law of armed conflict is codified in the Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols, whose terms have evolved into binding customary
obligations.' 94  An armed conflict must be either international or non-
international. 195 An international armed conflict is present where two or more
States engage their armed forces with the others', regardless of the intensity or
duration of the clashes.' 96 Historically, an armed conflict between two States was
termed a "war," however, this traditional nomenclature is nearly obsolete given
that States regularly use military force against their enemies without formally
declaring war. 197
Non-international armed conflicts are those not involving two States, but
rather a State responding to violence by non-State actors. 98 Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II governs these conflicts.' 99 The
rather vague treaty law has recently received much attention given the increasing
number of non-international armed conflicts. While international armed conflicts
190. HCJ 769/02 The Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The Gov't of Israel 57(6) IsrSC 285,
P 21 [2006] (Isr.); Koh speech, supra note 154.
191. Alston Report, supra note 35, 48.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL, supra note 35.
195. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 14, arts. 2-3.
196. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art. 2(1); Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi6, Case No. IT-
94-1-T, Judgment, 561 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE
AMELIORATION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 (1952); ; U.K.
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 28-29 (2005).
197. Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-first Century War and Its
Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1051, 1055 (1998) (arguing
that, "The old paradigms of war and warfare are being broken as we enter the next millennium.").
198. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T at 562.
199. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 14, common art. 3; Additional Protocol II, supra note
16; Alston Report, supra note 35, 50.
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conventionally provided robust protections for civilians compared to the minimal
protections in non-international armed conflicts, customary international law has
solidified the higher standards of an international conflict codified in Additional
Protocol I for all armed conflicts, regardless of whether they are international or
non-international. 00
The International Committee of the Red Cross, responsible for drafting the
Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, intended Common Article 3
governing non-international armed conflicts to be read broadly and have the widest
possible application.20 1 The development of criteria for establishing the existence
of a non-international armed conflict has occurred at a customary level, rather than
conventional, primarily at the United Nations' ad hoc criminal tribunals. In
determining whether a non-international armed conflict exists, the primary focus of
the analysis must be on the actions of the non-State actor, rather than State actor.20 2
A non-international armed conflict exists where: 1) sufficiently organized armed
groups carry out armed violence; 2) in an intense; and 3) protracted manner against
a State. 203  A non-State actor only needs a minimal degree of organization
204
sufficient to facilitate collective, armed, anti-government actions.20 5 A State's use
of its military against the non-State actor can be indicia of sufficient
organization.
206
The second two elements of a non-international armed conflict, intensity and
duration, are met when the violence rises above those "situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and
other acts of a similar nature."20 7  Intensity is measured by, inter alia, the
seriousness of the attacks, expanse and duration of clashes, Security Council
involvement in the issue, 20 8 the employment of military weapons and tactics, 209 and
200. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 79 (July 8); Tadi&6, Case No. IT-94-1-T at 562.
201. JEAN PICTET, INT'L COMM. FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, IV, GENE'A CO\VENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 36 (1958).
202. See Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-I-T at 7 566-67 (analyzing the existence of an non-international
armed conflict based primarily on the Bosnian Serbs' actions and whether they were sufficiently
organized armed group).
203. Id. 1561-62.
204. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, 248 (Jan. 27, 2000) ("The
expression "armed conflicts" introduces a material criterion: the existence of open hostilities between
armed forces which are organized to a greater or lesser degree. Internal disturbances and tensions,
characterized by isolated or sporadic acts of violence, do not therefore constitute armed conflicts in a
legal sense, even if the government is forced to resort to police forces or even armed units for the
purpose of restoring law and order. Within these limits, non-international armed conflicts are situations
in which hostilities break out between armed forces or organized armed groups within the territory of a
single State").
205. Alston Report, supra note 35, 52.
206. LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 38-39 (2002).
207. Additional Protocol I, supra note 16.
208. Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 41 177 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008).
209. See id.; Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, 565 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
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the number of civilians affected. 210 Additionally, the duration of the conflict must
involve "protracted armed violence., 21 1 As discussed within the human rights
section of this article,212 and affirmed by Additional Protocol II, isolated acts of
violence do not arise to the level of an armed conflict.21 3
Armed attacks by non-State actors, activating the right of self-defense, may
also rise to a requisite level of violence to constitute an armed conflict. 2 4 Thus, a
State might permissibly respond in self-defense to an armed attack, while
simultaneously acting within an armed conflict. The relevance of the distinction
between armed attacks and armed conflict is that in responding to an armed attack,
a State must ensure that each and every response is necessary and proportionate to
the armed attack,1 5 whereas a State acting within in armed conflict must only
ensure that each use of force is necessary and proportionate to the overall military
advantage. 216 Therefore, a State, arguably, is less confined by the law when using
force during an armed conflict.
The leniency created by the legal regime of armed conflict as compared to
self-defense has prompted the United States to assert both self-defense and an
armed conflict in its official position, and the associated legal justifications,
relating to its uses of force in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen. Specifically,
Koh defended U.S. drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen as acts
within "a war of self-defense against an enemy that attacked us on September 11,
2001 .... 211 Yet at the same time, Koh claims the U.S. is engaged in an "armed
conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces. ,218
Koh made no remarks as to whether "al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated
forces" comprises a single sufficiently organized armed group or multiple armed
groups carrying out this violence. Further, there is controversy in the legal
community over whether the violence carried out by these groups individually or
in concert meets the requisite level of intensity or duration to constitute a non-
international armed conflict. O'Connell maintains that these justifications are
"mutually contradictory ' 2 19 because the U.S. must be either responding to
ongoing 220 armed attacks implicating the right to self-defense or engaged in
violence that rises to the requisite level constituting an armed conflict.
the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
210. Boskoski & Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T at 182-83.
211. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T at 561.
212. See supra Section V(A).
213. Additional Protocol II, supra note 16, art. 1(2); Tadi, Case No. IT-94-1-T at 562.
214. An armed attack or series of armed attacks that activate a right to self-defense will also
constitute an armed conflict if the non-state actors are sufficiently organized and the violence meets the
intensity and protraction requirements of Geneva Convention IV and Additional Protocol II.
215. See supra Section V(B)(iv).
216. See infra Section VI.
217. Koh speech, supra note 154.
218. Id.
219. O'Connell Remarks, supra note 61, at 592.
220. The attacks must be ongoing, as the fight to self-defense in response to the original armed
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Yet the idea that these two paradigms are mutually exclusive is not
universally accepted. Instead, a State may be acting in self-defense against a State,
which is simultaneously an armed conflict, or alternatively, the State may respond
in self-defense to violence by a non-State actor and the violence rises to a
sufficient intensity and duration that it evolves into an armed conflict.
Accordingly, it is possible that a State may have initially used force in self-
defense, but later is using force against that same enemy in the context of an armed
conflict.
VI. JUS IN BELLO: LIMITING THE MEANS AND METHODS OF WARFARE
The jus in bello principles of international humanitarian law limit the means
and the methods of uses of force a State may implement in order to carry out an
armed conflict or an act of self-defense.2 2' Once a State begins to engage in the
use of force, it has an obligation to do so in a manner consistent with IHL, which is
also referred to by U.S. military as the law of armed conflict (LOAC). Three
primary principles of IHL work in tandem to restrict the way in which a State may
carry out a specific attack: necessity, proportionality, and distinction. As discussed
above, while there is an overlap of terms, these principles are wholly distinct from
the jus ad bellum analysis of necessity, proportionality, and imminence required
when acting in self-defense. 22
Humanitarian law requires a State use military force that is necessary to
achieve the goal of the military operation,223 only causes incidental loss of life or
civilian casualties that is proportionate to the military objective,224 and
distinguishes between legitimate military targets and civilians. 2 5  These
fundamental rules are codified within the Geneva Conventions and the Additional
Protocols, but also "constitute intransgressible principles of international
customary law., 22 6 Humanitarian law does not require perfection in the execution
of a military attack,227 nor does it prohibit all civilian casualties.22 8 However, these
three interrelated and indivisible principles assessed collectively are intended to
provide sufficient protection for civilians.
attack of September 1 1 a is no longer consistent with the self-defense element of imminence.
221. CASSESE, supra note 19, at 995; Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful and Unlawful Wars, in LAW
IN THE WAR ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 79, 86 (2005); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
1031 (5th ed. 2003); Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law,
102 AM. J. INT'L L. 715, 721 (2008); Noam Neuman, Applying the Rule of Proportionality: Force
Protection and Cumulative Assessment in International Law and Morality, 7 Y.B. INT'L
HUMANITARIAN LAW 79, 81 (2004).
222. Sassbli, supra note 28, at 241.
223. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. x.
224. Id. art. 57(l)(iii).
225. Id. art. 57(1)(i).
226. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 79
(July 8).
227. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art.5 1.
228. Joseph Holland, Military Objective and Collateral Damage: Their Relationship and Dynamic,
7 Y.B. OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 35,50 (2004).
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In order to illustrate the challenges of thejus in bello analysis, this article will
analyze these principles using the facts of a specific drone attack carried out by the
U.S. in Pakistan in August of 2009 against Baitullah Mehsud. As the primary
Taliban leader operating from Pakistan, Mehsud was responsible for leading vast
numbers of loyal fighters in years of attacks against the U.S. and its allies,
including suicide bombings and cross-border attacks on U.S. and allied troops.229
He was also allegedly behind the December 2007 assassination of former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan.
230
After several failed attempts to eliminate Mehsud, the U.S. military finally
located him at his father-in-law's house. 23 1 At the time of the attack, Mehsud was
on the roof of the house with his wife, receiving medication via drip infusion for a
kidney ailment caused by diabetes.232  The drone strike, carried out by a U.S.
Predator Drone equipped with Hellfire missiles233 killed Mehsud and eleven other
civilians, including his wife and doctor.234 This section will articulate the jus in
bello analysis and the applicable IHL principles as applied to this particular drone
strike against Mehsud.
A. Necessity
Military necessity permits a State to employ a degree and type of force that is
required to achieve a concrete military objective at the earliest possible moment
with the minimum expenditure of life and resources.2 35 The destruction of civilian
life and property is permitted, so long as it is necessary to the military objective; 236
237
any unnecessary use of force results in wanton killing and destruction.
In context of the attack against Mehsud, the principle of necessity requires
that the use of a Hellfire missile was necessary to achieve the military objective of
taking out a top Taliban leader. The necessity of taking out a terrorist military
commander is debatable. Some argue that these kinds of military objectives
strategically disrupt the terrorist organization and hamper the further planning of
terrorist attacks.2 38 Others, such as O'Connell, contend that executing high-level
229. Obituary: Baitullah Mehsud, BBC NEWS, Aug. 25, 2009, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/7163626.stm; Pir Zubair Shah, Sabrina Tavernise & Mark
Mazzetti, Taliban Leader in Pakistan is Reportedly Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/world/asia/08pstan.html.
230. Obituary: Baitullah Mehsud, supra note 229.
231. Shah, Tavernise & Mazzetti, supra note 229.
232. Id.
233. Mayer, supra note 92.
234. Shah, Tavemise & Mazzetti, supra note 229.
235. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. 57(2); MICHAEL BOTHE, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS
OF ARMED CONFLICTS 323 (1982); MELZER, supra note 60, at 17; O'Connell, supra note 221, at 85;
PICTET, supra note 201, 1 2018; U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 196, § 2.2.
236. U.S. v. List, Case No.47, Nuremberg Tribunal (1948); U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note
196, § 2.4.
237. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 196, at 21-22.
238. Leon Panetta, Director, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Speech to the Pacific Council on
International Policy (May, 18 2009), available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-
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terrorists is counterproductive, as it only incites animosity and does not weaken the
terrorist cell, as the leaders are easily and quickly replaced.239
Additionally, the necessity analysis considers that Mehsud had proven to be a
difficult target, and moreover, that the roof top identification of him provided a
rare clear line of site. This demonstrates that because Mehsud was an elusive
military target, the time, place, and circumstances under which the drone attack
was executed fulfilled the requirement of necessity.
Further, the necessity analysis includes the timing and the resources needed to
complete the military objective.240 Although the U.S. could have launched a full-
scale ground invasion in order to kill Mehsud, it would have required an
unnecessary expenditure of American lives and resources.
B. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality acts as a check on the broader principle of
necessity. The expected collateral damage must not be excessive in relation to the
anticipated military advantage. 241 The first step in a proportionality analysis is a
prospective assessment that considers the anticipated collateral damage242 rather
than a post-execution evaluation of how the military operation actually unfolded.243
While always regrettable, civilian casualties are lawful in this analysis, 244 and "the
general immunity that civilians enjoy is not absolute., 245
The second step in a proportionality analysis relates to evaluating the
targeting State's expected military gains from the attack. While this assessment
must be completed for each and every intended attack,246 debate arises over the
scope of the anticipated military advantage a State may use to justify its attack.
Several scholars argue that the specific attack must be weighed against the specific
military objective an individual attack will achieve.247 Others maintain that the
anticipated advantage can be assessed as a whole, which allows consideration of
248the overarching military objective for the entire military campaign. For
example, the U.S. could justify its killing of the eleven civilians surrounding
Mehsud as collateral damage weighed against either the specific military objective
of eliminating Mehsud or the overall goal of eliminating the Taliban. The former
analysis arguably creates a greater restriction on States, as only the military
advantage of a specific target can be used to justify the collateral damage to
civilian life and objects. The latter evaluation permits additional leeway for States
testimony/directors-remarks-at-pacific-council.html.
239. O'Connell Congress Statement, supra note 58, at 6.
240. See U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 196, at § 2.2.
241. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(iii), 57(2)(b).
242. Id. art. 51(5)(b).
243. Holland, supra note 228, at 50.
244. Schmitt, supra note 83, at 184.
245. Holland, supra note 228, at 50.
246. Id.; Neuman, supra note 221, at 96-98; Alston Report, supra note 35, 89.
247. DUFFY, supra note 37, at 231-35; Neuman, supra note 221, at 96-98.
248. Neuman, supra note 221, at 98-99.
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to justify collateral damage by allowing them to compare the collateral damage of
the specific attack to the military benefit in the context of the entire campaign.
The final step in assessing proportionality is to weigh the prospectively
determined collateral damage against the military advantage, to ensure the
expected loss of life and destruction of property will not be excessive to the gain.
The term excessive is vague and little State practice exists to readily determine the
exact meaning and scope of this term. Proportionality is evaluated on a case-by-
case basis, requiring that a State must weigh the value of the target, the location of
the attack, the timing of the attack, the number of anticipated civilian casualties,
and the amount of damage anticipated to civilian objects, such as buildings,
bridges, hospitals and utilities, for each and every attack it executes.
When applying the proportionality analysis to the Mehsud attack, the issue is
whether the anticipated collateral damages, including the people in the house, other
civilians around the house, and the house itself, is excessive given the value of
eliminating Mehsud, as a leader of the Taliban and a high value military target.
The U.S. could potentially justify a greater number of civilian casualties for the
attack on Mehsud, as compared to a lower level combatant with a less prominent
role than Mehsud. As a prospective analysis, the U.S. must consider its anticipated
collateral damage for executing Mehsud, and it is irrelevant to retrospectively
evaluate the actual damage or military gain the U.S. achieved in fact. For example,
if the U.S. received reliable surveillance intelligence that only five civilians were
in Mehsud's house and the surrounding area rather than the eleven actually
present, the proportionality analysis would consider whether the killing of those
five individuals, and not the eleven present, is excessive to the military advantage
of terminating Mehsud.
Foreseeable risks must also be taken into account within the proportionality
analysis. 249 Potential errors or mistakes by the targeting State must be considered,
but again, only risks assessable prospectively.250 If a missile is likely to misfire or
the blast radius could exceed the intended targeting area, thereby impacting
additional civilian lives or property, these foreseeable scenarios must also be
weighed against the expected military advantage. Upon executing an attack
however, perfection is not required, and unintended civilian casualties will not
render an attack disproportionate. 1
C. Distinction
The principle of distinction, as the "very heart and soul of the law of war,,
252
requires a State to distinguish between its legitimate military target and civilians.
253
Even if a target is necessary, the State must take all feasible steps to minimize
249. Neuman, supra note 221, at 97.
250. Id. at 96-98; DUFFY, supra note 37, at 234.
251. DUFFY, supra note 37, at 234.
252. Hays Park, The Protection of Civilians from Air Warfare, 27 ISR. Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 65,
72 (1997).
253. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. 57(2)(a)(i).
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254damage to civilian life and objects. Feasibility does not require perfection, but
rather that the person launching the attack takes appropriate measures to correctly
identify the target and limit civilian casualties as far as possible. 255 Distinction
encompasses three separate issues: 1) whether an individual is considered a
civilian or combatant and may be legitimately targeted; 2) whether the weapon
employed adequately distinguishes between civilian and military targets; and, 3)
whether the execution of an attack actually distinguished civilian life and property
from that of a military nature.
Turning to the first consideration, distinction demands that States distinguish
between members of the armed forces and all others present who are entitled to
civilian status. 2 56 Civilians are generally afforded immunity from military
attacks.257 Civilian immunity is the primary purpose ofjus in bello2 58 and civilians
maintain that immunity unless they directly participate in hostilities.25 9 Civilians
who join a terrorist organization and are responsible for planning and executing a
chain of terrorist attacks have a continuous combat function, and thus are
targetable at any time.
260
The second issue within distinction encompasses the modes of military force,
primarily the weapons utilized. Certain weapons inherently violate the principle of
distinction because of their inability to distinguish between civilians and
combatants. In its advisory opinion, The Legality of Nuclear Weapons, the I.C.J.
acknowledged that weapons such as mines, incendiaries, and those of a chemical
or bacteriological nature inherently violate IHL, as recognized by conventional and
customary law.261
It may be argued that drones equipped with Hellfire missiles are inherently
indiscriminate based purely on the number of civilian casualties incurred from U.S.
drone attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, as compared to the reported
successful terrorist kills. 2 62 However, most agree that drones are precise weapons
systems, and do not inherently violate the principle of distinction. Predator and
Reaper drones have 24-hour surveillance capability, referred to as persistent stare
capability,2 63 and as Aaron Drake, Captain in the U.S. Air Force, Air National
Guard, points out, drone operators can gather a substantial amount of information
254. DUFFY, supra note 37, at 231-35.
255. CLAUDE PILLOUD, COMMENTARY TO THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS § 2198 (1987).
256. Id. § 1917.
257. Additional Protocol I, supra note 15, art. 51(3).
258. Holland, supra note 228, at 50.
259. MELZER, supra note 60, at 16-17.
260. Id. at 75; Alston Report, supra note 35, 66.
261. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 76-
77 (July 8).
262. The number of civilian deaths as compared to the number of militants killed in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Yemen is highly contested. This article will not address these disputed numbers, but at
least one source suggests that drones armed with Hellfire missiles kill "10 or so civilians" for every
militant killed. Daniel Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work, FOREIGN POL'Y, July 14, 2009.
263. SINGER, supra note 35, at 222.
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about the targeting area, including the number of civilians present, and whether
combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities are present.2 4
Additionally, these drones are equipped with a laser designator for its Hellfire
missiles, permitting precise targeting.265
Moreover, the employment of Hellfire missiles in general, and specifically by
the U.S. against Mehsud and other terrorist leaders, may not violate the principle of
distinction. The Hellfire missile possesses an extremely precise blast radius,
ranging from ten to fifteen feet, and can be programmed for delay detonation.266
Thus, a Hellfire can precisely target a house and delay the explosion until after
fully penetrating the building, minimizing damage to surrounding people or
objects. Accordingly, attacks executed with Hellfire missiles launched by Predator
drones most likely do not inherently violate the principle of distinction.
Finally, as Drake correctly recognizes, potential misuses of weapons do not
render that entire class of weapons illegitimate. As he notes, "Commentary on
Article 36 of [Additional Protocol] I confirms this, providing that '[a] State is not
required to foresee or analyze all possible misuses of a weapon, for almost any
weapon can be misused in ways that would be prohibited.' 267 Therefore, even if
the U.S. were indiscriminately launching Hellfire missiles from drones, their
failure to comply with IHL would not automatically delegitimize the use of drones.
The third issue under distinction pertains to the actual execution of an attack.
Attacks are unlawful under the principle of distinction if they are directed
specifically against civilians or civilian objects or launched indiscriminately
without distinction between civilians and military targets.268 Additionally, once an
attack is launched, if a mistake is discovered and an object is found not to be a
military objective, then the attack must be immediately aborted.269  States must
employ greater caution when distinguishing between civilians and military targets
when the attack is launched from a further distance and a direct view of the object
is not available. 270 The requirement of distinction is likely the reason the U.S. and
other States utilize ground informants to confirm legitimate military targets for
Predator drone attacks.2 71 Ground informants often successfully prevent intended
264. Drake, supra note 18, at 653.
265. SINGER, supra note 35, at 33.
266. AGM-114 HELLFIRE MODULAR MISSILE SYSTEM (HMMS), Military, GlobalSecurity.Org,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/agm- 114.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2011); see
Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 Int'l R. Red Cross 445
(2005).
267. Drake, supra note 18, at 653.
268. DUFFY, supra note 37, at 228-29; Additional Protocol II, supra note 16, arts. 13, 51(2), 51(4).
269. Alston Report, supra note 35, 89.
270. PILLOUD, supra note 255, at art. 57, 2221.
271. The U.S. regularly utilizes ground informants to verify targets for drone attacks in Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Yemen. See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman & Adam Entous, CIA Plans Yemen Drone Strikes:
Covert Program Would Be Major Expansion of U.S. Efforts to Kill Members of al Qaeda, WALL ST. J.,
June 14, 2011, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023038481045763840515726791 10.html.
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attacks from violating distinction, as illustrated by the abortion of a U.S. drone
attack on six individuals suspected to be al Qaeda combatants planting roadside
bombs, which informants confirmed to actually be five children digging for
firewood.272
In analyzing the execution of the attack against Mehsud, it appears it most
likely complied with distinction. The attack was not purposefully launched at
civilians or civilian property without a military objective, because Mehsud had
continuous combatant status, making him a legitimate military objective.
Moreover, as discussed above, because a drone with 24-hour surveillance
capabilities executed the attack, the U.S. likely knew the expected number of
civilian losses and conducted a proportionality assessment, thereby not
indiscriminately killing those civilians.
VII. CONCLUSION
As illustrated throughout this article, the law relating to the use of force is
complex, contradictory, and highly contentious. Any use of force must fall under
one of the three basic legal paradigms: human rights, self-defense, or armed
conflict. Due to the lack of a comprehensive definition of terrorism and the failure
of the international community to adopt a binding instrument that specifically
governs acts of terrorism, States are required to justify their uses of force against
terrorists within the three existing bodies of law. Depending upon which legal
framework applies, the lethal drone campaigns perpetrated by the U.S. and other
States may be legal.
Additionally, it remains extremely controversial as to whether terrorism
triggers law enforcement methods governed by human rights or whether it
activates the right to use force in self-defense. Further, it is debated whether
terroristic activities can rise to the level of a non-international armed conflict,
allowing a State to operate underjus in bello principles. Thus, the legality of the
responses carried out by the U.S. and its allies against terrorists, and particularly
the use of weaponized drones, remains controversial. Accordingly, States should
attempt to clarify the law under which they are operating when responding to
terrorism. To improve accountability and transparency, States should notify the
Security Council not only of their use of force, but also as to which paradigm they
are operating within. This would prevent States, such as the U.S., from defending
its actions under multiple categories without giving any legal justifications for
doing so. In the end, under the current ad hoc approach to terrorism and the lack
of universal consensus as to definitions and parameters concerning the use of
force, a State can argue a myriad of reasons to justify any use of force against
272. Bill Weir, Our Reporter on Pakistan-Afghanistan Border: Drones and Diplomatic Efforts,
ABC NEWS, Jan. 12, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/Afghanistan/abcs-bill-weir-reporting-
afghanistan-influence-predator-drones/story?id=9542900; The Drone Wars: 21st Century Warfare
(ABC television broadcast Jan. 12, 2010), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/video/playerlndex?id=9545470.
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terrorists, with little fear of ramifications from the international community for
illegal uses of force.
THE NEED FOR SPECIAL VETERAN COURTS
Samantha Walls*
The life of the law has not been logic. it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed1
- Oliver Wendell Holmes
A Reflection:
This summer I had the privilege to work for the Colorado Public Defenders
Office under the Colorado Student Practice Act. I managed my own misdemeanor
caseload, under the supervision of an attorney. To my surprise, I discovered that
the majority of my clients were veterans, from both the Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Operation Enduring Freedom wars, and the Vietnam War. Furthermore, most of
the veterans stated that they suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD).
I was unaware of the number of veterans in our criminal justice system. I
made it a point to discuss with these clients their service and their readjustment
back into society. We discussed their substance abuse issues, their social network,
housing, and employment situations.
I, believing I was being innovative, thought that these veterans needed a
special court, similar to a drug court. Little did I know that many others shared
these same ideas, and in fact, Veteran Courts were spreading across the United
States. I was able to shadow the Colorado Public Defender, Sheilagh McAteer,
who helped create and run the recently established Veterans Trauma Court, in
Colorado Springs, CO. It is from my experience this summer that I write this paper
about the problems our veterans face when returning from war with psychological
wounds, and the grave need for specialty Veteran Courts across our nation. The
United States is not alone in its struggle to address the needs of veterans suffering
from psychological wounds. In the current state of international affairs, many
countries are joining forces to fight the same war. Therefore, the international
community could benefit from addressing the psychological issues of soldiers as a
collective group. The United States, in the implementation and progression of
Veteran Courts, could lead the international community in providing appropriate
treatment and care for its soldiers.
. Article by Samantha J. Walls, Denver Sturm College of Law, Juris Doctorate May 2011. In
memory of William Frantz.
1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963).
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We are taught history so that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past. Yet
here we are as a Nation, unequipped to care for our returning veterans, in a
situation hauntingly reminiscent of the Vietnam War. We are allowing history to
repeat itself. Instead of preempting the inevitable stress disorders that afflict
soldiers when they return from war, we are now trying as best we can to pick up
the pieces. The latest attempt: Veteran Specialty Courts.
The United States has sent approximately 1.64 million voluntary soldiers to
serve in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) wars since 2001.2 Some of those men and women have returned and some
have yet to return home. We welcome soldiers home with open-arms;
3
unfortunately, soldiers often find those arms empty and unwelcoming, lacking the
sufficient resources and understanding to assist the soldier in his or her transition
back into civilian life.4 We, as a Nation, have been ignorant to the deep
psychological wounds inflicted upon soldiers by the trauma of war.5 While there
are mounting policy concerns and attempts, both by the government and by the
public, to become knowledgeable about the psychological wounds endured from
war, for many troops it is too late. The basic fact is that many of our troops have
lost their lives to suicide, are already behind bars, or are currently involved in the
criminal justice system.6
The soldiers' psychological wounds, mainly Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), affect every aspect of their daily life.7
The veterans' behavior, resulting from the symptoms of these psychological
wounds, often involves the veteran with the criminal justice system. Once within
the criminal justice system, these symptoms may interfere with the veteran-
defendant's ability to appropriately interact with the court system. To deal with
2. RAND, CENTER FOR MILITARY HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE INJURIES, THEIR CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO ASSIST
RECOVERY 3 (Terri Tanielian & Lisa H. Jaycox eds., 2008) [hereinafter RAND]. The RAND
Corporation is a non-profit institution whose mission is to improve policy and decision-making through
research and analysis. See http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/
RANDMG720.pdf.
3. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Nicole A. Stockey, Last Stand? The Criminal Responsibility of War
Veterans Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 85 IND. L.J. 87, 107
(2010).
4. Erica Goode, Suicide's Rising Toll: After Combat, Victims of an Inner War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
2, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/us/02suicide.html.
5. See Kristi A. Estrada, Welcome Home: Our Nation's Shameful History of Caring for Combat
Veterans and How Expanding Presumptions for Service Connection can Help, 26 T.M. COOLEY L.
REv. 113, 116-139 (2009).
6. Goode, supra note 4 (noting that in 2008, there were 192 suicides deaths among active-duty
soldiers and soldiers in inactive reserve status, and that from January to mid-July of 2009, 129 suicides
were confirmed or suspected); see RAND, supra note 2, at 128 (noting that "male veterans face roughly
twice the risk of dying from suicide as their civilian counterparts").
7. Hafemeister, supra note 3, at 95; see C. Peter Erlinder, Paying the Price for Vietnam: Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder and Criminal Behavior, 25 B.C. L. REV. 305, 312 (1984).
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the concerning number of veterans in the criminal justice system, some
jurisdictions have recently implemented specialty courts for veterans with criminal
charges. These courts are in lieu of the traditional criminal prosecution method,
which provide treatment instead of incarceration, as a means to heal the veterans'
psychological wounds.8
While the effects of TBI on the mental processes are potentially as serious as
the effects of PTSD on the mental processes of the returning soldiers, this article
will exclusively discuss the relation between PTSD, service in combat, and
criminal behavior. Due to the recent medical diagnosis of TBI as a result of war,
the extent of the effects of TBI is relatively unknown to medical researchers. 9 At
this point, medical researchers do not have a solid understanding of how TBI
affects a veteran's functional activity or how it relates to criminal behavior.
10
The criteria of PTSD include "exposure to a life-threatening or other
traumatic event [like combat, rape, or experiencing a natural disaster], a subjective
response involving fear, helplessness, or horror, and symptoms from each of the
following symptom clusters: intrusive recollections, avoidant/numbing symptoms,
and hyper-arousal symptoms.""1 A veteran's exposure to a traumatic event during
combat causes the development of PTSD. As opposed to civilians who suffer from
PTSD after encountering a traumatic experience, PTSD is more severe for veterans
because they are exposed to a greater number of traumatic experiences through
continuous and unrelenting combat. 12 PTSD symptoms affect the way veterans
interact within their social environments.1 3 Anytime an individual suffering from
PTSD is reminded of the initial trauma (i.e. through sounds, taste, smells) their
body re-experiences the initial stress response. 14  PTSD causes the body to be
constantly in an anxious stressed state which has a "deleterious effect on the
brain."' 5 An individual who suffers from PTSD commonly suffers from other
8. Judge Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Court: A Proactive Approach, 35 NEW. ENG. J.
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 357,363-64 (2009).
9. RAND, supra note 2, at summary xx.
10. Id.
11. Hafemeister, supra note 3, at 94-95.
12. Constantina Aprilakis, The Warrior Returns: Struggling to Address Criminal Behavior by
Veterans with PTSD, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541, 545 (2005).
13. RAND, supra note 2, at 149.
14. Hafemeister, supra note 3, at 94-95.
15. Erin M. Gover, Iraq as a Psychological Quagmire: The Implications of Using Post- Traumatic
Stress Disorder as a Defense for Iraq War Veterans, 28 PACE L. REv. 561, 564 (2008). See
Hafemeister, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing the chemical process that occurs in the brain of an individual
suffering from PTSD as "When an individual experiences a highly traumatic event, the body undergoes
a physiological change, that is, a stress response. This stress response begins in the reticular activating
system and then progresses to the hypothalamus. The hypothalamus, in turn, signals the pituitary gland
to secrete a hormone called adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH). This hormone generates adrenaline,
which triggers rapid heartbeat, desensitization, and hyperalertness. Although this is a natural response
to a stressful situation, individuals with PTSD may experience a stress response every time there is a
reminder of the earlier stressful event."
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comorbid diseases such as depression, substance abuse or an anxiety disorder. 16 In
fact, individuals who suffer from PTSD have an average of 2.7 other mental health
diagnoses.17 Moreover, individuals with PTSD commonly abuse substances in an
attempt to self-medicate.
8
Individuals who suffer from PTSD require immediate and continuing
treatment. The effects of PTSD grow more severe the longer an individual suffers
from the traumatic symptoms. 19 Without treatment, people continue to experience
symptoms for decades, a condition known as PTSD with lifetime prevalence.
20
Fortunately, the effects of PTSD can be reversed through treatment to address the
initial traumatic event(s) and by helping the sufferer cope with the stressors of
daily life without re-experiencing the feelings associated with the initial trauma.2t
Part 1 of this article discusses the occurrence of PTSD in veterans, the
contributing elements that limit the availability of treatment of veterans with
PTSD, and lastly the prevalence of veterans in the criminal justice system. Part 2
discusses the recognized link, both by researchers and courts, between a PTSD
diagnosis which results from service in combat and criminal behavior. Part 3 of
this article describes and analyzes the proposed adequate way to deal with a
veteran-defendant suffering from PTSD: Veteran Specialty Courts.
I. THE PROBLEM
An increasing number of soldiers are returning home from war with substance
abuse problems, psychological issues, rising rates of suicide, homelessness, and
resulting criminal behavior.22 In recent years, governmental and non-governmental
interest groups have begun to study the effects of service in the OEF and OIF wars
on the returning soldiers. The RAND group, on behalf of the Center for Military
Health Policy Research, completed the first large-scale, non-governmental
assessment of the psychological and cognitive needs of soldiers who have served
in either the OEF or OIF wars. 23 The researchers concluded that "a major national
effort is needed to expand and improve the capacity of the mental health system to
,,24provide effective care to service members and veterans. Additionally, the
Department of Defense Task Force on Mental Health has studied the current
available health care for returning soldiers and veterans and concluded that "the
16. RAND, supra note 2, at 125.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 134.
19. Id. at 54.
20. GLENN SCHIRALDI, THE POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER SOURCEBOOK 40 (Lowell
House 2000).
21. RAND, supra note 2, at 9.
22. See Gover, supra note 15, at 561-62.
23. RAND, supra note 2. RAND researchers conducted this studying by surveying 1,965 veterans
from across 24 communities. RAND assessed their exposure to traumatic events, studied current
symptoms of psychologically illnesses, and evaluated whether they had received proper care for their
injuries sustained while in combat. See www.RAND.org.
24. One in Five Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans Suffer from PTSD or Major Depression, RAND
CORP., April 17, 2008, http://www.rand.org/news/press/2008/04/17/ [hereinafter One in Five].
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system of care for psychological health that has evolved over the recent decades is
insufficient to meet the needs of today's forces and their beneficiaries and will not
be sufficient to meet their needs in the future. 25
Current treatment and care facilities for veterans and soldiers need to be
expanded and improved in order to meet the growing number of soldiers and
veterans with PTSD. Some have called the significant increase in the number of
soldiers and veterans suffering from PTSD a social crisis.26 The numbers vary
depending on the study and its relevant assessment group,27 however, it is
estimated that of the current 2.3 million U.S. Veterans, approximately twenty to
thirty percent, exhibit the symptoms associated with mental health disorders or
cognitive impairments. 28 This breaks down to approximately 300,000 of the
returning soldiers, or one in five, will likely suffer from PTSD.29 Another study
found that out of 100,000 soldiers returning from the OEF and OIF wars that the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) treated between 2001 and 2005, almost one-
third suffered from a mental health problem, most commonly diagnosed as
PTSD.3 ° In that study, more than half of the veterans suffered from a comorbid
mental health problem along with PTSD, such as major depression, anxiety or
substance abuse. 31 In fact, one in six soldiers suffers from a substance abuse
problem. 32 The RAND study concluded that the prevalence of PTSD was highest
among soldiers of the Army, Marines and the Reserves because these military
forces operate in combat areas more often than other military forces.33 This
finding is consistent with studies that find a recognizable correlation between
repeated exposure to combat and the greater likelihood of developing PTSD.34
25. DEPT. OF DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, An Achievable Vision: Report of the
Department of Defense Task Force on Mental health, at ES-1 (2007), available at
http://www.health.mil/dhb/mhtf/MHTF-Report-Final.pdf (emphasis added); Judge Russell, supra note
8, at 360.
26. See One in Five, supra note 24 (discussing the individual and societal health and financial
costs associated with veterans and soldiers not receiving the appropriate and effective treatment for
PTSD).
27. RAND, supra note 2, at 105 (noting the discrepancies in study numbers of veterans suffering
from PTSD are due to several factors such as: most studies focused on active duty or enlisted soldiers;
the studies under-represent individuals at the highest rates for PTSD, i.e. persons separated from
service; most research has been surrounding the deployments prior to the escalation in Iraq insurgency,
in 2002-2004; studies only provide information of mental health condition of veteran/soldier at one
time, however studies have shown that PTSD symptoms fluctuate over time).
28. One in Five, supra note 24.
29. Id.
30. Sami Beg, Mental Problems Plague Returning Troops, ABC NEWS, March 12, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=2944619.
31. Id.
32. One in Five, supra note 24.
33. Id.
34. Karestan C. Koenen et al., Risk Factors for Course of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among
Vietnam Veterans: A 14-Year Follow-Up of American Legionnaires, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 980, 985 (2003).
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A. Elements that Exacerbate the Number of Veterans suffering from PTSD
This section will address the elements, such as the improper care of returning
Vietnam Veterans, an arguably different war environment, and significant barriers
to treatment that combine to exacerbate the trauma caused by war and effectively
increase the number of veterans suffering from PTSD. First, the prevalence of
PTSD among Vietnam veterans was not properly addressed after the Vietnam War,
and therefore the United States is still trying to provide adequate treatment for
Vietnam veterans. The continuing treatment of the Vietnam War veterans is
hampering the ability of the United States to focus the treatment resources on the
OEF and OIF veterans. Second, the OEF and OIF wars are different from past
wars in terms of longevity and enemy tactics. This arguably different war
environment has increased the prevalence of PTSD. Lastly, significant barriers
prevent veterans from receiving treatment; these failures consist of social stigmatic
associations with mental illnesses and systematic failures by the government.
1. PTSD and the Vietnam War
PTSD is a new name for a phenomenon that is as old as war itself.35 The
stress related to combat and its resulting psychological effects has been a
recognized consequence of warfare.36 During the Civil War, the psychological
impact of war was termed "nostalgia" 37 In World War I, it was referred to as
"shell shock" or "combat neurosis. 3 8 In World War II, the psychological impact
of war was called "combat fatigue," "operational fatigue," "old sergeant
syndrome," or "gross stress reaction., 39 Due to the differing titles and medical
diagnosis of combat stress throughout the historical wars, statistics relating to the
historical prevalence of the psychological impact of combat stress is difficult to
track.
Although society recognized combat stress as a natural consequence of war,
the effects of combat stress on veterans was not a focus of societal concern until
the end of the Vietnam War. In 1970, Congress held its first hearing to address the
issue of veterans' readjustment back into civil society.40 It was not until four years
following the end of the Vietnam War, in 1979, that the American Psychological
Association (APA) officially defined PTSD as a mental disorder.4 1  Medical
professionals rely on the APA to arrive at a clinical diagnosis. 42 Thus, Vietnam
35. Returning Veterans Involved in the Criminal Justice System 3, Seminar and Training
sponsored by Vet Center, Veterans Village of San Diego, Department of Veterans Affairs et al., Sept.
12, 2009 [hereinafter Returning Veterans].
36. RAND, supra note 2, at 4.
37. Estrada, supra note 5 at 134.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. RAND, supra note 2, at 5.
41. Id.
42. Barry L. Levin, Defense of the Vietnam Veteran with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 46 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 441, § 20 (2010).
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soldiers who returned from war and sought treatment for their psychological issues
within this four-year gap were not properly diagnosed and did not receive
appropriate medical treatment. This contributed to the lack of understanding
regarding the proper treatment for these returning veterans.
The United States and the VA did not respond appropriately or with any
urgency to the mental conditions of the returning Vietnam veterans. 43  The
community vilified the returning soldiers for their service, and the media portrayed
them as substance-abusing dangerous individuals. 44 The psychological state of the
Vietnam veteran was misunderstood, and many thought that individuals who
served as soldiers were predisposed to mental health issues, substance abuse, and
criminal behavior.45 The current motto for the Vietnam Veterans of America, who
are supporters of Veteran Specialty Courts, is: "Never again shall one generation
of veterans abandon another."'46 This motto exemplifies the way in which Vietnam
veterans perceived the sufficiency of their care and the general attitude of
Americans towards their coming home.
It was not until 1983, eight years after the end of the Vietnam War, that
Congress mandated a study to investigate PTSD and other post-war psychological
problems among Vietnam veterans.47 This study, titled The National Vietnam
Veterans Readjustment Study (NVVRS), found that higher levels of war-zone
exposure directly increased the rate of PTSD.48 Furthermore, it found that 30.9%
of Vietnam veterans had PTSD with lifetime prevalence, meaning that Vietnam
veterans were, for decades, suffering from PTSD symptoms.
49
While the results of the NVVRS study primarily put the PTSD diagnosis on
the social radar, the federal government did not implement effective treatment
services for those Vietnam veterans who were suffering from PTSD. This lack of
effective treatment is reflected in the fact that by 1985, almost one-fourth of the
federal and state prison populations were veterans. s0 The government's failure to
properly address the mental health problems of the returning Vietnam veterans
effectively increased the number of current war veterans needing medical
43. Estrada, supra note 5, at 122.
44. Erlinder, supra note 7, at 306-07.
45. Id. at 314.
46. Thomas J. Berger, U.S. Sentencing Commission: Regarding Mental Health & Substance
Abuse Issues Facing Returning Veterans Relating to Criminal Justice and Alternatives to Incarceration,
Public Hearing, March 17, 2010, http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100317/HearingTranscript.pdf.
47. Jennifer L. Price, National Center for PTSD. Findings from the National Vietnam Veterans'
Readjustment Study, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., Jan. 1, 2007,
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/vietnam-vets-study.asp.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Thomas J. Berger, Statement for the Record of Vietnam Veterans of America, before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission Regarding Mental Health & Substance Abuse Issues Facing Returning
Veterans Relating to Criminal Justice and Alternatives to Incarceration, Public Hearing, March 17,
2010, http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20100317/Berger testimony.pdf [hereinafter Statement for the
Record].
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treatment and is exacerbating the current strain on the system. Instead of focusing
governmental resources on soldiers and veterans from the OEF and OIF wars, the
government is still attempting to treat Vietnam veterans. Vietnam veterans are
included in the current statistics of both veterans and soldiers with PTSD, and are
included in the statistics concerning the veterans in our criminal justice system.
2. Special Aspects of the OEF and OIF Wars
Changes in the United States military operations have arguably increased the
number of mental health related injuries, or "invisible wounds" as described by the
RAND study.51 Some of these changes can be attributed to changes in military
operations due to the shortage of volunteer soldiers. The year 2010 marks the ninth
straight year of sustained combat for the United States Due to the length of the
war, coupled with the shortage of volunteer soldiers, more soldiers are
experiencing extended and multiple deployments.53 Soldiers often only receive
short periods off during deployments, if they receive time off at all.54 The
government has tapped into the Reserve resources, such as the National Guard, and
is deploying Reserves into combat areas without appropriate military training.55
Reserve soldiers are more likely to suffer from PTSD due to their lack of
traditional military training, which includes psychological conditioning.
5 6
Enemy tactics have been changing and fluctuating throughout the OEF and
OIF wars which may also increase the prevalence of PTSD. Soldiers must deal
with many unknown enemies, because adversaries do not maintain one exclusive
identity. The enemy attacks at anytime and anywhere. It is necessary for soldiers
to be in a constant vigilante state due to the use of suicide bombers, roadside
bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 57 A recent news article relayed
the views of a sergeant regarding the fluctuating warfare:
Enemy forces are moving away from small-unit infantry attacks against
coalition forces. Regime holdouts are moving toward more hit-and-run attacks,
using IEDs [improvised explosive devices], mortars or rocket propelled grenades.
They are using different tactics so they do not need to engage our forces directly.
The number of attacks fluctuates... October saw an average that fluctuated between
the mid-teens to low 20's. I think all we need to understand is that with some of
these IEDs, all that is required is someone with a paper bag or plastic bag to drop it
51. RAND, supra note 2, at 5-6.
52. Statement for the Record, supra note 50.
53. Returning Veterans, supra note 35, at 5.
54. RAND, supra note 2, at 5-6; see Responding to the Needs of Justice-Involved Combat
Veterans with Service-Related Trauma and Mental Health Conditions. A Consensus Report of the
C.41HS National GAINS Center's Forum on Combat Veterans, Trauma, and the Justice System, THE
CMHS NATIONAL GAINS CENTER, August 2008, http://www.gainscenter.samhsa.gov/t
ext/veterans/Responding to_Needs 8 08.asp [hereinafter GAINS].
55. Aprilakis, supra note 12, at 547.
56. Id.
57. RAND, supra note 2, at 5.
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as a walk-by. I think what it requires is for us to remain vigilant constantly, which
is what we are trying to do.58
To deal with the chaos that is modem warfare, the United States has begun
using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or drones. These UAVs have changed
the traditional arena of front-line combat into virtual combat. The United States
has extensively used drone warfare since the September 1 1 th attacks to suppress
enemy army defenses, to support counterinsurgency operations, and to locate and
kill enemy targets. 59 United States Air Force UAV operators remotely control the
armed drones, which are located in Iraq and Afghanistan, from military bases
within the United States. 60
While PTSD has primarily been considered a result of face-to-face physical
combat, UAV operators may also experience psychological trauma from their
"virtual" combat. 61 While the use of drone warfare may appear to be a form of
video-game like combat, UAV operators report that the intensity and realness of
their work mirrors that of field combat. 62 Col. Pete Gersten, a commander of the
Unmanned Aerial System at the Creech Air Force Base in Nevada, reported:
There's no detachment. Those employing the system are very involved at a
personal level in combat. You hear the AK-47 going off, the intensity of the voice
on the radio calling for help. You're looking at him [a fellow soldier], 18 inches
away from him, trying everything in your capability to get that person out of
trouble.63
Therefore, although UAV operators are not physically on the front-lines of
combat, their work captures all of the traumatic aspects of combat: firing weapons,
visually perceiving the effects of combat, hearing the cries of combat, and
experiencing the feelings associated with combat. UAV operators also express the
psychological difficulties associated with the stress of the job and the quick
transition back to a civilian lifestyle, which has been described as a "whiplash
transition." 64 Furthermore, UAV operators do not have a support network of unit
58. Jim Garamone, Number of Attacks in Iraq Constant, Enemy Tactics Change, DEFENSE.GOV,
AMERICAN FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 6, 2003 (emphasis added).
59. Andrew Callam, Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Int'l Affairs R., Feb. 21,
2010, available at http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/144.
60. Id.
61. Nic Robertson, Remote Warfare Ushers New Kinds of Stress, CNN WORLD, July 23, 2009,
available at http://articles.cnn.com/2009-07-23/world/wus.warfare.pilots.uav-1-drones-post-traumatic-
pilots?_s=PM:WORLD.
62. David E. Anderson, Drones and the Ethics of War, PBS.ORG RELIGION & ETHICS
NEWSWEEKLY, May 14, 2010, available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/episodes/by-
topic/international/drones-and-the-ethics-of-war/6290/.
63. Maryann Cusimano-Love, A Troubling Disconnection, AM. MAG., Mar. 15, 2010, available at
http ://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?articleid= 12180.
64. Associated Press, Remote-Control Warriors Suffer War Stress: Predator Operators Prone to
Psychological Trauma as Battlefield Comrades, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 7, 2008, available at
http://wwwv.msnbc.msn.com/id/26078087/.
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cohesion and camaraderie to debrief from the stresses of their jobs.6 5 Due to
security controls, UAV operators cannot even discuss the work with their
families. 66 The psychological effects of drone warfare are currently unknown and a
potential focal point for future study. However, P.W. Singer, the author of the
book Wired for War: The Robotic Revolution and 21st Century Conflict, stated
"[w]e have 5,000 years in one kind of combat, and we don't really understand all
of the stresses of it, so it's a little bit arrogant to think that we would understand
the stresses of this new kind of combat after only four or five years.,
61
Higher survival rates in OEF and OIF are the final characteristic that
differentiates these conflicts from previous ones. The downside of this good news
is the fact that mental health injuries are increasing due to the higher survival rights
of wounded soldiers. Advances in technology, advances in body armor, the use of
combat medics, faster evacuation times, and the placement of combat support
hospitals nearby means that soldiers are surviving from wounds that would have
been fatal in previous wars. 68 The OEF and OIF wars are producing the highest
ratio of wounded-to-killed in the United States history.69 The ratio of the number
of deaths to the number of wounded has dropped from 24% in the Vietnam War, to
13% in the OIF war.70 However the wounded, after treatment, are returning to
combat zones on average within 72 hours, only three days later, a fact which may
also contribute to the onset of PTSD.7 1
3. Barriers to Treatment: Stigmatic and Systematic
An increasing number of returning soldiers and veterans suffer from PTSD
because of the stigmatic mental health barriers to treatment and the systematic
failures by the government. While no easy solution will rectify these problems,
simply recognizing they exist is the first step towards eliminating them.
i. Stigmatic Obstacles
The primary barrier to receiving treatment, beyond the time-consuming
bureaucratic method of receiving support from the VA, is the stigma associated
with mental health issues in both general society and in the military. 2 Terri
Tanielina, author of the RAND study stated in response to the study's findings,
"[w]e need to remove the institutional cultural barriers that discourage soldiers
from seeking care. It's going to take system-level changes to improve treatment
for these illnesses. 73 The RAND study concluded that of the 300,000 soldiers
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Cusimano-Love, supra note 63 (emphasis added).
68. Manav Tanneeru, Advances Helping More Soldiers Survive Attacks, CNN.coM, May 22,
2007, available at http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/] 1/13/war.wounded/index.html.
69. RAND, supra note 2, at 6.
70. Tanneeru, supra note 68.
71. RAND, supra note 2, at 6.
72. Returning Veterans, supra note 35, at 10.
73. Kathleen Kingsbury, Stigma Keeps Troops from PTSD Help, TIME, May 1, 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1736618,00.html.
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from the OEF and OIF wars who have reported symptoms of PTSD, only a little
74
more than half have sought treatment either by the VA or other private resources.
Furthermore, the researchers from the RAND group deemed the soldiers' treatment
as only "minimally adequate" to properly treat PTSD.
75
The societal stigma stems from the way society, in general, views mental
health treatment. Most of the reported reasons why soldiers will not receive
treatment fall into the following categories: they are not convinced treatment will
help; 76 they do not want to be branded as someone with a mental health disorder;
77
they believe others will think less of them;78 or they think a spouse would resent
them for seeking treatment. 79 In fact, one-fourth of the soldiers that participated in
the RAND study stated that they did not believe that the mental health treatment
would be effective due to the military culture of pushing medications rather than
counseling. 80
The military perpetuates and reinforces the societal stigma against seeking
necessary mental health treatment. The military focuses on toughness in both
combat training and in survival techniques. 81 The required toughness does not end
in training; the military requires soldiers to remain tough throughout their service.
The military views anything less than toughness as unacceptable. 82 For example,
in a recent news article, the requisite toughness is evident:
Troop morale has not been affected by the increase in casualties. The troops
have a tough job and are proceeding to accomplish their missions. These soldiers
go out every single day for a year. That's a long time. And in this case, 15
months.That's a lot, that's a lot of pressure over time... So you have to be mentally
and physically tough, and they are.... We have the best noncommissioned officers
and soldiers in the world, and they will adapt to this. And they will continue to do
their job.83 - Army Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno - Commander of Multinational
Corps Iraq.
The RAND study also reported that many soldiers believe that admitting their
mental health concerns during service to a psychologist or unit command officer
would cause problems, such as differential treatment by leadership, a loss of
74. One in Five, supra note 24.
75. Id.
76. Returning Veterans, supra note 35, at 10.
77. Id. at 17.
78. Kingsbury, supra note 73 (stating that more than half of the 200 military men interviewed by
APA said that they believe others would think less of them if they received counseling, and the
majority of surveyed military men stated that they rarely-to-never speak with loved ones about their
mental health issues).
79. Id
80. RAND, supra note 2, at 278.
81. Id. at 276.
82. Id.
83. Jim Garamone, Troops Continue to Adapt to Enemy Tactics in Iraq, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
May 31, 2007, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/05/mil-070531-
afps02.htm (emphasis added).
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confidence by others in their unit, and harmful effect on their future careers. 4 One
solider shared his view that, "it would be dishonest to promise that 'coming out of
the PTSD closet' will be life enhancing." 85 Others have reported that the unit
command officers do not take mental health problems seriously.
8 6
While mental health issues are ideally supposed to remain confidential, the
unit dynamics makes confidentiality almost impossible. For example, each solider
of a unit must be accounted for.87 The on-site facilities for those seeking
psychological treatment are only open during the day. One must tell his or her unit
officer where they are going at all times. Furthermore, if a soldier seeks a mental
health evaluation, another soldier must escort the treatment-seeking soldier to the
mental health clinic. 88 Lt. Justin D'Arienzo, a psychiatrist on an aircraft carrier,
speaks about soldiers being hesitant to talk with him in his office for fear of others
seeing them.89 Instead of office meetings, the soldiers would often casually run in
to him in the lunchroom to have a quiet five-minute conversation about their
troubles.
90
Lastly, many soldiers do not seek the appropriate treatment because they fear
treatment will have a negative impact on their career. The APA interviewed
approximately 200 men and women and an overwhelming 60 percent stated that
seeking mental health care would negatively influence their future careers both
during and after the military. 9' These perceived harmful effects can have very real
effects on soldiers, for example individuals could face stigmatization within the
military, their future security clearances could be endangered, promotions could be
effected by a history of mental health issues, and it could effectively limit their
ability to carry weapons.92 Furthermore, soldiers labeled as having PTSD have
difficulties in the workplace, even outside of the military. Popular media
stigmatizes PTSD as being associated with violence and unstable lifestyles.93
84. RAND, supra note 2, at 277.
85. Returning Veterans, supra note 35, at 17.
86. RAND, supra note 2,.at 279.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Sadie F. Dingfelder, The Military's War on Stigma, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N, June 2009,
available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/06/stigma-war.aspx.
90. Id. The DoD Task Force on Mental Health's 2007 Report noted numerous DoD goals to
increase the availability and quality of the psychological care for soldiers and veterans. One of those
goals was to work towards building a culture of support for psychological health, which include
proposals to dispel stigma, increase the accessibility of mental health professionals to service members,
to increase training regarding psychological health issues throughout military life, to revise the DoD
policies to reflect current knowledge about psychological health, and lastly to make psychological
assessments an effective, efficient, and normal part of military life. DEPT. OF DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON
MENTAL HEALTH, An Achievable Vision: Report of the Department of Defense Task Force on Mental
health, at ES- 1 (2007), available at http://www.health.mil/dhb/mhtf/MHTF-Report-Final.pdf.
91. Kingsbury, supra note 73.
92. Dingfelder, supra note 89; RAND, supra note 2, at 279.
93. Silent Barriers - On Job Trail, Veterans with PTSD Fight Stigma, Misconceptions,
ALLBUSINESS.COM, 2010, http://allbusiness.com/print/14064661-1-22eeq.html.
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Therefore, some employers are unwilling to hire someone who admits to having
PTSD.94
ii. Systematic Obstacles
Systematic failures by the government and military operations hinder the
treatment of soldiers and veterans suffering from PTSD, thereby causing the
effects of the PTSD to grow more severe over time. Unless soldiers actively seek
out treatment during service, at the detriment of their reputation and career, the
only time the military screens the soldiers for a mental illness is upon their post-
deployment.95 As a Department of Defense mandate, the military administers a
Post-Deployment Health Assessment to all service members prior to returning
home. 96  The assessment requires completing an online health-screening
questionnaire prior to an interview with a mental healthcare provider. 97 If the
mental healthcare provider deems necessary, a referral is made for the soldier to
seek outside mental health services.98 While this system may be good in theory,
many soldiers do not answer the questions accurately or follow the referral because
they know it may delay their return home. 99 The RAND report noted that of those
soldiers who received a referral, only approximately one-half sought treatment. 0 0
Three to six months later the assessment is re-administered to the soldiers through
the mail.'l 1 One study reported that from the time of initial assessment to re-
assessment, positive screens for PTSD jumped to 42% for those who served in the
Army's active duty and 92% for those who served in the Army National Guard and
Army Reserve. 10 2 This jump indicates that it is critically important that the
assessments be answered properly and the referrals followed because the longer
PTSD goes untreated, the symptoms become more severe.
The VA is the primary avenue for post-deployment care and treatment.
However, this administrative agency has arguably been poorly-administered,
under-funded, and under-staffed. 0 3A thorough review of the systematic failures of
the VA would be a lengthy topic within itself and other authors have extensively
analyzed the failures. ° 4 Nevertheless, in general, the administration of the VA's
resources causes significant barriers to treatment for veterans in need.
For example, a veteran's right to VA health benefits is not statutorily
authorized but is wholly dependent upon a discretionary budget. 10 5 Due to the
94. Id.
95. GAINS, supra note 54.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. RAND, supra note 2, at 252.
101. GAINS, supra note 54.
102. Id.
103. See Estrada, supra note 5, at 119-30.
104. Id. at 117-141.
105. RAND, supra note 2, at 264.
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fixed budget, the VA provides treatment based upon a priority system. °6 The
priority system establishes accessibility to VA care upon eight priority levels,
priority level one being the highest priority to care. 10 7 Veterans who served in the
OEF and OIF wars are automatically eligible to receive cost-free health care
through the VA up to five years after military service. 10 8 These veterans enter the
VA system at a priority level of 6.109 Strategically, in order to receive VA health
care as soon as possible, the returning veteran would either attempt to show that
PTSD qualifies as a service-connected disability to achieve a first priority ranking,
or to qualify as a low-income veteran to obtain a fifth priority ranking.
Fortunately, the VA no longer requires the veteran to document his or her
traumatic experience which caused the PTSD. Now, the veteran just must prove
that he or she served in combat. While this undoubtedly is a step in the right direct,
the current priority system is hampering treatment.
Furthermore, the great influx of soldiers returning from war who need mental
health treatment is causing a backlog of claims in the VA." 0 Veterans often face
long waitlists for an appointment."' The Department of Defense has reported that
a 30-day delay for an initial mental health appointment is the norm. 1' 2 During the
wait, veterans still suffer from mental health issues.
Beyond arguably being under-funded, the VA is currently understaffed. The
Department of Defense, in 2007, stated, "[t]he DOD [Department of Defense]
currently lacks the resources - both funding and personnel - to adequately support
the psychological health of servicemembers and their families."" 3 For example, on
the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier, there was only one psychiatrist, Lt.
D'Arienzo, on board to attend to approximately 8,000 soldiers."
14
B. Lack of PTSD Treatment Correlates with Increase of Veterans in Criminal
Justice System
The RAND study suggests that "post combat mental health conditions can be
compared to ripples spreading outward on a pond. ' 15 Without treatment, over
time, the symptoms and effects of PTSD on one's life becomes more severe.
Untreated PTSD becomes a substantial interference in an individual's life.
106. Id.
107. Id. (explaining priority levels as follows: veterans with service-connected disabilities (priority
1-3); veterans who were prisoners of war (priority 3); veterans with catastrophic disabilities unrelated to
service (priority 4); low-income veterans (priority 5); veterans who meet specific criteria such as
serving in the first Gulf War (priority 6); veterans with a higher-income who do not qualify for other
priority groups (priority 7-8).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 259.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 260.
114. Dingfelder, supra note 89.
115. RAND, supra note 2, at 149.
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Veterans often find themselves in the criminal justice system due to the
combination of untreated PTSD and the comorbid substance abuse issues.'
16
The number of veterans in the United States criminal justice system is
substantial. In 2007, approximately 1.6 million inmates were in either state or
federal prisons and another 780,000 inmates were confined in local jails."
7
Approximately 9.4 percent of those inmates, or roughly 223,000, were veterans.
118
Of those veterans in jails or prisons, approximately 60 percent have a substance
abuse problem. " 9
Veterans who are incarcerated in jails and prisons have similar characteristics.
The Bureau of Justice conducted the most recent reports in 2000 and 2004. The
2000 report, titled Veterans in Jail or Prison Report, concluded that of the prison
and jail veteran population sampled, the majority were soldiers who had served in
the Army. 120  It further noted that veterans were more likely to be first-time
offenders, more likely to have less extensive criminal histories, and less likely to
be recidivists. 121 Lastly, incarcerated veterans were more likely to report alcohol
abuse and a mental illness than non-veterans.
22
At this point, statistics do not clearly indicate the number of OEF and OIF
returning soldiers in the criminal justice system. 123 In the 2004 Veterans in State
and Federal Prison, Stated that only four percent of the prison and jail population
was comprised of OEF and OIF war veterans. 124 Presently, soldiers are still
returning from the OEF and OIF wars and therefore the 2004 report does not
accurately reflect the current trend of OEF and OIF war veterans involved in the
criminal justice system. A more up to date study is necessary to accurately
calculate how many OEF and OIF veterans are in the criminal justice system
today.
1I. RECOGNIZED LINK BETWEEN CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND PTSD
Veteran Specialty courts are based upon a premise that veterans' culpability
for their criminal behavior is different from the average citizen-defendant. Their
culpability is reduced due to their unique experience in combat war, the associated
PTSD diagnosis caused by their service, and the behavioral symptoms of that
diagnosis that often serve as the catalyst for their criminal behavior.'
25
116. Judge Russell, supra note 8, at 358, 362.
117. GAINS, supra note 54 (applying statistics from the 2004 Department of Justice Report,
released in 2007)
118. Id.
119. Statement for the Record, supra note 50.
120. Christopher J. Mumola, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Veterans in Prison or Jail
3, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., January 2000, revised Sept. 29, 2000.
121. Id. at 7.
122. Id. at 9-10.
123. GAINS, supra note 54.
124. Margaret E. Noonan and Christopher J. Mumola, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report:
Veterans in State and Federal Prison, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., May 2004
125. Judge Russell, supra note 8, at 363-64.
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A. Effect of PTSD on Veterans 'Behavior
The effect of PTSD on a veteran's emotional and physical state relates
directly to his or her involvement with the criminal justice system. The effects of
PTSD impact every element of an individual's daily life. 126 The initial traumatic
event and the re-experiencing of the initial stress response of that traumatic event
cause damage to the hippocampus of the brain.127 In turn, this damage affects an
individual's ability to "manage fear responses [or] to appropriate[ly] react to
environmental stimuli.' 28 Therefore, the associated symptoms of PTSD affect the
way veterans perceive and respond to their social environment.1
29
Symptoms of PTSD affect three specific domains of functioning: cognition,
physiological arousal and emotions.' 30 The noted changes in the three domains of
functioning directly link PTSD symptoms to criminal behavior. Some of these
common changes are flashbacks of the traumatic event, perceived threats, anger
and irritability, avoidance, heighted emotions and emotional numbing. 131  One
effect of PTSD is the physiological state, termed Allostasis, wherein someone is
constantly hyperactive, aroused, and aware.' 32  This hyperactivity causes an
immense strain on the nervous system. 1
33
Furthermore, the veteran's reintegration into civilian life creates
complications.' 34  Behavior that is socially acceptable in combat areas may
actually be criminal behavior in a civil society. Some veterans have difficultly
reintegrating into civilian life because they are used to experiencing extreme highs
and lows in combat. 35 Veterans often become detached and numb once back in
civil society. 136 Many veterans feel that there are very few individuals in his or her
immediate social network who could fully comprehend what the soldier's life was
like during combat. 37 Due to the lack of community understanding, combined
with the aforementioned stigma associated with mental health issues and the
systematic obstacles to treatment, many veterans avoid dealing with their PTSD
symptoms.
126. Erlinder, supra note 7, at 312.
127. Hafemeister, supra note 3, at 96-97. Researchers have concluded, in general, that different
brain imaging techniques can prove that an individual suffers from PTSD by showing brain reactivity.
However, this has yet to be utilized in clinical settings. Researchers propose that one day this
technology will be used to aid in the objective diagnosis of PTSD and assist in monitoring treatment
responses for PTSD. Nobumasa Kato et al., PTSD: Brain Mechanisms and Clinical Implications 207-
08, Springer Pub. (2006).
128. Id.
129. U.S. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, Criminal Behavior and PTSD: an Analysis, National Center for
PTSD (June 01, 2010).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Aprilakis, supra note 12, at 551.
133. Id.
134. Hafemeister, supra note 3, at 104-05.
135. Id.
136. Aprilakis, supra note 12, at 555.
137. Goode, supra note 4.
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To overcome the mood-altering symptoms noted above, veterans act out in
certain ways that lead to involvement with the police.' Researchers have
concluded that some seek out exhilaration by engaging in risky behavior to satisfy
their need for stimulation.' 39 Some PTSD sufferers are overwhelmed with anger
and irritability; thus, when they are in a situation they perceive to be threatening,
the sufferer snaps and overreacts.140 The NVVRS study reported that veterans with
PTSD committed significantly more violent acts than veterans without a PTSD
diagnosis, 13.3 violent acts in one year compared to 3.53 relatively.141
A veteran is most likely to engage in criminal behavior during a dissociative
state, 42 or while abusing a substance. 43 During a dissociative state, the veteran
behaves as if he is in combat and reacts to elements in his environment in survivor-
mode. 144 The veteran's behavior is often strange and violent due to the veteran's
distorted reality.' 45  Moreover, the veteran is not aware of the morality of his
behavior, or the consequences of his actions.
146
Substance abuse and a mental disorder diagnosis go hand-in-hand.
147
Researchers found that between 15% 40% of people with mental disorders also
have substance abuse problems. 48 This statistic substantially increases in relation
to PTSD, 75% of veterans with PTSD also have a substance abuse problem.
149
Veterans often turn to abusing substances in an attempt to self-medicate to deal
with both their psychological state and their physical chronic pain.' 50  Others
become heavily involved with drugs and alcohol to deal with the stress and guilt
associated with survival.' 51  Traumatic stress, the initial cause of PTSD, also
causes relapses in individuals who have overcome substance abuse. 152 A noted
symptom of PTSD is re-experiencing the initial traumatic stress. Therefore, this
creates a cycle of abusing substances as a means to cope with the PTSD symptoms,
and a relapse back into using due to re-experiencing the initial traumatic stress.
The number of veterans with a substance abuse problem is significant. As
noted earlier, one in six veterans have a substance abuse problem. 53  This
substance abuse problem directly relates to criminal behavior. In recent years,
138. Erlinder, supra note 7, at 311.
139. Gover, supra note 15, at 567.
140. Erlinder, supra note 7.
141. Id.
142. Erlinder, supra note 7, at 311.
143 id.
144. Hafemeister, supra note 3, at 116-117.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. RAND, supra note 2, at 134.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Erlinder, supra note 7.
151. Aprilakis, supra note 12, at 555.
152. Statement for the Record, supra note 50.
153. Id.
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there has been an increase in the number of veterans involved in alcohol and drug
related crimes, such as Driving under the Influence, Reckless Driving, and
Disorderly Conduct.' 54 One study found that between 2005 and 2006, the rate of
veterans involved in the above-noted crimes rose from 1.73 per 1000 soldiers, to
5.71 per 1000 soldiers.
155
B. Recognized Link Between Criminality and PTSD
The behavioral link between criminal behavior and the diagnosis of PTSD is
well-recognized by researchers and psychologists. A study of Vietnam veterans
noted that the anger and violence by Vietnam veterans was "a reaction stress rather
than simply another outburst of a notoriously sociopathic population. ' ' 56
Furthermore, a substantial majority of criminal defendants who are veterans have
no criminal records prior to their service.157 The majority of veterans who commit
violent crimes or crimes related to drugs and alcohol are first-time offenders;
therefore, these individuals are arguably not criminally predisposed. 158
Courts have recognized and incorporated the research that acknowledges a
substantial link between criminal behavior and a PTSD diagnosis when assessing
the culpability of a veteran criminal defendant.1 59 This is most obvious in the
language of Porter v. McCollum, a recent United States Supreme Court case,
which stated that the United States has a "long tradition of according leniency to
veterans in recognition of their service, especially for those who fought on the
front lines.' 160 In this case, the Court held that the defendant's extensive combat
exposure was relevant "not only that he served honorably under extreme hardship
and gruesome conditions, but also that the jury might find mitigating the intense
stress and mental and emotional toll that combat took upon [the defendant]."' 6'
In the above case, the Court recognized the link between PTSD and criminal
behavior in terms of an element of consideration for mitigating a criminal
defendant's sentence. Likewise, in State v. Denni, at the sentencing trial for a 1st
degree murder charge, the defendant presented evidence that he suffered from
PTSD since returning from Iraq and testified that his actions were a result of the
extreme mental disturbance due to PTSD. 162 The jury convicted the defendant for
154. Judge Russell, supra note 8, at 363.
155. Id.
156. David M. Benedek & Thomas A. Grieger, Post-Deployment Violence and Antisocial
Behavior: The Influence of Pre-Deployment Factors, Warzone Experience, and Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder, 13(3) PRIMARY PSYCHIATRY 51, 52 (2006).
157. Mumola, supra note 120, at 7. Table 6 exemplifies that of the state prison population in 1997,
64.10% of veterans had no criminal justice status (i.e. criminal history) at time of current arrest. Id.
158. Id. (reporting that "'nearly a third of veterans were first-time offenders;" and in State prisons
"veterans had less extensive criminal histories than other inmates;" "veterans in State prison were less
likely than nonveterans to be recidivists").
159. See Gover, supra note 15, at 562-63, 570-81.
160. Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 455 (2009).
161. Id. (emphasis added)
162. Gover, supra note 15, at 579-80.
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the lesser charge of 2nd degree murder) 63 In fact, some legislatures have
recognized the importance of PTSD as a consideration for mitigation by statutorily
allowing judges to consider a defendant's PTSD diagnosis during a sentencing trial
and to afford appropriate treatment alternatives when necessary.
164
The judiciary has recognized the importance of PTSD as more than just
mitigation in sentencing. Some courts have recognized PTSD as negating the
required mens rea of the charged crime.' 65 Mens rea is the measurement used by
the courts to determine whether the defendant had the requisite culpable mental
state to be guilty of the alleged crime. 66  The criminal justice system has
recognized that an individual who suffers from a severe mental illness that renders
them legally insane does not have the requisite mental state and therefore is
entitled to an insanity defense. 67 The same line of argument arguably applies to
individuals diagnosed with PTSD. A PTSD diagnosis could support a mental
status defense because, as scientific studies have shown, PTSD has a substantial
altering affect on an individual's mind.'
68
Lawyers have been litigating the PTSD mental health defense since the late
1970s. 169 To raise the defense, counsel for the defense must prove that "but for the
PTSD, the crime would not have occurred."' 170 This requires many different offers
of proof. Counsel must establish that the defendant actually suffers from PTSD.171
To prove that the veteran defendant has PTSD, counsel will have to pinpoint the
traumatic event that instigated the PTSD.1 72 Many veterans with PTSD do not
report their symptoms or seek medical attention; therefore, a medical record to
prove PTSD might be difficult to secure. 73 Evidence to prove the initial traumatic
event might be difficult to find due to a lack of documentation of combat
occurrences and security measures. 74 Therefore, it might be impossible for the
defense to prove the traumatic event without forcing the defendant to waive his
right against self-incrimination and testify regarding his traumatic event. Then,
counsel must establish that the defendant was suffering from a PTSD symptom at
the time the crime occurred. Lastly, counsel must establish the causal link between
the experienced symptom and the criminal act.'
75
Furthermore, even if counsel successfully completes the above-required steps,
it is ultimately up to the jurors to decide whether they believe the defendant's
163. Id. at 579-80.
164. Erlinder, supra note 7, at 339 (discussing Cal. Penal Code § 1170.9 (1984).
165. Hafemeister, supra note 3, at 123-25.
166. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1006 ( 8 th ed. 1999).
167. Gover, supra note 15, at 570-75.
168. Hafemeister, supra note 3, at 96-97.
169. Gover, supra note 15, at 562.
170. Levin, supra note 42, at § 17.5, 18.
171. Aprilakis, supra note 12, at 560-64.
172. Gover, supra note 15, at 568.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Aprilakis, supra note 12, at 560.
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defense. 176 Although the psychiatric community and courts recognize the link
between criminal behavior and a PTSD diagnosis, lay individuals may not be as
knowledgeable of the link.177  Furthermore, non-veteran jurors might not
empathize or understand the psychological toll that war takes on an individual. 78
Jurors might not believe in a PTSD diagnosis or be weary of a PTSD defense due
to the ability to feign mental illnesses such as PTSD.
In the cases where PTSD has been used as a mental health defense, it has
primarily been successful where the defendant's criminal behavior could be
attributed to a dissociative state. 179 In dissociative state cases, it is easier to prove
the direct link between the PTSD symptom, the defendant's lack of mental
capacity, and the criminal behavior. Usually a veteran in a dissociative state is
acting in survivor-mode, and therefore his actions seem strange in correlation to
the reality of the environment around him.180 It might be easier for a jury to
identify and understand this behavior. However, only the minority of criminal
cases involve veterans who are in dissociative states. 181
The recognition by the courts of a defendant's reduced culpability because of
PTSD is a step in the right direction. Yet, it is not enough. For the aforementioned
reasons, PTSD defenses are often difficult to prove and are arguably unlikely to
gain acceptance by the jury. Sending a veteran to jail is not going to help the
veteran's underlying PTSD mental-health issues that led to his or her criminal
behavior because the veteran will not receive the necessary treatment. One author
put it best:
Although constitutionally and statutorily legitimate, these convictions should
be considered a moral blight on the legal justice system. As the Executive branch
sends more and more young men and women to Iraq and Afghanistan, the
Legislative and Judicial Branches should respond by providing special rules to
govern veteran defendants.182
III. VETERAN SPECIALTY COURTS
"The care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the first
and only legitimate object of good government. ,,183
Some state legislatures and state judicial branches have responded to the
growing number of veterans in the criminal justice system by initiating Veteran
176. Gover, supra note 15, at 569.
177. Aprilakis, supra note 12, at 560-64.
178. Gover, supra note 15, at 569.
179. Id. at 573.
180. Hafemeister, supra note 3, at 116.
181. See id.
182. Aprilakis, supra note 12, at 566.
183. Thomas Jefferson to Maryland Republicans. 1809. ME 16:369; see also Honorable Peggy
Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement:
Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System 's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 439 (1999).
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Specialty Courts. Veteran Specialty Courts are courts that use alternative
prosecution and sentencing methods to treat the underlying PTSD diagnosis and
substance abuse problems. The Veteran Specialty Court does not use the
traditional method of charge-conviction-incarceration as this method exacerbates
the veteran's mental health issues. This idea has gained wide acceptance in the
legal community, and across the United States different versions are springing up.
A. Use ofAlternative Prosecution Methods
The Veteran Specialty Court's use of alternative prosecution methods is
modeled upon the drug specialty court programs that began in the late 1980s. The
year of 1989 offered hope to many veterans and drug offenders. That year
exemplified an understanding by the community that the traditional method of
prosecution was not helping the local veterans in San Diego, nor drug-users across
the United States, to overcome their drug addictions. San Diego established the
first Homeless Court Program in that year.' 84 The program was instituted by the
Misdemeanor Criminal Court to find alternatives to the traditional prosecution of
homeless veterans involved in the criminal justice system who suffered from
alcohol and drug addictions.
185
Also in that year, the legislature and judiciary in Florida created the first Drug
Treatment Court (DTC).186 After its creation, many drug specialty courts emerged
in other urban centers.'8 7 Drug courts primarily arose due to the overwhelming
increase in drug offender incarcerations during the '80's and early '90's. Social
media and the government termed the rising drug use and incarceration in America
as a "war on drugs."' 88 The increase in cases placed an overwhelming burden on
the court systems.' 89 The legislature initially created drug specialty courts as an
avenue to deal with the overwhelming caseload of drug crimes.
The enactment of drug specialty courts showed recognition, on behalf of the
criminal justice system, that the traditional method of prosecuting drug crimes was
not working to solve the drug-use problem in America. The enactment of drug
courts also showed recognition that the prevalence of drugs in society created a
public safety concern that needed a response. Recidivism for drug crimes was
high,' 90 and incarcerating individuals for drug crimes did nothing to curtail the use
of drugs, or treat the underlying addiction to drugs.' 9'The drug specialty courts
184. Katrina J. Eagle & Steve R. Binder, Veterans Facing Criminal Charges: How a Community
of Professionals can Serve Those who Served our Country, 16 NEV. LAW. 16, 18(2008).
185. Id.
186. Honorable Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment
Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in
America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 439, 545-57 (1999).
187. Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, Coming Home: Accommodating the Special Needs of Military
Veterans to the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST J. CRIM. L. 563, 568 (2010).
188. Honorable Hora et al., supra note 186, at 456.
189. Id. at 456.
190. Id. at 456.
191. Id. at 456.
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allowed non-violent drug offenders to choose to participate in an intensive
supervision and treatment program, in lieu of the traditional prosecution method.
The intensive supervision and treatment programs addressed the underlying drug
addiction, and helped the individual confront and overcome the addiction through
evidence-based treatment.1 92 Drug specialty courts produced positive outcomes by
reducing costs associated with incarceration, decreasing the overwhelming
caseload in misdemeanor courts, and most importantly decreasing the rates of
recidivism.
193
When the drug courts were created, the system of treatment-over-
incarceration was primarily viewed as a way to create greater efficiency in the
processing of court cases. 194 However, the drug court system has become
associated with a contemporary criminal justice ideology called therapeutic
jurisprudence. Therapeutic jurisprudence is "the use of social science to study the
extent to which a legal rule or practice promotes the psychological and physical
well-being of the people it affects."' 195  This jurisprudence analyzes through
empirical research the direct relationship between the law, the legislature's goal in
enacting the law, and the social effects created by the law.196 This jurisprudence
concept was first utilized in 1987 in mental health law.1 97 Since then, the criminal
justice system used therapeutic jurisprudence, primarily in regards to drug
convictions, to justify the movement away from the traditional methods of
prosecution, charge-convict-incarcerate, to a model of treatment-rehabilitate.' 98
This movement was based upon the recognition that the legislature's goal of
reducing recidivism among drug offenders was not being fulfilled, and in fact the
court was seeing a rise in repeat drug offenders. The treatment-rehabilitate model
worked to reduce recidivism by treating the underlying drug-addiction. The use of
therapeutic jurisprudence to address the underlying issues of the criminal behavior
necessarily emphasizes the responsibility of the individual to take an aggressive
and self-motivated approach to treatment.
B. Foundation of Veteran Specialty Courts
Veteran Specialty Courts utilize the therapeutic jurisprudence ideology in
creating the treatment-rehabilitate model. State legislatures have based the veteran
courts' foundation on the established infrastructure of the drug courts.' 99 These
new courts can be considered a merger of both drug court and mental health court
in that it provides treatment for both the underlying PTSD and the associated
substance abuse concerns.200 Treatment of the mental and psychological well-
192. Id. at 463-68.
193. Id. at 502-04.
194. Id. at 449.
195. Id. at 443.
196. Id. at 444-48.
197. Id. at 443.
198. Id. at 449.
199. See SERV Act, S. 3379, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008).
200. Judge Russell, supra note 8, at 364-65.
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beingof the veteran-defendant is the number one concern.201 In 2004, two judges in
Anchorage Alaska established the first known Veteran Court in the United
20States. 02 The judges established the court in response to the concerning numbers
of veterans who appeared before them.2 °3 In 2008, Judge Robert Russell
established the second Veteran Court, now the model program, in Buffalo, New
York.2°4 The New York court system pioneered the treatment model for Veteran
Specialty Courts. Since then, many state legislatures have created Veteran
Specialty Courts incorporating the New York treatment model.2 °5
Although Veteran Specialty Courts have gained support from state legislation,
these courts have not been as fortunate on the federal level. During the I 10 th
Congressional session, Senator John Kerry and Senator Lisa Murkowski
introduced the SERV Act (Services Education & Rehabilitation for Veterans
Act). The act sought to create federal funding for research and support of
veteran courts through the National Drug Court Institute (NDCI). 20 7  The bill
signified federal recognition of a need to support the veterans who, due to their
PTSD and substance abuse issues, end up facing criminal charges.208 However, on
September 26, 2008, the SERV Act was referred to the House Committee on the
Judiciary where it has effectively been stalled.20 9
The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs supports the Veteran Court
movement. It initiated the Veteran Justice Outreach Initiative, a program to help
"avoid the unnecessary criminalization of mental illness and [the] extended
incarceration among veterans.,, 210 This outreach initiative seeks to help connect
the VA medical services to state court programs that assist in the treatment of
justice-involved veterans. Therefore, veterans regardless of their financial status
can participate in the treatment program. This is important because if the veteran
was sentenced to a term of probation or required to receive psychological treatment
by court order, the veteran would typically have to find the means to afford those
201. Judge Hawkins, supra note 187, at 570.
202. Id. at 565.
203. Id. at 570.
204. Judge Russell, supra note 8, at 364.
205. Id. at 566 (noting that Tulsa, Oklahoma; Orange County, California, Connecticut, Illinois,
Nevada have begun Veteran Courts).
206. SERV Act, S. 3379, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008).
207. Id.
208. Kerry, Murkowski Bill will Create Veteran Treatment Courts, JOHN KERRY.COM, July 31,
2008, available at
http://www.johnkerry.com/news/entry/kerrymurkowski bill-will create-veterantreatment-courts/
(last visited on Nov. 14, 2010).
209. GovTrack.Us, H.R. 7149: SERV Act, 1 10 t Congress (2007-2008), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 10-7149. Once a bill is assigned to a committee, the
committee can either (1) consider the bill and report favorably or unfavorably or (2) not consider the
bill, which effectively stalls the bill in the House. The bill will not move to the Senate if it stalls in the
House.
210. Veteran Justice Outreach Initiative, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., June 23, 2010,
http://wwwl.va.gov/HOMELESS/VJO/asp.
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services. The VA's contribution of their medical services is essential to a
successful Veteran Court because many veterans face the risk of homelessness
upon returning home from war. In 2008, the government stated that there were
over 200,000 homeless veterans in the United States, of which the majority were
Vietnam veterans.211 Of those 200,000 homeless veterans, approximately 2,000
individuals served in Iraq or Afghanistan. 212 The veterans' lack of financial means
to afford treatment should not create an obstacle to receiving the necessary care.
C. How the Veteran Specialty Court Works
Admission into the veteran court program is based upon veteran status,
213service combat, and the filing of non-violent misdemeanor chargers. However,
admission is not automatically based upon 'veteran status.' The prosecutor screens
each candidate and has discretion regarding which veterans to place into the court
program. 214 At the outset, the veteran-defendant must show a willingness to
undergo treatment for his PTSD. Furthermore, the veteran-defendant must enter
into a plea bargain with the prosecutor, admitting guilt to the charged offense. This
plea is based upon the willingness of the veteran-defendant to enter into treatment
for the underlying PTSD, and thus the prosecutor is willing to forgo requesting a
jail sentence. The progress of the veteran defendant is a shared responsibility
among many members of the criminal justice system, including the judge, the
prosecutor, defense counsel, a probation officer, an individual from the local VA
medical facility and a coordinator of the grant organization. This team works
together to establish the best course of treatment for the veteran-defendant, and
supports him or her in successfully completing the treatment program by
overcoming PTSD and often the associated substance abuse. 21 5 Under this model,
the veteran-defendant is surrounded by a support network of individuals who
understand his or her military background, mental health background, and the
current daily stressors. A critical element of the veteran court is the mentoring
21program. 16 Other veterans in the community volunteer to be the veteran-
defendant's mentor. The mentor helps the defendant throughout the treatment
process. Although the emphasis of this treatment model is on personal
accountability, throughout the entire process the veteran-defendant is not alone.
217
Due to various state programs only recently initiating veteran court programs,
there are currently no national statistics to comment on the success of veteran
courts. However, the statistics of the New York Veteran Court are telling. In
December of 2008, the Buffalo veteran court had 130 participants. Of those 130
211. Mike Mount, Homeless Veterans Face New Battle for Survival, CNN.coM, July 02, 2008,
available at http://articles.cnn.com/2008-07-02/us/homeless.veterans-1-homeless-veterans-vietnam-
veterans-veterans-affairs? s=PM:US.
212. Id.
213. See Judge Russell, supra note 8 at 367-68.
214. Id. at 367-68.
215. Id. at 365.
216. Judge Hawkins, supra note 187, at 569; Judge Russell, supra note 10, at 369-70.
217. Judge Russell, supra note 8, at 369.
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participants, in 2009 the Buffalo court reported that there were fourteen graduates
and no recidivists.
2 18
D. Arguments Supporting Veteran Courts
The prevalence of state veteran courts signifies the general acceptance of
allowing veterans to be subject to different prosecutorial methods than non-
veterans. There are four prevalent reasons why many states governments support
the veteran court movement: a societal sense of duty to provide support in return
for their service; a need to reconcile for the government's insufficient reaction to
the return of Vietnam veterans; as a means to provide public safety; and a cost-
benefit analysis.
The most common reason for supporting veteran courts is recognition that it is
society's duty to care for returning veterans because they fought to maintain our
liberties. 2 19 The government, through military training and deploying troops into
combat, forever morphs civilians into soldiers. On the other end, when the war is
completed the government's attempts, albeit unsuccessfully, to aid in the veterans'
reintegration into society. The government then punishes the veteran when he or
she does not behave as expected in a civil society. Veterans voluntarily choose to
sacrifice their lives to fight for the freedom of all Americans, and therefore they
should be entitled to differential treatment upon return for their actions that stem
from their experiences of war.
Incorporated into this entitlement-responsibility argument is the argument that
our Nation failed to provide support for past veterans, and therefore it is now time
to start doing the appropriate, just action by providing the appropriate treatment. 220
Research results exemplify that societal support of veterans upon homecoming is
an influential element affecting the success of PTSD treatment.221 For example, the
NVVRS study found that "social support plays a critical role in reducing PTSD
symptoms and increasing one's level of functioning.
'
"
222
Thirdly, many believe that veteran courts work to enhance public safety. If
we do not provide treatment for individuals suffering from PTSD and substance
abuse, then there will be high levels of veteran recidivists. On the other hand, if we
provide treatment and rehabilitate these individuals, then there would be more
productive members of society. 23 A similar argument was put forth to support the
drug court movement. It is based upon recognition that the traditional prosecution
model is not an effective way to create productive members of society because it
does nothing to treat the underlying problems causinginvolvement in the criminal
218. Judge Hawkins, supra note 187, at 566.
219. Id at 569.
220. See id. at 569.
221. Koenen et al., supra note 35, at 980, 984-85.
222. Price, supra note 49; see also Koenen et al., supra note 35, at 984 (stating that "[t]hose that
were involved in community in 1984 were also more likely to show remission in PTSD than were those
with less community involvement").
223. One in Five, supra note 24.
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justice system, thereby resulting in recidivism.
Lastly, veteran courts find support based upon a cost-benefit analysis
argument. In short, it is cheaper for society to treat and rehabilitate veteran-
defendants than to continuously pay for their repeated incarceration in the criminal
justice system or to pay for the costs associated with supporting an unproductive
member of society.224 Society, through taxes, bears the cost of caring for veterans
of war through treatment of physical and psychological wounds and by providing
social services to the veterans whom do not seek care and suffer from prolonged
PTSD symptoms, such as homelessness, suicides, drug abuse, or incarceration.225
The RAND study concluded that it is more expensive for society to deal with an
unproductive member of society than provide adequate treatment services to
veterans in need.226 The RAND study estimated that in the current state of
227
available mental health care, within two years following deployment, PTSD and
depression among veterans would cost the United States approximately 6.2 billion
dollars.228 This dollar amount includes both direct medical costs and indirect costs,
such as the cost for the loss of productivity among veterans in society and the costs
229
of suicide. Veteran courts provide an alternative means of treatment for veterans,
beyond the VA, that do not necessarily require more taxpayer funds for support.
The VA Justice Outreach Initiative aids in the state court veteran programs by
providing the required resources for treatment. Therefore, the establishment and
proliferation of the veteran courts is not creating an additional cost for society to
bear. In fact, by offering treatment to get to the source of the criminal behavior
recidivism will decline and eventually result in fewer veterans interacting with the
criminal justice system.
Since veteran courts are nascent, statistics regarding the amount of money
saved by incarcerating fewer veterans is unavailable. However, statistics of drug
court savings are telling: a study of the New York drug courts found that by
allowing 18,000 individuals into the drug court program, instead of incarceration,
the state saved approximately $254 million dollars in incarceration costs.23°The
treatment provided by the veteran courts and the reduction in incarcerating
veterans will save both the state and federal government money. Due to different
political views regarding the propriety of war and the use of military forces, many
can disagree with the responsibility/entitlement arguments. However, regardless of
differing ideological views, the public safety and cost-benefit arguments benefit
society as a whole.
E. Opposition to Veterans Courts
224. One in Five, supra note 24; RAND supra note 2, at 170-71, 438-40.
225. RAND supra note 2, at 170-71, 438-40.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 171.
229 Id. at 170-71.
230. Judge Russell, supra note 8, at 371.
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The establishment of veteran courts has not gone without opposition. Some
disagree with allowing the criminal justice system to treat veterans differently than
other criminal defendants. 231 Inherent in this opposition is the belief that the
government, through creation of specialty courts, is beginning to create a class-
based criminal justice system. Civil liberties groups, such as the ACLU, object to
the creation of veteran courts because admission into the program requires a
veteran status.232 The groups view the veteran court as creating advantages for
veterans that non-veterans cannot utilize. Therefore, it creates a disadvantage to
those who are not veterans but still suffer from PTSD, and who would benefit from
treatment over incarceration. About eight percent of the American population
suffers from PTSD with lifetime prevalence.233 The government is arguably
creating a first-class and second-class criminal-justice system, based upon
determining who is more deserving of treatment: non-veterans who suffer from
PTSD or veterans who suffer from PTSD. However, the counterargument is that
individuals who are not veterans, but who suffer from mental illnesses or PTSD,
along with substance abuse, can take advantage of the drug-court programs that
almost all judicial jurisdictions within states now maintain.
Others believe that veteran courts are unnecessary due to the already present
leniency towards veterans in the court process. For example, judges have the
discretion totake into account the veterans military disabilities, including PTSD,
during sentencing.23 4 However, the scope of the courts' relief, when considering a
veteran-defendants PTSD, is not far-reaching.As discussed in Part 2, mental health
defenses based upon PTSD are typically unsuccessful. Furthermore, PTSD as a
consideration of mitigation usually only minimizes the sentence and the veteran-
defendant still faces incarceration. If incarcerated, these veteran-defendants will
not receive the necessary psychological treatment.
Lastly, some argue that the legislative creation of special prosecution
alternativesthat follow the therapeutic jurisprudence ideology, such as drug courts
or veteran courts, is solely a way for the government to displace its responsibility
upon the criminal defendants.23 5 For example, drug courts emerged due to the
increase of drug use in urban areas of America. The high rate of drug use in urban
areas is due to a lack of general social services in these communities to aid the
poor in attaining a higher economic status. 36  Instead of accounting for the
government's failure to increase the availability of resources (i.e. access to
education, available healthcare, housing, or employment opportunities), the drug
court model made the defendant take responsibility for his or her life choices and
231. Judge Hawkins, supra note 187, at 570; see Returning Veterans, supra note 35, at 14.
232. Judge Hawkins, supra note 187, at 570; Dahlia Lithwick, A Separate Peace: Why Veterans
Deserve Special Courts, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/02/10/a-separate-
peace.html.
233. Gover, supra note 15, at 565.
234. Judge Hawkins, supra note 1787, at 571.
235. Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 417, 437.
236. Id. at 432-35.
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made it the defendant's goal to overcome his or her environment on their own.2 37
This is called the 'responsiblization' strategy, where the government places the
responsibility on the individual to change their individual conduct, rather than
addressing the lack of general rights and availability of governmental social
services that affect the lifestyle of the individual.238
The same argument is applicable to veteran courts. Like the drug courts, state
judiciaries and legislators initiated veteran courts by recognizing the increase of
veterans in our criminal justice system. However, the increase of the number of
veteran defendants directly relates to their lack of treatment.239 As noted above,
the stigmatic mental health and the systematic barriers surrounding the access to
mental health care creates obstacles to receiving treatment. The Department of
Defense has recognized that the available treatment it is providing American
veterans is "insufficient., 240 The creation of veteran courts could be a political
decision on behalf of the government to displace its responsibility for failing to
provide adequate treatment for veterans' mental health issues caused by their
service onto the individual defendant-veteran.
While this argument is persuasive, it does not take into account the pressing
need to treat PTSD or the potential length of time it would take the government to
implement positive and noticeable changes in the availability and sufficiency of
the social services provided to veterans. The establishment of the veteran court,
although arguably allowing the government to pass-the-buck might be the best
option available.F. International Guidance: Are Veteran Specialty Courts the
Right Solution?
Thus far, this paper has primarily focused on the effects of PTSD on
American soldiers. Despite this emphasis, American soldiers are not alone in their
battle to overcome the psychological wounds endured from war. As mentioned
previously, the psychological wounds of war are an inherent part of the very act of
war. Therefore, soldiers from any conflict, which includes combat, will likely
battle with a variety of psychological wounds.
In the current state of international affairs, many countries are joining forces
to fight the same causes, whether it be the global war against terrorism or global
efforts to provide humanitarian aid to countries in need. The numerous countries
whose soldiers fight in combat, and as a result have PTSD, may benefit from
addressing the issue as an international community. The United States, in the
implementation and progression of Veteran Specialty Courts, could lead the
international community in providing appropriate treatment and care for its
soldiers.
How do other countries respond to the needs of returning veterans? Speaking
237. Id. at 423.
238. Id. at 425.
239. See One in Five, supra note 24.
240. Judge Russell, supra note 8, at 360.
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in generalized terms, there is not a plethora of literature relating to the prevalence
and treatment of PTSD among non-U.S. armed forces. However, from the
academic or news articles available, there are noticeable trends in the way that
non-U.S. military forces view the veterans' difficulties with PTSD.
Before discussing the trends, it is important to note that the amount of armed
forces the U.S. military utilizes in armed conflicts is, in general, exponentially
greater than most non-U.S. military forces. For example, since 2001 the United
States sent approximately 1.6 million soldiers to serve in the OEF and OIF wars.
241
Germany reports that it has sent approximately 3,400 German army troops to
Afghanistan.242 This discrepancy in size and utilization does affect the prevalence
of PTSD and therefore the amount of concern a country places upon this problem.
The first notable trend is that many non-U.S. militaries, such as Germany,
France, and Britain, turn to the United States for guidance on the method of
addressing and treating PTSD among their troops.243 The United States began
researching the psychological effects of war after the Vietnam War, and the APA
made it an official diagnosis in 1979.244 The United States is arguably ahead of
other countries in academic research, statistics, and treatment methods of PTSD.
France, for example, has not conducted any research that has produced
statistics regarding the prevalence of PTSD among its armed forces.245 Rather, it
looks to the United States statistics when deciding to implement mental health
programs.246 However, France's procedure for dealing with veterans returning
from combat is somewhat different from that used in the United States. France
passed a new rule in June of 2010 that requires all returning soldiers to spend three
days with Cispata, the French Army's psychological intervention unit, prior to
returning to their civilian lifestyles. 247 The justification for the three-day time-span
is to provide the armed forces with a buffer period between combat and returning
home to assist in addressing possible mental health issues.
Unlike France, Germany has conducted studies of its solider population and
determined that the number of German soldiers with PTSD has tripled in the last
two years.248  Due to this concerning rise, Germany is in the initial process of
241. RAND, supra note 2, at 3.
242. Marcus Klockner, Germany Army PTSD Cases on Rise, STARS AND STRIPES, March 2009,
available at http://www.stripes.com/news/german-army-ptsd-cases-on-rise-1.89317.
243. See e.g., id; Perrine Mouterde, Soldiers Confront the Psychological Cost of War,
FRANCE24.COM, Nov. 2010, available at http://www.france24.com/en/20101125-french-soldiers-
confront-psychological-issues-battlefield-afghanistan-trauma-military; Aaron Levin, Combat Reactions
Oceans Apart for British, U.S. Soldiers, 45 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS No. 24, Dec. 2010, available at
http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/content/45/24/6.1 .full.
244. RAND, supra note 2, at 5.
245. Perrine Mouterde, Soldiers Confront the Psychological Cost of War, FRANCE24.COM, Nov.
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researching the causes and effects of PTSD among its soldiers. Germany turned to
the United States for guidance on the methods of treatment and the administration
of financial aid to support the health care of its suffering soldiers.249 A member of
the German parliament expressed how impressed he was with the treatment and the
amount of financial aid the United States provides for its returning soldiers.
250
While research regarding the proper treatment of PTSD is underway, the German
military utilizes a "Warrior Adventure Quest" program that assists soldiers'
transition back into civilian life after serving in war.251 This program allows
soldiers to participate in adventure activities such as rock climbing, whitewater
rafting and mountain biking. These activities build mental resilience in soldiers by
introducing them to a stressful event and assisting the soldiers in overcoming the
stress through utilization of different coping strategies.2 5 2 The soldiers usually
attend the program with other soldiers whom they have served and the soldiers
participate in the program one time a month, for a few months. Beyond assisting
soldiers in coping with the stresses of war, Germany recently introduced a law that
guarantees post-service employment for soldiers who are severely wounded in
war.253 It is unclear at this stage of the development of the law whether 'severely
wounded' also includes mental inflictions.
Britain has also conducted a study that compared the psychological combat
reactions of British soldiers and American soldiers.254 British researchers utilized
the comparison to research the contributing factors of PTSD because the two
255
armed forces have many similarities. For example, both armed forces are
western armies whom fight against the same enemy, in the same environment. The
two armed forces also report the same mortality casualties.256  Despite these
similarities, the rate of PTSD among British soldiers is strikingly lower than that of
Untied States soldiers. Approximately 2% to 3% of British soldiers suffer from
PTSD while approximately 12% to 15% percent of American soldiers suffer from
the mental illness.
2 5 7
The research concluded that the differences in the prevalence of PTSD
between the two countries are attributable to the cultural traditions of the two
249. Id.
250. Id
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countries and the different types of stressors.258 For example, the United States
military uses more reservist soldiers than Britain.259 The United States deploys its
soldiers for a longer period of time than Britain.2 60  Lastly, the United States
soldiers do not have as much dwell time (time in between deployment, home stay,
and return to combat) as British soldiers. In Britain, once returning from
deployment, the soldiers stay at home twice as long as their deployment period.26 1
In America, the majority of soldiers are home for approximately one year or less
before returning to the war.262
Despite the reduced percentage of British soldiers suffering from PTSD, the
research concluded that substance abuse problems were fewer among United States
263
soldiers than among British soldiers. Approximately fifteen to twenty percent of
British active soldiers suffer from alcohol abuse problems. 264  The research
attributed this high percentage of alcohol abuse to the lack of a cultural stigma
against alcohol.265 The study also recognized that both cultures have a stigma
surrounding the use of mental health to treat psychological problems.266 Both
soldiers are reluctant to seek and utilize mental healthcare.2 67
An interesting side-note of the research is that the British researchers found an
increase in the rates of psychological problems among British soldiers when their
268 trie
service in Iraq was spontaneously extended without warning. It was determined
that surprise and unsatisfied expectations contributed to the rise in the PTSD
rate.269
The second noticeable trend is that European countries are joining forces in a
multi-national effort to address the problem of PTSD among its soldiers. Thirty-six
military associations have unified to create EUROMIL (the European Organisation
of Military Associations).2 70 The mission of EUROMIL is for European countries
to work together to promote the social and professional interests of approximately
500,000 soldiers from twenty-four different countries, which includes the
promotion of mental health. 21  EUROMIL recognizes PTSD as an occupational
sickness and therefore is working together to guarantee long-term medical
treatment of the participating countries' soldiers.272 Similar to the United States,
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See e.g., RAND supra note 3, at 23-24.
263. Levin, supra note 257.
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268. Levin, supra note 42.
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270. EUROMIL, supra note 253.
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EUROMIL believes that a soldier's physical health and psychological health are
pre-requisites for military effectiveness.
273
Lastly, the United States is not alone in its concern of the number of veterans
in its criminal justice system. Britain has reported that an alarming large number
of its veteran population is in the British criminal justice system.2 74 In its 2009
report titled Armed Forces and the Criminal Justice System, the National
Association of Probation Officers (NAPO)275 reported that at any one time, there
are approximately 8,500 British veterans in custody following a criminal
conviction.276 Furthermore, the report noted that there are approximately 12,000
British veterans under supervision of probation officers, which includes
community sentences and individuals on parole.277  The majority of the
incarcerated British veterans were convicted of violent offenses with a "direct link
to drug or alcohol misuse. ' 278  While NAPO did not provide any statistical
evidence regarding how many of the 8,500 suffered from PTSD, it did note that
"most of the soldiers who had served in either Gulf War or Afghanistan were
suffering from PTSD. 279
NAPO criticized the lack any systematic psychological support and treatment
methods available to the returning British veterans. 280  NAPO argued for an
increase of psychological support through the availability of support services both
at the time of discharge and at the initial encounter with the criminal justice
system.281 If these support services were available, and the underlying PTSD
and/or substance abuse was addressed early on, NAPO noted that custody of
282
veterans would not be necessary. NAPO argued that an increase in support
services to British veterans would be in the best interest of the public and would
reduce taxpayer money both in the short and long term.283 The unspoken British
"military covenant," the military's guarantee that the soldiers will receive fair
treatment in return for putting their lives on the line, also supports the increase of
psychological services for the veterans.
284
273. Id.
274. Harry Fletcher, Armed Forces and the Criminal Justice System: A Briefing from NAPO, the
Trade Union and Professional Association for Family Court and Probation Staff September 2009,
NAPO, Sept. 2009, available at http://www.napo.org.uk/about/veteransincjs.cfm. NAPO is a non-
governmental trade union, professional association and campaigning group. The group works to provide
policy briefs in support or opposition to various parliamentary acts.
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In response to the NAPO criticism of the available health care, a Ministry of
Defense spokesman noted "[r]obust systems are in place to treat and prevent PTSD
and other stress disorders. Counseling is available to service personnel at all times
and all troops receive pre- and post-deployment briefings to help recognise the
signs of stress disorders.',
285
However, not all members of the parliamentary share the Ministry of Defense
spokesman's view. In response to the NAPO report, the following year the
Veterans Parliamentary Group produced the Coordinated National Action Plan
(Plan) to implement a national strategy to deal address the large number of British
forces that are incarcerated or are in probation's control.28 6 The goal is to reduce
the large number of British veterans in the criminal justice system and to reduce
recidivism through providing adequate treatment. 287 The aims of this national
movement were to provide adequate psychological services at two stages: (I)
during and after military service, and (2) at the initial contact with the criminal
justice system and while incarcerated or on probation.28 8 The Plan listed specific
strategies for the criminal justice system to implement. For example, at the
veteran's initial encounter with the criminal justice system, the officials should ask
if he or she has a service record.28 9 If so, the veteran's service record should be a
part of the court record and given to all participants in his or her case.29 ° Once
identified as a veteran, the veteran should be referred to relevant treatment and
counseling agencies.291 If as a result of the veteran's charged crime, he is
sentenced to incarceration, while in incarceration the veteran should be provided
with knowledge of where to seek counseling and treatment services while
incarcerated.2 92 Furthermore, while incarcerated the veteran should be given the
293opportunity to attend monthly group meetings discussing substance abuse. To
effectively implement the above changes to the criminal justice system, the Plan
proposed funding for a "National Veteran Support Officer" for each prison and
probation office in order for the veteran to have a services liaison. 94
It is clear from researching the different responses to PTSD that the United
States is ahead of the rest of the world in its response to PTSD among its soldiers.
This is arguably attributed to the higher frequency of involvement of the United
States in armed conflict compared to other countries. Despite the media and
societal critique of the United States adequacy of treatment for its wounded troops,
285. Id.
286. NAPO et al., Veterans in the CJS: Coordinated National Action Plan, Justice Unions
Parliamentary Group, June 2010, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/
onthefrontline/2651148/Thousands-of-war-veterans-locked-in-British-prisons.html.
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the United States, through the VA and now through the judiciary, arguably offers
the best overall treatment of PTSD among the international community.
CONCLUSION
This article is a call to recognize and address the invisible. All too often
PTSD is overlooked and ignored because it is an invisible wound on the mind.
Neglecting PTSD drives our veterans to the margins of society, where they become
invisible to the community as they are incarcerated or beset by extreme poverty.
Thus, the only visible manifestations of PTSD are reports containing statistics
about the number of veterans succumbing to suicide, homelessness, and crime. It is
only by recognizing the invisible wounds of the mind that we can begin to
adequately recognize and thank our veterans.
PTSD, as a stressor of war, is as old as war itself. It is not a new
phenomenon, yet surprisingly the United States, and other countries around the
world, have yet to find a workable solution to address the health care needs of
veteran's inflicted with PTSD. This lackadaisical approach to providing treatment
for veterans returning from war with a mental infliction is no longer acceptable.
The lack of available and adequate treatment for veterans suffering from PTSD
undoubtedly contributes to the severity of the PTSD and the resulting criminal
liability. As mentioned previously, the symptoms of PTSD grow more severe the
longer one suffers without treatment. Courts and researchers recognize a valid link
between the suffering from PTSD and their related criminal behavior. These
veterans are not predisposed career-criminals, and typically do not have a criminal
record prior to service.
The United States government has attempted to provide services to the
returning soldiers, however, for the reasons stated in this article, those services
have fallen short. Furthermore, only recently has the government and society
recognized the rising numbers of veterans in the criminal justice system. Treating
the veteran's underlying PTSD upon return from combat is an imperative
prerequisite to preventing substance abuse and criminal behavior.
While the current system requires comprehensive changes, the United States
simply cannot begin to re-build and re-administer the VA. This would not address
the current treatment needs of the veterans from the OEF, OIF and Vietnam wars.
To go down this route, would be to leave another generation of veterans in the
shadows. However, the creation of Veteran Specialty Courts across the country is
an immediate response to what has been described as a social crisis. Potentially,
with the increase of drone warfare and the ongoing researching of TBI and its
affects upon the mind, the gravity of this social crisis could exponentially increase.
The Veteran Specialty Courts are workable and cost-effective solutions to the
current problem. Modeled after the drug-court system, the Veteran Specialty
Courts will address the underlying PTSD of the veteran-defendant. Theoretically,
these courts will stop the domino effect of a veteran suffering from PTSD, abusing
substances, and acting out in criminally liable ways which has produced the
current state of affairs. Veteran Specialty Courts will save the financial toll of
society in incarceration costs. But most importantly, Veteran Specialty Courts will
VOL. 39:4
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save the quality of a veteran's life, the same veteran who fought to save American
lives and liberties.
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